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ABSTRACT 
!
The Concept of Temporality in John Dewey’s Early Works 
Ruairidh J. Macleod 
!
It is well understood that a concept of temporality is central to Dewey’s later work, 
finding its culmination in his essay “Time and Individuality” (1938). What has not 
been either acknowledged or established is the fact that a detailed and sophisticated 
concept of temporality, one which is fully in accord with his later work, was already 
present in Dewey’s early work, particularly in his essay “The Reflex Arc Concept in 
Psychology” (1896). This thesis therefore seeks to demonstrate not only that such a 
concept of temporality exists in Dewey’s early work, but also the nuanced nature of 
that concept of temporality, particularly in its function as a central, grounding compo-
nent of the preconditions required for Dewey’s concept of experience. The nature of 
Dewey’s concept of temporality will be explicated through close analysis of Dewey’s 
texts, particularly his Reflex Arc essay, his central statements on education contained 
in Democracy and Education (1916), and the comprehensive statement of his mature 
philosophy found in Experience and Nature (1925). With the nature of Dewey’s early 
concept of temporality established, this thesis argues that it in fact constitutes a key 
contribution to a tradition of philosophy of temporality which starts with the work of 
Henri Bergson, continues with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (most saliently 
with Being and Time), and finds its full contemporary statement in Gilles Deleuze’s  
work on time, based on his concept of ‘the virtual.’ The fact that Dewey’s concept of 
temporality, as with that of Deleuze, is based on a sophisticated understanding of con-
temporary scientific findings, is also explored, with the argument made that possess-
ing such a foundation in scientific thought allows Dewey’s concept of temporality to 
become fully compatible to current research in psychology, particularly as it concerns 
educational psychology. 
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Introduction: Dewey and Deleuze; temporality and time !
“The past, like the future, is indefinite and exists only as a spectrum of possibilities.”  
— Stephen Hawking 
!
1. The aims of this inquiry 
This thesis seeks to establish the following:  
(1) That, contrary to present scholarship on the matter, a nuanced and sophisticated 
concept of temporality, and one fully in accord with that exhibited in his later work, 
can be discerned in Dewey’s early work, particularly his (1896) paper ‘The Reflex 
Arc Concept in Psychology’, and his seminal text, Democracy and Education (1916). 
This will be demonstrated with a close reading of Dewey’s Reflex Arc essay in Chap-
ter 4.7, and also by showing that the resultant concept of temporality can be read into, 
and is fully compatible with, the key concepts and underlying logic of Democracy 
and Education (Chapter 5.8). (2) In the course of analyzing Dewey’s concept of tem-
porality, we shall attempt to discern, and then demonstrate, the naturalistic founda-
tions of his philosophy, foundations which ground his concept of temporality in the 
scientific thought of Dewey’s time. Further to this, it is hoped that through examina-
tion of these naturalistic foundations, it can also be shown that Dewey’s concept of 
temporality remains compatible with relevant findings emerging from contemporary 
scientific research. (3) Furthermore, in exploring these naturalist foundations, we will 
attempt to trace, then establish, significant links and parallels between Dewey’s work 
on temporality, and the work on time and temporality produced by the philosopher 
Gilles Deleuze; and also, through Deleuze’s reading of him, Henri Bergson. (4) In 
drawing out these links and parallels, we shall attempt to show that Dewey’s early 
concept of temporality represents a sophisticated and innovative contribution to the 
 1
field of philosophy of temporality - a field which, drawing on the point of departure 
provided by Immanuel Kant’s work on the concept of time, was established in full by 
the phenomenological project of Martin Heidegger, particularly as it is found in Being 
and Time. (5) Finally, we shall attempt to demonstrate that, as a consequence of being 
based upon the aforementioned naturalistic foundations, the full scope of Dewey’s 
concept of temporality thereby represents an ongoing opportunity through which his 
work can be brought in line with current psychological research and educational prac-
tice. 
!!
2. The risks of this inquiry 
A sizeable risk attaches to a project such as this, however. In no particular order, we 
have the prospect of what might be regarded as a comparison between two philoso-
phers. Necessarily, any kind of comparison involves both an exercise in reduction – 
and for this reason alone must be regarded as philosophically unsatisfactory – as well 
as an act of judgement – which, for this reason, makes the exercise – again, in philo-
sophical terms – open to suspicion.    1
!
In fact, any attempt to avoid the dangers that attach to the nature of judgement might 
be advised to heed the following warning: 
!
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"  Even Kant was able to identify one of the central limitations of an act of judgement, a cen1 -
tral component of the operation of Reason: ‘Reason does not in fact produce any concept, but 
at most frees the concept of understanding of the inevitable limitations of a possible experi-
ence…’ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1996), 
445 (A409/B435).
    “Such is the world of representation in general. We said above that representation 
was defined by certain elements: identity with regard to concepts, opposition with re-
gard to the determination of concepts, analogy with regard to judgement, resemblance 
with regard to objects… difference becomes an object of representation always in re-
lation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a per-
ceived similitude…” (DR, 137 – 8) 
!
We shall do our best to both heed and explain this warning in the wider body of this 
thesis. For now, however, we recognize the need, when considering the relations be-
tween Dewey, Deleuze and Kant, to avoid the uncritical acceptance of the ‘rational’ 
model of judgement which has remained hegemonic in western philosophy since at 
least Aristotle’s time, and which features as one of the central facets of critique and 
critical philosophy in the work of Immanuel Kant. 
!
There is the fact, too, that the central philosophers under consideration here – Dewey 
and Deleuze – are generally held to occupy seminal positions within the history of 
separate and opposing trends comprising western philosophy, namely the so-called 
‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ traditions. While I believe that the putative ‘opposition’ 
between these two trends has been vastly overstated, it cannot be denied that the ‘con-
tinental’ tradition does appear to have a style and set of priorities quite different to 
those commonly identified as belonging to the ‘analytic’ tradition.   2
!
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"  Cf. Manuel DeLanda’s concerns in his 2004 Introduction to Intensive Science and Virtual 2
Philosophy. London: Continuum, p. 3.
That this danger is real cannot better be attested to than by the fact that a casual 
glance at the career of each philosopher will discover what appear to be mutually ex-
clusive aims, preferences, historical and philosophical resources and so forth. Thus, 
Dewey wrote his doctoral dissertation on Kant, and was, at least for a time, consider-
ably influenced by the Hegelian idealist tradition (Calore 1989, 12); whereas Deleuze 
is on record as stating that he regards Kant as an ‘enemy’  , and was particularly clear 3
on the fact that much of his philosophical output was premised on the need to over-
come the dangers and deficiencies attaching to any attempt to subscribe to the 
Hegelian worldview.    4
!
Furthermore, though Dewey cannot, for historical reasons, possibly have responded to 
the work of Deleuze, it is also clear that Deleuze, despite maintaining an interest in 
Dewey’s pragmatist colleague Charles Peirce, at no point puts on record any evidence 
of having read or engaged with Dewey’s work. Simply put, the two men carried out 
their philosophical projects in a manner that prompts the reader to either understand 
(in Dewey’s case), or else to suppose (in Deleuze’s case), that each was oblivious to 
the aims and conclusions sought out and stated by the other. Indeed, as one recent 
commentator puts it rather nicely, the work of each philosopher is divided by time, 
culture and place (Semetsky 2003, 17). 
!
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"  Cf. Cressole, Michel. 1973. Deleuze, Paris: Editions universitaires, p.110.3
"  When remarking on the genesis of Difference & Repetition, Deleuze places his work square4 -
ly in the anti-Hegelian camp: “All these signs may be attributed to a generalized anti-
Hegelianism” DR, xix. Cf. B, 44, DR, 27, 42 – 5 & 269.
But – and there was always going to be a decisive qualification to this view – the ben-
efits of an act of comparison are also quite clear. Deleuze in particular placed great 
emphasis on the creative aspect involved in an act of comparison, just so long as it is 
carried out in a critical manner. Thus, in a text we shall go on to consider in greater 
detail, below, he reformulates the idea of a straightforward comparison into the notion 
of an encounter. When speaking of the significance of an encounter, he declares: 
!
    “The encounter between two disciplines doesn't happen when one of them sets 
about reflecting on the other, but when one realizes that it must resolve for itself and 
with its own means a problem which is similar to that which is also posed in another. 
We can concede that similar problems, at diverse moments, in different occasions and 
conditions, can shake up diverse sciences, and painting, and music, and philosophy, 
and literature, and cinema. They are the same shudders in quite different terrains. 
There is no critique except comparative… because any work in a domain is itself 
auto-comparative.”   5!
Now, Deleuze was talking about the two separate disciplines of cinema and philoso-
phy, and the results that can be achieved through a critical comparison between the 
two. If, though, like me you agree that the supposedly mutually exclusive traditions of 
analytic and continental philosophy are no such thing, then it should also prove true 
that a critical comparison of the work of two philosophers from each tradition might 
yield conclusions which not only undercut such a superficial distinction, but also dis-
cover the potential for creation and innovation which comes from confronting prob-




"  Toubiana, Serge. 1998. ‘The brain is the screen: interview with Gilles Deleuze on the time-5
image’. Discourse 20.3., p. 49.
For that reason what this inquiry is intended to offer is not so much a comparison per 
se, but a reformulation, or reconstruction, perhaps, of John Dewey’s philosophical 
project by way of consideration of the problems and resources offered by Deleuze’s 
own philosophy. This will not be – and is not intended to be – a comprehensive or 
‘complete’ reformulation of Dewey’s work, however. Instead, this inquiry focuses 
primarily on one concept, temporality, as it is developed throughout Dewey’s work, 
and will consider the affinities, relations and points of overlap between Dewey’s con-
cept of temporality, and the corresponding concept of time as it is used within 
Deleuze’s work. Because of what I shall argue is the foundational role time and tem-
porality occupy in Dewey’s thought – particularly his later work – it will also be nec-
essary for us to re-examine his concept of experience, which is, itself, central to the 
pragmatist project for which Dewey is a central figure. Tracing the relations, and the 
nature of intervolvements, between the two concepts, temporality and experience, will 
provide us with the opportunity to investigate the conditions of possibility required by 
Dewey’s stated idea of experience, and thereby clarify the ontological commitments 
and assumptions that underlie the very basis of Dewey’s mature philosophy, particu-
larly as it holds within his philosophy of education. 
!
Of course, other considerations will arise as this inquiry develops – most particularly 
in relation to the nature of the relationship between both Dewey and Deleuze’s 
projects, respectively, and the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger – 
but these, too, will only be treated in so far as they are relevant to the central concept, 
namely temporality as it is found within Dewey’s work (cf. Calore 1989, 13). 
!
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Orienting the inquiry in this way allows us not only a greater capacity for detailed 
analysis of a single concept, but also a much greater freedom to pursue the ramifica-
tions or lines of thought which arise from such analysis. Accordingly, a brief appraisal 
of the prevalent interpretations of Dewey’s concept of temporality allows us to illus-
trate this point further: As we shall see in Chapter 4, there has not been a great deal of 
attention paid to Dewey’s idea of temporality, but it can be argued that much of the 
reflection on that concept has tended to divide into two modes of procedure: (1) defin-
ing Dewey’s understanding of the concepts of time and temporality, and then tracing 
the historical development of a concept of temporality over the course of Dewey’s 
career. The results of such a project tend to take form in the division of the evolution 
of the concept into distinct or separate ‘phases’ (e.g. Helm 1985); and (2) delineating 
the relations and effects the development of this concept has for Dewey’s employment 
of other concepts of significance (e.g. ‘events’ – see Richards 1972; ‘experience’ and 
‘nature’ – see Helm 1985), as well as for his wider philosophical project (e.g. Mozur 
1991).  
!
Substantive as these previous interpretations and scholarly treatments are, what they 
signally fail to offer is the chief aim of this present inquiry. Succinctly stated, this aim 
is a consideration of what is, perhaps, the most important aspect of Dewey’s concept 
of temporality: namely, its role and function as a constructivist concept, one which 
has a vital role to play in a wider appraisal of the practice of philosophy per se – es-
pecially as it is applied in a creative, inventive fashion to the nature of thought, and 
with it, the very art of living, itself. 
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Accordingly, following the example of DeLanda’s (2004) reconstruction of Deleuze’s 
project – not to mention Deleuze’s (1966/97) reconstruction of Bergson’s philosophy, 
or Dewey’s (1920) attempt to reconstruct the very endeavor of philosophy itself : if it 
should be shown that by using the entirely different resources and theoretical materi-
als offered by each author we are enabled to reach the same conclusions, then the 
force of those very conclusions, though attained according to differing lines of 
thought and inquiry, must be considerably enhanced. Not only that, but should it oc-
cur that Dewey’s own conclusions are seemingly validated – indeed, vindicated, per-
haps – by agreement with Deleuze – despite the latter having used much more con-
temporary philosophical and scientific resources to do so – then we might also be en-
titled to suppose that Dewey’s philosophical project, particularly as it proceeds from 
his concepts of temporality and experience, remains relevant to the concerns and chal-
lenges of the present-day. Indeed, if the latter point were granted, we might go on to 
suggest that Dewey’s work may continue to yield the philosophical and pragmatic re-
sources required to successfully meet those very same challenges. And if this should 
be accepted, then it might also be agreed that there is no field of endeavor more in 
need of such resources than the field of education as it is currently practiced in the 
west. 
!
If it should be objected that this project amounts to a treatment of Dewey’s philoso-
phy according to externally imposed aims, and in relation to an alien and quite differ-
ent philosophy, then it ought to be pointed out that Dewey was admirably clear about 
the potential that might be realized by such an encounter. Indeed, when speaking of 
 8
potential per se, a clearer, more succinct statement of one of the signal purposes of 
this inquiry cannot be imagined than Dewey’s own contention that: 
!
    “If we accept the intrinsic connection of time with individuality, [developments] 
are not the mere redistributions of what existed before… potentiality is a category of 
existence, for development cannot occur unless an individual has powers or capacities 
that are not actualized at a given time. But it also means that these powers are not un-
folded from within, but are called out through interaction with other things.” (TI, 236-
7). 
  
As with Dewey, so with us. If we are to take seriously his idea that “potentialities 
must be thought of in terms of consequences of interactions with other things,” then 
the potential proffered by Dewey’s philosophy can only truly be discerned and real-
ized through its encounter with the thought of another. “Hence”, then, the real poten-
tiality of his work on temporality  “cannot be known till after… [these] interactions 









Chapter 1: Kant and Experience !
1.1. Introduction 
Kant’s views on time (and space) are not difficult to locate in writing. Indeed, they 
receive a detailed statement throughout several sections the Critique of Pure Reason. 
The fact that individual sections are devoted to them in the opening stages of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic (Sections II and I for ‘time’ and ‘space,’ respectively) attests 
to their crucial role, not just for Kant’s task of ‘critical philosophy’, but especially 
with regard to his stated aim of uncovering the conditions which must be presupposed 
by the nature of human experience. What is more difficult to locate is any large de-
gree of consensus as to how they might be characterized and explicated.   This is in 6
part because, in writing on the nature of time (and space), Kant was deliberately en-
tering into a highly complex and political argument between many of Europe’s most 
prominent thinkers – chief among them Newton (holding an‘ absolutist’ conception of 
time) and Leibniz (defending the ‘relationalist’ conception)   – as to how exactly time 7
and space should be defined, both in ontological terms, and in terms of their status 
within the emerging science of the early modern period.   It is also, no doubt, because, 8
as we shall see (below), the emerging understanding of time (and temporality) had 
become beset by conceptual contradictions, divisions, and both logical and definition-
al ‘dead ends’. 
 10
"  Janiak, Andrew. 2012. "Kant's Views on Space and Time", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 6
Philosophy (Winter Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2012/entries/kant-spacetime/>.
"  Cf. Kant’s mention of these alternate viewpoints at A23/B37-8, and A39-40/B56-7.7
"  See ibid., for a more detailed discussion. Cf. also Patricia Kitcher’s remarks in the ‘Intro8 -
duction’, Kant 1996, page xxv onwards.
!
Fortunately, however, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to determine any kind 
of scholarly consensus on Kant’s views on space and time. What is essential to our 
task in these sections is to lay out his arguments for the central function time plays in 
relation the conditions of possible experience. In a sense, this section attempts to ex-
plicate why and how time extends beyond, or is presupposed by, experience in the 
broadest sense of the term. 
!
Part I: Kant’s concept of time !
1.2. The Transcendental Logic: Possible experience 
1.2.1. Groundwork: The Metaphysical Exposition 
Although Kant wrote about time throughout his career  , we shall confine our analysis 9
to the full, mature and most influential statement of his philosophical views on the 
matter: namely, the text of the Critique of Pure Reason. Within that work, the concept 
of time is repeatedly shown – or at least stated – to play a role which is central to the 
very conditions required by our common sense of ‘experience’, or ‘undergoing an ex-
perience’. Thus, even before explicating a full case for the nature and function of such 
fundamental transcendental elements as ‘the categories’, or ‘pure concepts’ – without 
which Kant’s very notions of knowledge and cognition could not work – in the Tran-
scendental Logic, Kant uses Part I of the Critique to lay out the foundational, or a 
priori, elements of perception which are themselves required for knowledge or cogni-
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"  For example, this statement, from his Inaugural Dissertation (1770), which signals his de9 -
parture from the Leibnizian concept of time, and foreshadows his views as eventually stated 
in the CPR: “Although time, posited in itself and absolutely, is an imaginary entity, it is none-
theless a true concept and a condition of intuitive representation, extending to infinity in all 
possible objects of the senses, insofar as it concerns the immutable law of the sensible as 
such” (Inaugural Dissertation, §14,6).
tion to become possible.   Chief among these elements are time and space, only the 10
former of which will be considered here. 
!
Within Section II of the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant attempts to lay out a meta-
physical exposition of the concept of time. The exposition is supported by five propo-
sitions (A30-2), each of which apparently operates as an argument to support the posi-
tion that time is presupposed by human experience – or, stated in his own terms, that 
time is (1) an a priori element that (2) underlies all intuitions.   If this is established, 11
Kant can seemingly move on to his more famous statement on the nature of 
time: ‘[that] Time is not something that is self-subsistent or that attaches to things as 
an objective determination, and that hence would remain if one abstracted from all 
subjective conditions of our intuition of it’ (A33). Instead, time is determined in Kant-
ian terms as ‘a pure form of sensible intuition’ (A32). 
!
The logic of each of the five parts of the metaphysical exposition have been exten-
sively questioned, and in several instances demonstrated not to be able to support the 
conclusion Kant hopes – viz, that time is the formal a priori condition of all appear-
ances generally (A34).   Our concern at this stage is not to criticize Kant’s logic, but 12
to understand his argument and his stated conclusion, as these will enable a fuller ap-
preciation of the role time plays in the argument of the ‘metaphysical’ and ‘transcen-
 12
"  Following Kitcher 1996, ‘Introduction.’ 10
"  Following Allison 1983, p. 82. He goes on to explore how arguments 1-3 support the ‘a 11
priori thesis’; and arguments 4-5 support the ‘intuition thesis.’
"  E.g. Allison (1983), pp. 86-7.12
dental’ deductions of the Transcendental Logic. Accordingly, it will suffice, below, to 
note the structure of his argument, and how it is designed to lead to his conclusion. 
!
The first proposition establishes ‘a priority’ by denying that time can be an empirical 
concept ‘abstracted’ from any experience on the grounds that ‘simultaneity’ and ‘suc-
cession’ would not then be a feature of perception (A30). Presumably this is because 
for any such objects to be either ‘simultaneous’ or successive’ is to presuppose that 
they have already been differentiated within time.   The second proposition establish13 -
es a priority by stating that as regards ‘appearances in general, we cannot annul time 
itself, though we can quite readily remove appearances from time’ (A31). Again, this 
seems to show that objects can only be individuated if time is a prior foundation; or, 
put another way, this means that time thus appears to act as a ‘universal’ condition 
which is required if appearances are to be represented. The third proposition is logi-
cally related to the second, going on to claim that, it is only on the grounds of such a 
universal or a priori proposition that we can establish any of the ‘apodeictic’ princi-
ples, or axioms of time which are commonly accepted: that ‘time has only one dimen-
sion’ or that ‘different times are not simultaneous but sequential’ (A31). Such axioms 
are held to instruct us prior to experience, not through it. 
!
The final two propositions are designed to show that time is an ‘intuition’, rather than 
a ‘concept’. For this proof to work, Kant is relying on the distinction he uses through-
out his work whereby ‘intuitions’ are defined as applying to individual things; where-
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ophy, edited by E. Craig. London: Routledge. Retrieved August 27, 2014, from http://
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as ‘concepts’ apply only to general classes of things.   Thus, proposition four uses the 14
logic of this distinction to point out that, ‘different times are only parts of one and the 
same time; and the kind of presentation that can be given only through a single object 
is an intuition’. Similarly, the proposition that ‘different times cannot be simultane-
ous’ is ‘synthetic, and [therefore] cannot arise from concepts alone. Hence it is con-
tained directly in the intuition… of time’ (A32). The fifth and final proposition rea-
sons that if time is ‘infinite’, then it is also ‘unlimited’; and any such determinate 
temporal magnitude within it can be presented only via limitations placed upon a sin-
gle underlying ‘whole’ of time. Because concepts are defined as containing ‘only par-
tial presentations’, however, any such presentation of the unlimited whole cannot be 
via concepts, and must then be ‘based on direct intuition’ (A32).   
!
1.2.2. Key concept: The Transcendental Exposition and Kant’s ‘Conclusions’ 
Having traced the key points of the groundwork for Kant’s full statement of his con-
cept of time, we can now analyze at least the structure of the full concept itself. I men-
tion ‘structure’ mainly because much of Kant’s argument for the adequacy of his con-
cept of time relies heavily on the definitions of key terms he uses throughout the First 
Critique, and so an understanding of his full concept of time can only occur should 
the definitions and relations between such terms be made explicit. Essentially, we 




"  Agreeing with Guyer, ibid. Cf. Kant 1996: “An intuition refers directly to the object and is 14
singular; a concept refers to the object indirectly, by means of the characteristic that may be 
common to several things” (A320) (cf. A69 & A79).
Also, as with our previous approach, we are not here interested in the full scope of the 
issues, criticisms or problems associated with Kant’s concept of time in the wider 
scholarly literature. Instead, we are chiefly concerned to find out both how Kant’s 
concept of time constitutes a significant departure from the concept(s) of time found 
prior to Kant, as well as with what we might suggest that Kant’s concept manages 
to ‘achieve.’ That is, having achieved such a departure or new statement, what is it 
that Kant’s concept can do for us, for Deleuze, and, most particularly, for Dewey? 
!
For our purposes, we might take this statement as one of several which are adequately 
representative of Kant’s mature statement of the concept of time he holds throughout 
the Critique of Pure Reason. It is worth quoting in full: 
!
“Hence the doctrine we are asserting is that time is empirically real, i.e., objec-
tively valid in regard to all objects that might ever be given to our senses. And 
since our intuition is always sensible, no object that is not subject to the condi-
tion of time can ever be given to us in experience. On the other had, we dispute 
that time has any claim to absolute reality; i.e., we dispute any claim whereby 
time would, quite without taking into account the form of our sensible intuition, 
attach to things absolutely, as a condition or property. Nor indeed can such 
properties, properties belonging to things in themselves, ever be given to us 
through the senses. In this, then, consists the transcendental ideality of time. 
According to this view, if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible 
intuition, then time is nothing, and cannot be included among objects in them-
selves (apart from their relation to our intuition) either as subsisting [as such an 
object] or as inhering [in one].” (A36/B52-3) !
The most obvious need we have if we are to understand the full import of this state-
ment is some kind of workable definition of its key terms, such 
as ‘intuition’ and ‘(the) senses’, as well as what Kant might mean by such statements 
as ‘empirically real’ and ‘transcendentally ideal’. Once these are established, along 
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with an explication of Kant’s full concept of time, we will then be enabled (in the next 
section) to complete our investigation of what Kant regards as the conditions neces-
sary for experience to be possible, and thereby begin to understand what Kant means 
when he makes the signal statement ‘no object that is not subject to the condition of 
time can ever be given us in experience’. 
!
With regard to intuition: what should be noted is that, so far as the First Critique is 
concerned, Kant defines it in at least two differing ways.   In the Transcendental Aes15 -
thetic, Kant states that “In whatever way and by whatever means a cognition may re-
fer to objects, still intuition is that by which a cognition refers to objects directly, and 
at which all thought aims as a means” (A19/B34). Later, in the Transcendental Logic, 
Kant makes a further statement on intuition - this time within the context of 
defining ‘perception’ - that “an intuition refers directly to the object and is 
singular” (A320/B377). In this way, Kant emphasizes as key to the concept that intu-
ition is both ‘immediate’ or ‘direct’ - which is to say, it is non-conceptual - and ‘sin-
gular’, with regard to representation (or, following Kant ‘the presentation’) of objects. 
That is to say that firstly, intuition is capable of presenting a singular object to mind; 
and, moreover, that intuition is a key ‘enabler’ of, or fundamental aspect within, any 
cognition of an object.   16
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!
Furthermore, as is customary with Kant’s procedure within the First Critique, intu-
ition becomes a concept which bears an internal division, and one closely related to 
the fundamental division between the a priori and a posteriori which Kant places at 
the heart of his transcendental idealism. That is, intuition per se is held by Kant to ex-
hibit two aspects: the first is that in which we are directly affected by an object via 
sensation, which is called empirical intuition (A20/B34). These, because they are only 
able to occur subsequent to an encounter with an object, are necessarily given to us 
solely a posteriori. Empirical intuitions, when given in an appearance, are similarly 
divided between the a posteriori and a priori aspects. They comprise, at the a posteri-
ori pole, of an undetermined object, with the aspect of that appearance which corre-
sponds to sensation being termed ‘matter’; and also, at the a priori pole, a ‘manifold’, 
which exhibits certain ordering relations comprising the ‘form’ of the appearance 
(ibid.). Those presentations referring solely to the ordering relations of the mind - that 
is, the a priori aspect - or those aspects of the form of the appearance alone, are what 
Kant terms pure presentations, on account of having nothing within them that belongs 
to sensation, or empirical intuition. Being of an a priori nature, the pure form of the 
presentation must lie already within the mind if the empirical content is to be present-
ed according to the manifold, something which Kant takes to secure the contention 
that accordingly the form of all appearance must be within the mind a priori (A20/
B34). The pure, a priori form of sensibility is also termed by Kant pure intuition, and 
is used by him to refer to the manner in which the mind holds the capacity to intuit 
objects according to the ordering relations and principles of time and space (A22). 
!
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At this point, further remarks on the structure in which time is given a central role are 
needed. For evidence of a further distinction, or division of function, regarded as cen-
tral to Kant’s transcendental idealist project is here required to be brought in. Earlier, 
in the Introduction to the First Critique, Kant had declared: 
!
“Human cognition has two stems, viz., sensibility and understanding, which 
perhaps spring from a common root, though one unknown to us. Through sen-
sibility objects are given to us; through understanding they are thought.” (A15/
B29) 
!
Aside from underlining the heterogenous nature of sensibility and understanding, it 
might be granted that the wording of this statement is designed to emphasize the pas-
sive nature of sensibility, through which objects are ‘given’ to us  ; and the active na17 -
ture of the understanding, the operation of which affords us the capacity to synthesize 
the various elements required by cognition such that an object becomes the subject of 
thought (this will be explored further in the next section, dealing with the two Deduc-
tions). 
!
The nature of this distinction and division appears to hold when we consider that, be-
yond our initial definition of intuition, we have seen Kant declare that ‘all intuition is 
sensible’ (A36/B52). The terms sensible, sensibility, and sensation are related to this 
central notion: the subject’s capacity to be affected. This much becomes clear when 
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Kant declares right at the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic that ‘The capaci-
ty (a receptivity) to acquire presentations as a result of the way in which we are af-
fected by objects is called sensibility’ (A19/B33. Emphasis in the original).   Accord18 -
ingly - and still stated in a way which underlines the passive nature the subject of in-
tuition - we are then told ‘the effect of an object on our capacity for presentation, in-
sofar as we are affected by an object, is sensation’ (A19-20/B34).    19
!
This distinction is then further replicated in the contrast Kant draws between what we 
have come to know as the empirical reality of time, and that which also renders 
it transcendentally ideal. We saw, above, that the objects of experience are presented 
to, or affect us initially - that is, in their empirical form - via sensibility, specifically in 
the form of an undetermined object, which, as an appearance relating to sensation, we 
term matter. What is crucial here is that the object whose appearance we experience 
via sensation as matter, is not in itself what we intuit it as being (A42).  
!
Furthermore, the form of the appearance, experienced by us as a manifold which is 
ordered according to the a priori relations and principles of the mind, is similarly in-
capable of presenting to us any aspect of the object as it is in itself. The ordering rela-
tions of the mind do not, Kant tells us, ‘have the character they appear to have’ (A42). 
By this I take Kant to mean that, although the a priori ordering relations of the mind 
are experienced by us as a necessary aspect of any intuition - and as necessary, enable 
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the capacity for inter-subjective or objective agreement about appearances - these or-
dering relations have no such necessity, and, indeed, no direct relation, to objects as 
they are in themselves. For this reason, the form of the manifold of an object of expe-
rience is also, regardless of any idea of objectivity or necessity it may provide, 
still ‘merely’ an appearance. 
!
 It is at this point that we are finally able to discern something of the transcendent 
ideality of time. Because appearances hold no direct relation to the object in itself, 
and so yield nothing that can be predicated of objects in themselves, Kant holds that 
they are thus found only within an intuition. That is to say, appearances cannot exist 
in themselves, and so must exist only in us (the perceiving/intuiting subject) (A42). It 
follows from this that the way in which they structure our intuition is a central feature 
of the way in which the subject perceives the world, and is one which is indicative of 
the conditions which must obtain in the human mind prior to any experience: that is, 
they are fully indicative of the a priori elements of human intuition or perception. 
!
But appearances themselves cannot complete the conditions of perception, as they 
often exist simply as the ‘content’ of a perception. In order that they can be discerned 
as singular objects, they already exist against a preceding backdrop of space in which 
they are placed; and in an order of time, wherein we experience in seemingly sequen-
tial fashion the different aspects of a manifold of appearance, and the differing 
thoughts we have in relation to both objects and our experience. It is in this way that 
time and space, as universal conditions of the possibility of appearances, come to be 
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called by Kant the ‘pure forms’ of our human sensibility (A42), with space the pure 
form of outer sense (A34/B50), and time the pure form of inner sense (A33/B49).  
!
Preceding appearances in this way, and operating a formal, determinative structure of 
perception, time is not simply an a priori element of intuition, or the ground for em-
pirical intuition: as the pure form of inner sense, the formal condition for the manner 
in which we perceive, intuit, think or judge, time operates as the formal condition 
for all presentations to the mind. It is the formal condition of all inner intuition, and 
all items of inner intuition are thus subject to the a priori determination of time (A34). 
Being thus prior to all experience - a priori - and operating as a formal condition of 
intuition, time is a necessary and universal condition of experience: as such, it is tran-
scendent. Similarly, being a feature of the human mind, or that through which the 
mind structures the intra-subjective, spatio-temporally determined objective reality 
about which we share knowledge, time exists prior to and separate from reality. It is 
for this reason that it is ideal, rather than real.  
!
1.2.3 A final note about time 
Now that we have established the structural framework in which time plays a central 
role, in preparation for our later analysis we must note this further remark which Kant 
makes in the Transcendental Logic: 
!
    “The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but is the 
merely formal condition of an object (as appearance) (i.e., it is an ens imaginarium) - 
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as pure space and pure time. These are indeed something, viz., as forms for intuiting, 
but are not themselves objects which are intuited.” (A291/B347) 
!
 With this a further aspect of time’s role as a structural foundation, or substratum, of 
experience is both revealed and emphasized. As the formal condition of an object, 
pure time operates as the ground and prior possibility of any thing which appears to us 
- including the thoughts of inner sense - as well as any empirical intuition which af-
fects us. In this way, time-as-pure-intuition operates as a unifying function, intervolv-
ing and relating every apprehension within one time, and assigning to every appre-
hension a relation of (at least) temporal sequence. That is, any and every possible ap-
prehension is given a ‘place in one time’.   20
!
The significance of this cannot be overstated. Within Kant’s transcendental frame-
work, time not only plays a fundamental role in making experience possible; it is, it-
self, the central structure, or substratum, through which experience is not merely 
made possible, but also ordered and related to every other aspect of human intuition. 
It thus becomes that which is presupposed by cognition, and the objects of cognition, 
and also that which structures the objects of intuition and cognition in the way that is 
peculiar to human sensibility. In this sense, time is not merely transcendental; it is a 
fundamental factor in the very ontology of human experience. 
!
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As such, time is, for Kant, one of the structures which make intra-subjective objectivi-
ty possible. As the presupposed ground upon which experience is made possible, and 
as the transcendental structure which all human experience shares in common, time’s 
unifying capacity is one of the features of transcendental idealism which allows us to 
speak meaningfully of objects and appearances, even if ultimately the thing-in-itself 
which lies behind appearances cannot be known to us. The appearances themselves, 
and the properties of them which can be discerned, being transcendentally structured, 
do not derive from any empirical or sensory ground, but from the way in which our 
minds interpret the objects of intuition. This mind-dependent structure is universal to 
human experience, and so, in being a priori, yields the capacity for  us to identify the 
necessary features, laws, rules and repeated patterns of the perceived world, and the 
occurrences which comprise our experience of it. 
!
It is, then, to the rule-based and formal structures of human thought - the categories, 
and their role in cognition - that we must now turn if we are to complete our inquiry 
into the conditions required by Kant for experience to become possible. 
!
Part II. Kant’s Concept of Experience !
1.3. The 'Metaphysical' and 'Transcendental' Deductions 
In what follows, I will first attempt a sympathetic explication of a notoriously tricky 
part of Kant’s First Critique, as we attempt to gain some understanding of (1) what it 
is that Kant’s philosophy attempts to achieve in the name of experience; and (2) why 
it has proven so influential, even to hostile commentators such as Dewey and 
Deleuze. In accordance with these aims, where necessary, I shall employ interpreta-
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tions put forward by critics who attempt to secure Kant’s argument on viable grounds 
- that is, widely accepted, ‘orthodox’ interpretations - most notably those put forward 
by Henry Allison (1983). In the next section, we shall go on to consider the logical 
grounds of Kant’s argument in a more critical fashion. 
!
In his consideration of the nature of both human experience and knowledge within 
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant was led to postulate the existence of ‘pure concepts 
of the understanding’  , or Categories. These were held to be of an a priori nature: 21
that is, they are used in a manner wholly independent of all experience. Kant assigned 
such categories a fundamental role within cognition, asserting that 'nothing is possible 
as object of experience unless these concepts are presupposed' (B126). In this way, the 
categories were stipulated to possess (at least) objective validity  , in that they exist as 22
the conditions necessary for the cognition of an object. There is a case for saying that, 
further to the latter assertion, Kant was also concerned to demonstrate the objective 
reality   of the categories, this being because they are necessary for the cognition of 23
an object of experience (an actual object existing in a spatio-temporal reality). As a 
consequence of the manifest importance of the categories for human cognition, Kant 
deemed it necessary to provide a deduction of the function of the categories. The at-
tempt to provide such a deduction was divided: in the so-called Metaphysical Deduc-
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tion, or Guide, Kant sought to demonstrate the existence of the categories in their ca-
pacity to provide a priori rules for the thought of an object; in the Transcendental De-
duction, he endeavored to establish proof of the necessity of the categories for both 
sensible, and intellectual, experience. Both arguments were designed to comprise of a 
complete and sufficient deduction of the categories.  
!
For the purposes of this dissertation, I shall confine my analysis to the parts funda-
mental to the proof of each deduction before discussing whether or not Kant can be 
said to have achieved his stated aim. 
!
The a priori nature of the categories is first suggested through consideration of the 
possible cases wherein synthetic presentation and its objects can concur. It becomes 
apparent that if – as is the case in the first possibility – the object makes possible the 
presentation, then the concurrence is of an empirical nature. If this should obtain for 
human cognition in its entirety, then we should be incapable, contra any skeptical ar-
gument, of asserting the validity of such apparent laws as cause and effect; indeed, we 
should have to render any apparent regularity amongst appearances at least the prod-
uct of chance, at worst a mere chimera. Rules derived from experience can enjoy only 
comparative universality: it is impossible that they should hold necessarily. Yet there 
is an alternative theory for the concurrence of object and presentation: it could obtain 
that the presentation should be ‘a priori determinative in regard to the object if cog-
nizing something as an object is possible only through it’ (B125). It is the latter ex-
planation that Kant seeks to endorse, and which lies at the center of the critical project 
underlying his transcendental idealist philosophy. 
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Kant had detailed earlier in the Critique the components necessary for successful 
cognition. The initial element required is a ‘manifold’ of pure intuition, which must 
then be subject to a ‘pure synthesis’ performed by the imagination; the final element 
consists of unity, engendered through the subsumption of the synthesis under a con-
cept resting in the understanding (A79). The unification is achieved by a concept as a 
consequence of its analytical nature, a nature that enables a concept to unite under 
one representation a series of features characteristic of a diversity of objects (cf. Cf. 
Allison 1983, 125.). Such unificatory powers cause concepts to exist as a fundamental 
part of that which is the function of unity among our presentations: namely, judg-
ments (A69).  
!
Kant goes on to assert that in addition to providing unity to presentations within a 
judgment, concepts also unify the mere synthesis of presentations within intuitions. 
Through the same analytic unity which unifies within judgments, concepts are able to 
bring about a ‘synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition’ (B105). That is, concepts 
impose a determinative order on the manifold of intuition, creating an object 
(objekt)  , or what might be broadly defined as ‘a subject for judgment’. In this way, 24
concepts exist as rule-providers for the determination of an object, there arising ‘as 
many pure concepts of understanding applying a priori to objects of intuition as such, 
as ... there were logical functions involved in all possible judgments’ (B105). Con-
cepts are thus essential parts of Kant's attempt to illustrate a theory of cognition in 
 26
"  Consult Allison (1983) p. 135 for a clarification of the two senses of object used by Kant. 24
which subjective conditions of thought could yield conditions for the possibility of all 
cognition of objects. 
!
If we accept these claims – the explicit argument of the Metaphysical Deduction –
 then Kant envisages that we must concede that he has at least provided a firm basis 
for the logical proof of the objective validity of the categories. For it is apparent that 
he has so far established that the pure concepts supply a priori the categorial rules for 
the thought of an object. But it should be remembered that at this point in the argu-
ment, Kant has succeeded only in proving the fact that the categories apply to an ob-
ject in the general sense of the word (objekt); as yet, there is no proof that the cate-
gories have reference to the spatio-temporal conditions of human experience. In order 
to assess the success of this latter proof, we must examine the second of the two De-
ductions, before providing a more detailed explication of the Kantian concept 
of time’s role as a condition of possible experience. 
!
1.3.1 The Transcendental Deduction 
The Transcendental Deduction of the Second Edition   is divided into two parts: the 25
first of these (§§15-21) is concerned to demonstrate that the categories are necessary 
to the cognition of objects of sensible intuition in general; the second part (§§24-6) 
seeks to demonstrate that the categories must be presupposed if cognition of the actual 
distinct objects of human sensibility is to be achieved.   Although there are other in26 -
terpretations of the two parts of the Transcendental Deduction, I consider this reading 
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the most favorable, not least because it is compatible with my earlier assertion that 
Kant sought to establish the objective reality of the categories as well as their objec-
tive validity. There is also the stress laid on discussions of objective validity evident 
in Sections 17 (B137), 18 (see B140), and 19 (see B142); and also – in relation to the 
second part of the Transcendental Deduction – the reference to the unity prescribed by 
the category ‘to the manifold of a given intuition as such’ (B145). Further reasons for 
this interpretation may be revealed as our examination proceeds.  
!
The most significant aspect of the first part of the Transcendental Deduction is the 
asserted link between the transcendental unity of apperception, and the representation 
of objects.   This much is shown by Kant's assertion that: “... the reference of presen27 -
tations to an object consists solely in this unity of consciousness, and hence so does 
their objective validity” (Bl37). In postulating such a link, Kant was seeking to devel-
op and consolidate the findings of the Metaphysical Deduction, in which it was 
demonstrated that the categories existed as rule-providers for the determination of an 
object; that is, Kant was concerned to illustrate fully the objective validity of the cate-
gories. But instead of a mere repetition of the argument of the Metaphysical Deduc-
tion, a new element is added: for Section 17 is concerned to establish a reciprocal re-
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In asserting that ‘all unification of presentations requires that there be unity of con-
sciousness in the synthesis of them’ (B137), Kant is illustrating the necessity of unity 
of consciousness for the representation of an object.   Such an assertion is seemingly 29
warranted on the strength of Kant's theory of apperception. Yet, given the nature of 
his claims concerning the fundamental status of the categories within human cogni-
tion, Kant must also establish the inverse of the above assertion; that is, he must also 
demonstrate that there is an object represented whenever there is unity of conscious-
ness. If we consider that apperception is only possible through the unification of di-
verse representations in the thought of the ‘I think’; and if we remember that such uni-
fication can occur only via the employment of a concept; then, according to the defin-
ition of an object given at B137, the unified representations subsumed under the 
aforementioned concept must constitute the representation of an object. It follows 
from this that the representation of an object exists as a necessary condition for the 
unity of consciousness; and in this way a reciprocal relation has been established be-
tween the presentation of objects and the unity of apperception (Allison 1983, 145-6). 
!
The purpose of such a relation only becomes manifest in the succeeding paragraph. 
There, Kant declares that: 
!
“The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all 
cognition. Not only do I myself need this condition in order to cognize an ob-
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ject, but every intuition must be subject to it in order to become an object for 
me.” (B138) 
!
In this statement the objectively valid nature of apperception is made clear, it existing 
as the fundamental ground on which representation of an object is possible. Given 
that ‘synthetic unity’ is a function of the understanding that occurs under a judgment, 
it follows that the manifold, if it is to become an object for a unified consciousness, 
must be subsumed under a category (as was established in the Metaphysical Deduc-
tion). This conclusion completes Kant’s deduction of the objective validity of the cat-
egories. 
!
1.3.2. Time as a condition of possible experience 
Despite the coherency of Kant's proof of the objective validity of the categories, how-
ever, it does not constitute a demonstration of the ability of the categories to provide 
knowledge of the actual, spatio-temporal objects of human experience. Such a 
demonstration would amount to proof of the objective reality of the categories, a task 
attempted in the final part of the Transcendental Deduction. The fundamental element 
of this proof consists of Kant's attempt to establish that empirical synthesis – termed 
the synthesis of apprehension – is governed by the categories.  
!
Kant begins this attempt by noting that any content given in space and time must be 
subject to the same method of synthesis that operates on space and time themselves 
(in their capacity as forms of intuition). Commentators suggest that Kant assumes 
such unification to be performed by the transcendental synthesis of the 
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imagination  , rather than a concept of the understanding, as ‘the unity of the a 30
priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understand-
ing’ (B161, fn. 305). Given that Kant held that the imagination is required for the suc-
cessful representation of time and space, the former conclusion appears valid. Kant 
moves from this consideration to state that, because the synthesis of apprehension is 
determined by space and time, it must therefore be subject to the transcendental syn-
thesis of the imagination. We are then told that such a synthesis is the result of the 
same method of combination as is required for an object to be presented to appercep-
tion, yet in this case applied to objects of human sensibility. Given that any combina-
tion of intuition in general, in order to become an object for apperception, must be 
subsumed under a category, this appears to license the claim that the synthesis of 
imagination – and hence the synthesis of apprehension – must conform to the cate-
gories also. Yet despite the obvious importance of this claim in his attempt to link the 
categories with objects of human sensibility, Kant provides no argument as proof. Re-
gardless of this, Kant goes on to conclude that all synthesis – including that which 
renders possible perception itself   – is subject to the categories. If such a conclusion 31
is warranted, the foregoing argument has succeeded in deducing the objective reality 
of the categories. 
!
Although Kant offers no explicit argument in support of his connection of the cate-
gories with the synthesis of imagination, commentators (e.g. Allison 1983) have been 
able to discern one implicit within his theory. For if we accept the conclusion of the 
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first part of the Transcendental Deduction, it must be the case that any synthesis en-
gendered by the imagination must be subject to the conditions of the unity of apper-
ception. If we consider even the common notion of time, unless the latter were the 
case, we should be unable to represent it as one single whole, encompassing different 
time periods; this would amount to a denial of the existence of human experience (a 
single consciousness would be unable simultaneously to unite successive, or different, 
time-states, thereby rendering impossible the possibility of coherent human experi-
ence). Because we are thus able to infer the unity of apperception from the evident 
unity of time, a connection between the categories (the conditions for the unity of ap-
perception), and the transcendental synthesis of the imagination (that which unifies 
time) has been established. In this way Kant has deduced the objective reality of the 
categories through the demonstration of their necessary role in all synthesis.   32
!
From the above we are entitled to (1) allow that Kant has at least succeeded in prov-
ing the objective validity of the categories according to his own terms; and (2) under-
stand the central role time plays in securing this key tenet of Kant’s transcendental 
idealist project. In this way he has achieved the task explicit within the Metaphysical 
Deduction and the first part of the Transcendental Deduction. Further, it is also the 
case that one of the chief arguments of the Transcendental Deduction – that concerned 
to demonstrate the necessity of the categories for empirical cognition – has been 
proven valid. But if we consider the purpose of the Transcendental Deduction as a 
whole, we find that Kant sought also to illustrate claim that the categories make expe-
 32
"  Argument made by Allison (1983), p. 162, and pp. 166-7.32
rience possible. Although a full consideration of the latter assertion moves us beyond 
the strict scope of this enquiry as to the role of time as a condition of possible experi-
ence, in the light of its existence we must modify the conclusion that a deduction of 
the objective reality of the categories has been provided. Consequently, given the suc-
cess of his argument for the necessity of the categories for empirical cognition, we 
can allow that Kant has deduced the objective reality of the categories in the weak 
sense of the term; whether or not the categories possess objective reality in the strong 
sense is a conclusion which must be deferred beyond this thesis to an examination of 

















Chapter 2: Heidegger and the emergence of temporality as a discrete concept !
2.1. A brief history of the confusion surrounding time 
The overt history of mankind’s attempt to think through the idea of time is an exercise 
in the production of confusion. Despite being, perhaps, one of the most tangible as-
pects of our immediate experience, with few notable exceptions (e.g. Bergson 1910; 
Heidegger 1962/1927; Deleuze 1966/97, 1968/97, 1985/2000), our inquiry into the 
nature and function of time has, following the Kantian example explored in Chapter 1, 
tended to focus primarily on the coherence of the conceptual apparatus used to inves-
tigate the phenomenon – often at the expense of this inquiry’s adequacy to experience. 
  Despite this privileging of coherence, however, the confusion has persisted on many 33
levels; from confusion amongst the many stated findings throughout the history of 
thought   ; to confusion, at the very inception of reflection on the matter, between the 34
observable effects (change and motion, for example) held to provide evidence of time, 
and the concept of time simpliciter (Turetzky 1998, 5; Sherover 2003, 9). That time is 
an idea we treat, even today, with an unreflective familiarity and insouciance is little 
merited by our documented understanding of the concept. 
!
2.2. The relation between time and temporality in physics and philosophy 
In order to discern the viability of my putative thesis, it will first be necessary to ad-
dress in brief form the nature of the traditional relation, and the attendant confusion, 
between the concepts of time and temporality. 
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"  One of the key objections to Kant’s philosophic method advanced by Dewey. This will be 33
explored further in Chapter 5, Section 1, below.
"  A history of documents which, finding its earliest example in Anaximander of Miletus, 34
thereby coincides exactly with the written tradition of western philosophy (Turetzky 1998, 6).
!
As shown, above (Section 1), a sense of confusion surrounds our understanding of the 
concept or idea of time. That this sense of confusion results from an obsession with 
logical coherence is nowhere more evident than in the point of division which was, 
until recently, perceived to be axiomatic to the current debate on time. This divide is 
commonly held to exist between the varying concepts of time developed within indi-
vidual scientific disciplines, and the conception(s) of time generally associated with 
the experience of it within the diurnal or ‘everyday’ (Sandbothe 2001, 1), a domain of 
inquiry and description which has been covered largely by thinkers within the disci-
plines of philosophy and psychology, and, by extension, education. Traditionally ren-
dered, the division contradistinguishes between the domains of so-called natural time 
– that is, quantitative (‘objective’) time, or that conceived at the level of material 
change – and historical time – that is, qualitatively-felt (‘subjective’) time, or that 
conceived from the perspective of the human individual (Sherover 2003, 15). The ef-
fects of this differentiation can be found most obviously perhaps in the contradictions 
that arose between both the project and content of physical and philosophical theories 
of time characteristic of the beginning years of the twentieth century (Sandboth 2001, 
2; cf. Wallace 2013, 277 & Calore 1989, 16-17). Thus we find commentators noting 
with regard to time conceived within the field of physics that its leading proponents 
(such as Einstein) were tempted to entertain the non-existence of time and history, 
whilst in the field of philosophy thinkers such as Husserl, Bergson and Heidegger 
were constructing work whose theses were premised on the fundamental importance 
of time and duration for the basis of human/Dasein’s experience (of Being) (Prigogine 
and Pahaut 1985, 26; Cited in Sandbothe 2001, 2). 
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To further complicate matters, the form of this division between natural or mathemat-
ical and historical or human time has, following both Descartes’ treatment of it, and 
Kant’s consolidation of its explanatory value (Sherover 2003, 16), also been uncriti-
cally accepted as axiomatic for many within the field of philosophy itself (Sherover 
2003, 15; Derrida 1982, 63; Wood 1989, 1-2). Even a cursory glance at the history of 
the philosophy of time identifies the widespread recurrence of this bifurcation in vary-
ing forms (Sherover 2003, 14-15), each instantiation of which derives in some manner 
from a qualitative distinction between aspects of time considered from the viewpoint 
of personal reflection (e.g. Locke 1894, 245-6; McTaggart 1908, ‘A-series’), and a 
more abstracted viewpoint which tends to focus on the bare process of time, generally 
reducing it to the systematic measurement of either change (e.g. Aristotle, Physics IV, 
chapters 10-14) or motion, or else the medium by which entities exhibit some kind of 
relation to a rational or ordering principle (e.g. Plato Timaeus; McTaggart 1908, ‘B-
series’). Indeed, of perhaps the three most influential traditions of philosophical time 
analysis within the twentieth century  , each can be shown to have instituted some 35
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"  According to Turetzky, these are the traditions which arise from (1) the analytic considera35 -
tion of McTaggart’s outline and treatment of the problem; (2) the phenomenological tradition 
arising from the work of Husserl; and (3) the distaff tradition which, focusing on Bergson’s 
work, ‘critically develops the problems of temporal synthesis and the generation of 
novelty’… (Turetzky, 1998, 117-18).
form of this division as the basis for a central set of problems to which they purport to 
provide answers (Turetzky 1998, 117-18).   36
!
What is genuinely problematic, here, is not so much the plethora of differing concep-
tions of time, but the apparently irreducible nature of the distinction between the two 
aspects of time – whether conceived in the form of natural against historical time, sta-
tic time against dynamic time (Turetzky 1998, 117), or Newton’s absolute, true math-
ematical time against relative, apparent, common time (ibid., 73). 
!
For, considered in isolation from one another, the conception of each temporal aspect, 
of whatever form, is open to a series of risks. One primary concern is that the concep-
tion of the temporal aspect may become reified, a process which, however useful for 
enabling quick comprehension of the matter, renders it inadequately informative in 
relation to experience. A failure to exhibit a demonstrable relation to the empirical and 
existential processes of actualization runs the further risk of reducing the temporal 
aspect to a mere function of theoretical soundness, wherein its explanatory value re-
lates solely to its function within the scheme of a theoretical statement, irrespective of 
whether it has any viable relation to experience.  
!
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"  Thus: “These traditions focus on different problems and relate to one another only tangen36 -
tially at certain points. Beginning with McTaggart’s problem, analytic philosophy critically 
develops the contrast between static time and temporal becoming. Beginning with Husserl, 
phenomenology critically develops problems concerning temporal appearances and their uni-
fication. Beginning with Bergson, the distaff tradition critically develops the problems of 
temporal synthesis and the generation of novelty. However, the phenomenological tradition 
acknowledges and incorporates the aspects of time studies by the analytic tradition, and the 
distaff tradition acknowledges and incorporates the aspects of time studied by the phenome-
nological tradition and thereby the analytic tradition.”
A second, related, concern is that the specific way in which an aspect of temporality is 
formulated as a concept (as ‘A-series time’, say), on the one hand; and its actual em-
ployment within theoretical statements (in McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of 
time, for example), on the other, exposes that conception of an aspect of temporality 
to a degree of rejection which is illegitimate in its scope. It is often the case with theo-
ries of time that, regardless of the discipline considered, a successful critique or refu-
tation of either the formulation, or deployment of a concept is considered sufficient 
for its unviability to be demonstrated, thereby curtailing or removing entirely its per-
ceived use-value as a tool of inquiry. The fact that, more often than not, the reasoning 
used to discredit conceptual formulations is based upon a prior and uncritical accep-
tance of the antinomies and classifications whose logic is in question leads to an un-
warranted emphasis on the preservation of theoretical consistency – usually at the ex-
pense of innovative and productive investigation of experience.  
!
The third concern relates to the recurring need for a distinction between time as it re-
lates to the physical universe, on the one hand, and to mankind, on the other.   For, 37
beyond even the work of philosophers such as Husserl, Bergson, Heidegger and 
Dewey, recent scholarship in the history of physics has highlighted several effects in 
the wake of the establishment of thermodynamics as a theoretical framework that 
have crucial ramifications for the conception of time within the sciences. According to 
Sandbothe, 
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"  A division which, as Calore notes, Dewey considers ‘untenable’ (Calore 1989, 16-17).37
    “From the attempt to operationalize complex thermodynamic systems with the 
means of physical formalization, the necessity resulted in physics to supplement the 
reversible time concept underlying classical mechanics with modified time concepts 
that imply in various ways the irreversibility of a time directed from the past into the 
future. The transition thus expressed from a Newtonian worldview, one oriented to-
wards universality and uniformity, to a science operating with plural models of the 
construction of physical objects had already been highlighted by Comte…” (Sand-
bothe 2001, 59). !
With the introduction of the thesis of the irreversibility of time within the framework 
of physics, elements of the scientific understanding of time thereby exhibit features 
much more closely related to those the of the qualitative kind on which our ‘everyday’ 
notion of time is based. Similarly, a close examination of the behavior of systems of 
complex bifurcation achieves two related consequences of note: (1) it helps to trans-
late examples of physical functioning from the purely mathematical, quantitative con-
ception of temporality. It achieves this by demonstrating that systems of complex bi-
furcations proceeding beyond ‘primary bifurcation’, when moved further from equi-
librium through interaction with the environment, “pass through zones of instability 
towards certain fluctuations.” That is to say, by passing through such unstable zones, 
complex bifurcations in effect result in an ‘historical’ evolutionary path in which 
“fluctuations ‘decide’ which working regime the system will subsequently find itself 
in” (Prigogine and Stengers, 1985. Cited in Sandbothe 2001, 58). Related to this, the 
second consequence holds: (2), the emergence of unique historical paths, punctuated 
by non-determinable moments of ‘decision’, place these systems fully within the do-
main of historical time previously regarded as both unique to reflective human sub-
jects, and antithetical to the natural concept of time traditionally reserved for process-
es of material change. 
!
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2.3. Heidegger: The emergence of temporality as a discrete concept 
Yet, despite the foregoing account of the confusion that attaches to time throughout 
history, at least as concerns the philosophical understanding of time  , the conceptual 38
means by which to clarify much of this confusion already exists. Work by, for exam-
ple, Martin Heidegger (1962/1927, 1992/1925) within the field of phenomenology has 
demonstrated the value in clarifying the relationship between the qualitative, experi-
ential dimension of time commonly denoted by the term temporality, and time consid-
ered in a more abstract conceptual manner, with its corresponding emphasis on the 
universal nature of the process in which change is remarked and measured. This latter 
approach, traditionally conceived, is the one held to be hegemonic within the sci-
ences. According to the traditional terms of this distinction, ‘temporality’ obtains 
merely as a derivative of time, and as a concept whose scope of reference is limited 
solely to the sphere of human experience. ‘Time’, correspondingly, operates as the 
foundational term, specifically as the objective and universal concept by which 
process and change are measured throughout the Universe. Heidegger reverses this 
priority thus: 
!
“Dasein is my specificity...Dasein is time, time is temporal. Dasein is not time but 
temporality. The fundamental assertion that time is temporal is therefore the most au-
thentic determination – and it is not a tautology, because the Being of temporality sig-
nifies non-identical actuality. Dasein is its past, it is its possibility in running ahead of 
this past. In this running I am authentically time, I have time. In so far as time is in 
each case mine, there are many times. 'Time itself is meaningless; time is 
temporal.” (Heidegger 1992, 20-21E.) 
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"  As opposed to what might broadly be called the traditional scientific viewpoint. As we 38
shall see, however, this traditional distinction, particularly in the wake of recent work in the 
history of physics by Prigogine and Stengers, is no longer adequate (cf. Sandbothe 2001, 58). 
Indeed, as our consideration of the work of Mike Sandbothe shall show, the current theory 
within the field of thermodynamics renders the conception of time within areas of physics 
fully compatible with the work of philosophers such as Heidegger. 
!
By referring directly to Dasein’s past, and the ‘running ahead of this past’, Heidegger 
reminds us of the tri-partite structure of time: that is, time as containing the separable 
dimensions of past, present and future. While the ‘everyday’ or ‘ordinary’ concept of 
time is premised on a series of sequential now-points – thereby privileging the dimen-
sion of the present ‘moment of presence’ over the seemingly ‘finished’ and thus ‘ab-
sent’ dimension of the past, and the not-yet real (and thus absent, ineffective) dimen-
sion of the future – ‘primordial’ or authentic time (i.e. temporality) replaces this focus 
on the way in which each of the three dimensions of time in actuality ‘reaches 
throughout’ the entire structure of Dasein. Accordingly, once it is recognized that 
temporality reaches throughout the structure of Dasein, it is but a short step for us to 
realize that each of the three dimensions of temporality, though having their own 
demonstrable quality or character, must nonetheless demonstrate a reciprocal unity 
!
It is only thus that Heidegger can claim “time constitutes the metaphysical continuity 
of Dasein.”   To understand this claim more fully, and to finally establish how it is 39
that temporality can reach throughout the structure of Dasein, requires a brief explica-
tion of Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world, as well as its related - indeed, we 
might better say ‘interrelated’, if we are to honor the structure of Heidegger’s work - 
concepts, care and concern. 
!
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"  Heidegger, M. 1984. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim 39
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 198. Cited in Rosenthal, Sandra B. 2000. Time, 
Continuity and Indeterminacy: A Pragmatic Engagement with Contemporary Perspectives. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 49.
2.4. Time and experience in Heidegger: ‘Care’ and ‘concern’ 
Before we proceed to a full analysis of being-in-the-world, it is important - especially 
in light of our concern with temporality as it features in the educational sphere - to 
first consider the significance attached to the ‘everyday’ manifestation of being-in-
the-world, namely (the comportment) ‘care’, along with its related existentiale ‘con-
cern.’ The kind of comportment Heidegger designates as care is especially important 
in view of our stated project of considering the preconditions for experience, as it is 
with the modes of care and concern in particular that we begin to understand how 
‘experience’ is structured for Dasein, and thus come to appreciate the full role tempo-
rality plays in the structure of experience. 
!
The significance of both care and concern for any understanding of being-in-the-
world is made apparent in Section 28 of Being and Time when Heidegger declares 
that: 
!
“…[W]e must turn our Interpretation back to the phenomenon of Being-in. By 
considering this more penetratingly, however, we shall not only get a new and 
surer phenomenological view of the structural totality of Being-in-the-world, 
but shall also pave the way to grasping the primordial Being of Dasein itself – 
namely, care” (BT, 169/H131). 
!
By returning attention once again to Being-in, and especially its aspect of care, Hei-
degger brings to mind his earlier summation of the importance of this compound ex-
pression: “‘Being-in’ is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, 
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which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state” (BT, 80/H54). Characterized ear-
lier in the same passage as an existentiale, what Heidegger seeks to highlight is that 
Being-in is an irreducible, necessary and structured mode through which an individual 
can be considered to realize its specific sense of the verb (to) exist. That is, without 
having an identifiable state of Being which renders us predisposed to locate the sense 
and expression of our existence in the world in which we already reside, Dasein could 
not be said to have a relationship with Being which can be distinguished from that of 
categorial entities, viz. those inanimate objects which we commonly designate a 
‘Thing’ (BT, 80-81/H54-55). It will be important, then, for our full understanding of 
the significance of Being-in-the-world to illustrate this specific sense of Being-in with 
reference to Heidegger’s exploration of the ‘everyday’ manner of Being-in-the-world, 
particularly as it relates to the further existentiale of concern. 
!
In terms of satisfying the purpose of his phenomenological inquiry, Heidegger’s 
analysis of our ‘everyday’ mode of approaching the world (comportment) can be con-
sidered paradigmatic. Premised on the distinction between Vorhanden (theoretical en-
tities) and Zuhanden (tool-like beings), Heidegger proceeds to elaborate the differ-
ences between the detached, theoretical approach to understanding the world – as 
epitomized in the Cartesian worldview upon which he considers the current Western-
scientific stance is based – and the pre-theoretical and engaged mode of everyday liv-
ing in which we find ourselves already embedded within a meaningful world of enti-
ties and relations. Characterizing Vorhanden as that mode in which objects are viewed 
as ‘present-to-hand,’ Heidegger points out that the assumption of such a mode, rather 
than the providing the foundation of analytical knowledge from which we can come 
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to ‘know’ entities in the essence of their nature, is in fact derivative of the prior mode 
of engaging entities as Zuhanden, or ‘ready-to-hand.’   This is because an entity 40
comes to exhibit sense or meaning for Dasein only when it assumes the character of 
‘equipment’ by way of being subsumed within a network of assignment or reference. 
Such a network comprises of a totality of equipment-like entities (a pen, for example, 
alongside pieces of paper, a desk, and so on) which exhibit their nature (being) cour-
tesy of being approached (via circumspection) in terms of uses structured according to 
an overarching end goal, to be achieved ‘for the sake of a possibility of Dasein’s Be-
ing’   (e.g. communication, something which can be achieved by using a pen to pro41 -
duce writing on a page of paper). Any totality’s primary sense derives from its ability 
to achieve, through assignment of a sense of ‘in-order-to’ to various related entities, 
certain projected outcomes (that ‘towards which’ we work) necessary to allow Dasein 
to bring about or maintain a desired or desirable end state (the aforementioned ‘possi-
bility’ of its Being). This end state is not necessarily one which we represent to our-
selves: in fact, the ‘equipment structure’ is not known to us when using it (BT, 98/
H69). Instead, its projection arises as an irreducible component of 
our concernful dealings with the world of beings (BT, 95-102/H67-73). 
!
It is with the mention of concern that we can begin to discern the importance of Hei-
degger’s analysis of the everyday world for our overarching understanding of experi-
ence, and the preconditions - especially those which relate to temporality - which 
make it possible. For a concernful dealing with beings implies the projection of cer-
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tain possibilities onto beings, or what we might, in another, more loaded sense, con-
sider an act of interpretation. Indeed, Heidegger is explicit about this, stating: 
!
“In contrast to… colloquial ontical significations, the expression ‘concern’ will 
be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an existentiale, and will 
designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. This term has 
been chosen not because Dasein happens to be proximally and to a large extent 
‘practical’ and economic, but because the Being of Dasein itself is to be made 
visible as care. This expression too is to be taken as an ontological structural 
concept… It has nothing to do with ‘tribulation’, ‘melancholy’, or the ‘cares of 
life’… These… are ontically possible only because Dasein, when 
understood ontologically, is care. Because Being-in-the-world belongs essen-
tially to Dasein, its Being towards the world is essentially concern.” (BT, 83-84/
H57)   !
Concern, then, has a fundamental relationship with the facticity of Dasein, or those 
facts, limitations (physical, mental, situational, biological, and so on), circumstances, 
capabilities, ideological structures and the like  , deriving from the past, which com42 -
bine to co-implicate a ‘definite way of Being [Seinsbestimmtheit]’ (BT, 82/H56) in 
relation to any particular Dasein. In so doing, concern comes to relate those features 
of Dasein which are anchored in the past to the act of projection, or that by which Da-
sein both relates itself to, and structures, its future possibilities. It is, in this way, a 
fundamentally teleological mode of orientation which pertains primarily to Dasein’s 
activities within the world, and is the modality through which an individual directs 
itself into the future by way of the tasks of discerning and realizing possibilities for 
itself as they might be expressed through projection of these possibilities onto the 
world. And yet concern is ultimately a variation of the stated primordial mode of Da-
sein’s being, namely, care: that mode in which Dasein, in expressing anything about 
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itself, performs a fundamental act of projection mediated by self-relation. It is thus 
that “no sooner has Dasein expressed anything about itself to itself, than it has already 
interpreted itself as care (cura), even though it has done so only pre-
ontologically” (BT, 27/H183). Care, and its world-oriented modulation concern, thus 
become the primary form of expression for a pre-cognitive orientation of experience 
such that it reflects the teleology peculiar to an individual Dasein. 
!
The crucial point we derive from this is the following: the teleology – the ‘in-order-
to,’ or ‘towards-which,’ and so on – according to which is conducted any ‘involve-
ment’ with the world – all these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligi-
bility (BT, 119/H86). Thus, just as we shall see with Dewey’s reformulated version of 
the Reflex Arc coordination (Chapter 4, Section 7, below), any act of understanding in 
this sense is irreducibly temporal in nature, as it must have seized upon a tacit or ex-
plicit sense of potentiality for Dasein, and allowed itself to become involved with the 
entities of its world in the light of this interpretation of potentiality. In Heidegger’s 
words: “The ‘wherein’ of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that 
for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to in-
volvements; and this ‘wherein’ is the phenomenon of the world” (ibid.). 
!
2.5. The temporal underpinnings of ‘Being-in-the-world’ 
Within the ontological investigation contained in Being and Time, the concept of Be-
ing-in-the-world is so fundamental that Heidegger was led to declare that the charac-
ter(s) of Dasein 's Being 'must be seen and understood a priori as grounded upon that 
state of Being which we have-called “Being-in-the-world’”’(BT, 78). Such a concept 
 46
sought to further the contention that the nature of Being has been obfuscated as a con-
sequence of the prevalence of the ‘scientific’ attitude - and its related treatment of 
time and temporality - towards the world and its entities; an attitude that, since its 
clearest exposition in the writings of Descartes, has found nothing but consolidation 
in its position as the paradigmatic attitude of the Western world. The notion of Being-
in-the-world represents Heidegger's attempt to avoid such confusion, through his for-
mulation of a description of the world which is at once both fundamental, and phe-
nomenological: that is, a description presupposed by any other, but one that also suc-
ceeds in identifying the nature of the world as it is apprehended by Dasein. And the 
nature of that world is, as we shall see, one which is thoroughly temporal. 
!
As noted above, our fundamental and proximal engagement with the world does not 
occur through perceptual cognition, but through a ‘kind of concern which manipulates 
things and puts them to use’ (BT, 95). This state of affairs arises because although Da-
sein is ‘thrown’ into a particular socio-historical context which partly constitutes its 
'facticity', it is different from a present-at-hand entity such as a piece of wax; instead 
of existing 'in' three-dimensional space, Dasein 'dwells alongside' a world in which it 
is ‘absorbed’, the context and surroundings of the world perpetually affecting and in-
forming that which is an ‘issue’ for Dasein: namely, its own Being (BT, 67-8). It is 
because the environment (Umwelt) affects Dasein's Being – and the projects inherent 
within Being – that we come to regard the world proximally with ‘concern’ (besor-
gen), an existentiale that prompts us to manipulate the environment in the manner of 
equipment (BT, 97) to be utilized in pursuit of our own ends. As we saw, above, ob-
jects thus are discovered proximally as ‘ready-to-hand’, as entities intelligible only as 
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they pertain to our human purposes (entities which have an ‘in-order-to’). Any other 
way of accessing the world is the result of an existentiale which presupposes one in 
which the environment is yielded as being equipmental and 'ready-to-hand'. 
!
The disclosure of the Being of entities found in our environment is achieved, as noted 
earlier, via the subsumption of objects as things 'in-order-to'. Because Dasein consid-
ers its Being an issue, the various possibilities (each possibility Heidegger terms a 
‘for-the-sake-of-which’) of that Being become involved with Dasein's understanding; 
such understanding interprets the environment in the light of Dasein's possibilities, 
with the successful interpretation of an object as an ‘in-order-to’ imbuing that entity 
with ‘meaning’, or relevance. In this manner an object obtains a reference, in that it 
becomes integrated into a sphere of meaning; its relevance refers ultimately – perhaps 
via a function subservient to that possibility (a ‘towards-which’) (BT, 99) – to the pos-
sibility of Dasein's Being for which it is an ‘in-order-to’. Any hierarchy of reference 
which becomes involved in a ‘for-the-sake-of which’ exists as a referential totality; it 
is an integrated set of referential totalities which constitute Dasein's world.   Because 43
the understanding enjoys familiarity with the relations within, and between these to-
talities, they become assigned to it, and the possibilities of Dasein's Being with which 
it is concerned. Once the understanding has involved these relationships in assign-
ment, they become ‘bound to one another as a primordial totality’; they exist in a rela-
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"  I am using world here in the third of four senses Heidegger attaches to the word: namely, as 43
“that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’.” Not to be confused with 
'”world” , which Heidegger defines as 'the totality of those entities which can be present-at-
hand.' See BT, 93.
tional totality that possesses ‘significance’ for Dasein, and in this capacity they com-
prise the structure of Dasein's world (BT, 120-1/H77). 
!
This ontological account, which acknowledges the psychological aspect inherent 
within our perception of the world, receives further consolidation through the notion 
of signs. Signs comprise an important part of a referential totality, and, therefore, Da-
sein's world. They address themselves to our 'circumspection' (Umsicht) (BT, 98) – 
the ‘sight’ with which we intuit how to use an object – allowing the environment sur-
rounding them to become explicit in relation to our concernful dealings (BT, 110). In 
so doing, signs succeed in orienting a Dasein in its environment, allowing the aspects 
of the surroundings which might prove conducive to the realization of a possibility of 
Dasein's Being to be divulged. In Heidegger's words, “Signs always indicate primarily 
‘wherein’ one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is 
with something.” (BT, 111.) 
!
From this it becomes evident that in describing Dasein as ‘Being-in-the-world’, Hei-
degger intends to establish that the world is not an entity essentially alien to Dasein, 
from which we garner knowledge through disinterested, cognitive perception: the 
world does not become intelligible, or accessible via our regarding its objects as 
‘present-at-hand’. Such a manner of perceiving the world is, as noted above, merely 
an existentiale, and one by no means the most primordial and fundamental. Instead, 
because Dasein is fundamentally temporal – it can become concernfully engaged with 
both a past and a future, as well as the present – its world is found to comprise of ob-
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jects which become involved with Dasein's projected possibilities. Dasein's world is, 
therefore, holistic: it is comprised of much more than the sum of its entities. 
!
The only way in which the world can become intelligible is with reference to possibil-
ities of Dasein's Being; primordially, the world is disclosed in its significance only on 
an intentional, or at least non-cognitive, level. It is this fact which makes manifest the 
essential unity of Being and the world. For it becomes clear that Dasein's Being is de-
pendent on the world for its involvement, and in turn, for its eventual definition (au-
thentic or not): ‘Being-in-the-world ... [is] a way in which Dasein's character is de-
fined existentially’ (BT, 92). But given that the world's significance is the product of 
Dasein's intentionality, Dasein in its essentially temporal Being becomes the neces-
sary and sufficient condition for the existence of a ‘worldly’ environment. Indeed, it 
would appear that if you strip Dasein of its intentional understanding, there would be 
no world   at all; for in depriving Dasein of its intentional understanding, you negate 44
its facticity; and without facticity, Dasein no longer possesses ‘Being-in-the-world’: it 
thus becomes worldless (BT, 81-2). In sum, “Ontologically, ‘world’ is not a way of 
characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteris-
tic of Dasein itself” (BT, 92). 
!
Despite the apparent cogency of this argument, fundamental – and perhaps telling – 
objections remain. Firstly, it becomes apparent that, although it may be the case that 
Dasein incorporates objects into its environment in the manner of the ready-to-hand, it 
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"  Not just in the third of Heidegger's four senses of the term ‘world’, but in all senses. See 44
BT, 93.
remains that such incorporation presupposes there being, in the first instant, an object 
existing in its bare physicality, devoid of the purely personal connotations attached by 
(a) Dasein. The significance and relevance of an object varies between individuals, 
yet the subject of such variations remains a numerically identical object: ‘at the lowest 
level… the object... confronts us as a ... mere physical thing.’   On this reasoning, it 45
must be the case that, contrary to Heidegger's assertions, the ready-to-hand in fact 
presupposes the present-at-hand.  
!
Ostensibly crucial as this objection might be, it is essentially myopic. If we consider 
the case of one of our early ancestors, say, living before the advent of hammers, we 
can suppose that, in desiring to force an object into a particularly resistant area (a peg 
into the ground, for example), the individual might seize upon an object heavier, and 
harder, than his hands (a rock, perhaps). Critics of the Heideggerian viewpoint might 
attribute the resulting selection as the outcome of regarding various objects purely in 
their bare physicality, and in a present-at-hand manner. However, there remains the 
fact that the discernment of hardness in this scenario was possible only within the 
wider context of the ready-to-hand; for in his circumspection, concerned to realize a 
‘towards-which’, the individual became aware of an impediment to its successful ful-
fillment. Consequently, the referential totality which he had established became obvi-
ous, revealing as conspicuous the lack of an object for hammering. It was only as a 
result of the frustration of the 'towards-which' that consideration of objects in the 
mode of the ready-to-hand was abandoned in favor of the ‘present-at-hand’. Despite 
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"  An objection advanced by Edmund Husserl in his Cartesian Meditations. Cited in Cooper's 45
Existentialism, p. 64.
this necessitating the consideration of the object purely in term of its physicality, the 
‘hardness’ of the rock was revealed, and became significant, only in relation to the 
larger context of that particular Dasein's practical concerns. The objective characteris-
tic of hardness was understood only because the individual could not achieve his task 
with his hands alone. If this account is accepted, it must be conceded that the present-
at-hand presupposes the ready-to-hand, and the cogency of Heidegger's concept of 
Being-in-the-world remains intact. 
!
The viability of Heidegger's viewpoint is further enhanced by its ability to account for 
the manner in which intentional, and psychological, considerations inform our Being. 
When we consider the world at large, or even our own particular culture, we find a 
collection of entities, all of which are invested with values (which are often contradic-
tory or conflicting). For example, the fox is an animal vilified by some, which meets 
with indifference in certain people, and which is held in a positive light by others. 
This fact makes manifest the existence of what one might term different linguistic 
communities, each of which attaches a different connotation to the word ‘fox.'   Hei46 -
degger's conception of Being-in-the-world is able to account for this fact, as it asserts 
that Dasein is not just 'in' the world (as an entity), but actually dwells within the 
world; the world is a fundamental aspect of Dasein's Being, a Being which possesses 
'Being-in' as one of its fundamental aspects. Thus the fox becomes understood in dif-
ferent ways consequent to the differing interpretations each Dasein has of its own Be-
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"  For the purposes of this thesis, the term ' linguistic community' should be taken to refer to a 46
community, among others, which attaches a particular connotation (e.g. positive, negative, or 
indifferent) to a concept denoted by a particular world (e.g. 'fox '). Thus of two differing lin-
guistic communities, Community I could attach a positive connotation to the word 'fox '; 
which differs from Community II's negative connotation.
ing: the farmer understands the fox as a threat to the realization of his interpretation of 
himself as a farmer, and therefore belongs to that linguistic community investing the 
fox with negative connotations; the environmentalist may understand the fox in a pos-
itive light, as it exists as a symbol of positive concern in his interpretation of himself 
as a Being anxious for, and contributing to, the welfare of his natural surroundings. In 
this way the fox becomes involved in a Dasein's world: because in this way it be-
comes involved in the '"here' of an 'I-here"', which "is always understood in relation to 
a 'yonder' ready-to-hand, in the sense of a Being towards this ‘yonder"' (BT, 171). 
!
Once it is recognized that temporality reaches throughout the structure of Dasein, it is 
but a short step for us to realize that each of the three dimensions of temporality, 
though having their own demonstrable quality or character, must nonetheless demon-
strate a reciprocal unity  . For this unified nature – or, the ‘continuity of Dasein’ – 47
provides for the unified ‘horizon’ of temporality in which Dasein finds the ‘Being-
alongside’ of present existence, the ‘ahead-of-itself’ projected structure of ‘care’ – 
corresponding to the futural dimension – and the already realized, ‘Being-already-in’ 
determinations of his facticity, which correspond to the dimension of the past. Thus 
“Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this 




"  Something which will be underlined by our analysis of the ‘correlative and contemporane47 -
ous’ phase of the Reflex Arc coordination as it is presented by Dewey. See Chapter 4, Section 
7 (especially pp. 92-3), below.
But with the realization that temporality provides the basis for the metaphysical con-
tinuity of Dasein, that it makes possible the unified horizon comprising of the united 
dimensions of past, present and future, and that it is the primordial structure of Da-
sein’s characteristic mode of ‘Being-in-the-world’ – namely, care – then we must 
abandon the ‘leveled down’ focus of ‘ordinary’ time, and with it, the privileging of the 
present. Such a conception of time, in a manner which echoes Dewey’s criticisms of 
the Reflex Arc concept in psychology, cannot account for the unified structure of 
time, as its privileging of the present divorces each privileged moment from the ‘ab-
sent’ dimensions of the past and the future. Even more tellingly, the fact that the 
present cannot be related in any significant way to either its past or the future means 
that, just as, on Dewey’s reading, the individual phases of the deficient Reflex Arc 
concept cannot coordinate to form a comprehensive and dynamic phase of experience, 
the idea of ordinary time cannot either account for the experience of time passing, or 
even its basis as a structure of Dasein’s experience.  
!
That Heidegger has shown how an originary structure of temporality can account for 
both the passing of time, and the qualitative nature of experience (i.e. the structure of 
care), and that such a structure makes possible the leveled-down privileging of the 
present characteristic of ordinary time; then it must be admitted that he has also 
shown the means by which time can be derived from temporality, and that temporali-
ty, as a concept, has the significance to function as a grounding concept underlying 
the full scope of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world –or, in other terms, mankind’s very 
sense of existence. 
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With this, then, the basis for the full scope of the concept of temporality is explicitly 
established, and can thus be treated as a concept to be distinguished from that 
of time per se. Furthermore, as we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, below, the logic and 
ramifications of Heiedegger’s proof that temporality must be the foundational term 
which makes experience possible exhibit several significant parallels with Dewey’s 




















Chapter 3: Gilles Deleuze !
In the foregoing, alongside tracing within Being and Time the emergence of temporal-
ity as a discrete and informative concept in its own right, we have also come to ob-
serve that one of the chief concerns of Heidegger’s phenomenological project is with 
the repudiation of a metaphysic, or a world-view, premised upon essentialist-based 
categories. As we shall see, this concern, configured by similar means and with simi-
lar results, holds also for both Dewey and Deleuze. For each of the three philosophers 
mentioned, in a manner analogous to that of the traditional conception of ‘rational’ 
judgment, such essentialist-based systems comprise of the (teleological) organization 
of relations susceptible to calculation, and are thus grounded in an a priori paradigm 
of quantification. The purpose of this chapter is, accordingly, to trace the putative 
mode of realization of a philosophy that operates beyond both essentialism, and, ulti-
mately, the metric of quantification.  
!
3.1. Deleuze on Bergson and ‘memory’ 
According to Deleuze’s book-length interpretation, in the course of his philosophical 
project Bergson was led to posit three different kinds of memory. The more mundane 
of these are the first two: ‘habit-memory’, and ‘recollection-memory’. These two 
types of memory are orientated towards the praxial requirements of a lived-body: that 
is, they admit of a use-value. The first type denotes the adaption of motor-mecha-
nisms such that they may function teleologically; the second, a capacity to utilize the 
past in order to enhance our ability to meet the requirements of the present. In this 
way the privileged domain of their operation is that of an actual, psychological con-
sciousness. Yet the subsistence of this domain - and thus its operations - is wholly de-
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pendent on the third designation of the term memory that operates on 
an ontological level: that of the pure past.    
!
Such a concept is diametrically opposed to the prevalent empiricist memory par-
adigm, and, by extension, the concept of temporality on which it is based. Conceiving 
of time as a punctilinear succession, the present moment of which serves as a realized 
instant orientating a ‘before’ and ‘after’, the aforementioned temporal model trans-
lates itself to a memory paradigm that is capable only of conceiving of the past as 
coming into existence once it has realized the present, of which it represents a weak-
ened version/image. The past and the present, perception and memory, are, according 
to this conception, differentiated merely by degree rather than kind.  
!
Observing that this model was insufficient for any account of how time passes, Berg-
son sought to construct a different theory, from which three consequences follow. For 
in order that the present does pass, it is necessary – and this is the first consequence –
 that the present and past be contemporaneous, that the past coexist with the present 
that it has been (B, 58-9). In this way, the present presupposes the past as its pure 
condition. Thus Bergson goes on to propose that our actual existence, as it unfolds in 
time, ‘duplicates itself all along with a virtual existence, a mirror image. Every mo-
ment of our life presents the two aspects, it is actual and virtual, perception on the one 
side and memory on the other.’ Such a distinction, instead of being one of degree, is 
instead one of kind: thus whereas perception is actual, dependent on matter (and 
therefore spatial extension), memory is virtual, intensive, purely ontological; percep-
tion belongs to the realm of the psychological, memory, in its pure form, is non-psy-
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chological; perception occurs in the present, memory only in the past. This last bifur-
cation highlights the fact – constituting the second consequence – that, in order to co-
exist with the present it has been, the past must exist of its own accord (i.e. it is con-
temporaneous). To become stored ‘in’ the brain, given that this is, within the Bergson-
ian theory of perception, just one image amongst others, would be to negate the dif-
ference in kind between the order of time (memory) and that of space (from which 
present perception arises).  
!
Considered from another viewpoint, while the present is the site of perpetual becom-
ing, the past, if it is to be the store for recollection, must be preserved beyond the 
present: that is, in itself. In this sense, it can be said that, as becoming, the present is 
‘outside itself’: therefore it is not; though it does remain the privileged site of action 
or the useful. The past, however, has ceased to be that which acts, though it is in the 
full sense of the word (B, 55). An act of recollection, then, though its end product may 
justly be considered to effect itself within the realm of psychology, originally – and 
fundamentally – involves a leap beyond the psychological present. This act, which 
is sui generis, detaches us from the present and places us at once in the past. For, just 
as we cannot perceive things purely within ourselves, but only where they are; so we 
cannot recollect the past unless we are placed, ourselves, in the past, there where we 
will find the particular recollection we seek. It is this that is the past in general, the 
pure past: the sphere of pure ontology.  
!
The third consequence arising from Bergson’s theory is that the past must, given that 
it preserves itself in itself beyond the passing present, coexist with the present in its 
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entirety: it is all our past which coexists with each present (B, 59). In order to under-
stand this we must return to the leap of recollection that places us into the past. Berg-
son says of this: we place ourselves ‘firstly into the past in general, then into a certain 
region of the past’ (B, 61). Each of these regions is virtual – that is, ‘belonging to the 
being in itself of the past’ (B, 60) – but contains not merely particular elements of the 
past, but the totality of the past at a more or less contracted or expanded level. Thus 
the past coexists with itself at every level, every degree of tension, and all degrees of 
relaxation and contraction: it repeats itself, at the same time, on its every level. (It is 
in this sense that we can, with Bergson, come to understand the concept of duration as 
necessarily involving succession; namely as repetition of the entire past on different, 
coexisting planes of past.) 
!
Yet there are, within each level, remarkable or shining points, dominant recollections 
(or, as below, attractors), which vary the theme of one level from another. Having 
placed oneself on a peculiarly contracted level of the past, having observed the ‘ap-
peal of recollection’, for the past to become actualized in a recollection-image (the 
‘evocation’ of the image) the importunate, urgent nature of the present moment must 
be heeded. The needs of the present situation initiate the leap onto a particular level 
that is assumed capable of meeting our requirements; the level, though, may be too 
contracted or expanded, and the apposite recollection may not be found. When it is 
located, however, memory responds to the appeal of the present via two simultaneous 
movements: translation, by which memory in its entirety contracts, without dividing, 
in order to meet action; and rotation, wherein it turns toward the present situation that 
side of itself which will prove most useful (B, 63-4). The relevant recollection thus 
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loses the impassivity and ineffectiveness that characterize recollections, becoming 
instead a ‘recollection-image’, that which is capable of being recalled to the realm of 
praxis. To be recalled, and proceed through the distinct ‘planes of consciousness’, is 
to be contracted to the ultimate level of contraction: the present. It is to be embodied, 
actualized. It is actualization alone that constitutes psychological consciousness 
(see B, 63). 
!
T o p o s i t t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o c o m m o n s e n s e , w e 
move from recollection to perception, from the past to the present, has revolutionary 
ramifications, and matches exactly Dewey’s statement that ‘response’ acts on ‘stimu-
lus’, etc. in his Reflex Arc paper. Indeed, the implications following from Bergson’s 
outline of the ontological nature of the pure past were further developed by Deleuze, 
coming eventually to constitute the basis for his attempt to construct a non-entropic 
system involving a non-metric, ‘smooth’ space of the manifold; that is, a system ade-
quate to thought of multiplicities rather than closed, entropic, and essentialist-based 
systems. 
!
3.2. Deleuze and the ontology of ‘the virtual’ 
Perhaps the most signal point of departure for a detailed account of the ontological 
nature of the virtual is this statement concerning dx/dy, early on in Chapter IV of Dif-
ference and Repetition: 
!
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        “In relation to x, dx is completely undetermined, as dy is to y, but they are per-
fectly determinable in relation to one another. For this reason, a principle of deter-
minability corresponds to the undetermined as such.” (DR, 172) 
!
With this we observe the rejection of the Cartesian method of characterizing a geo-
metrical object. The Cartesian method may be characterized as operating on the as-
sumption that, for example, a curved surface is embedded in a three-dimensional 
space, itself characterized by a fixed set of axes (e.g. x and y), these being used to as-
sign coordinates to every point of the surface. Such a procedure eventually allows for 
the expression and determination, via algebraic relations, of the geometric links be-
tween surface-points. Instead, following the differential calculi of Gauss and Rie-
mann, Deleuze favors thought capable of proceeding without any reference to either a 
global or meta- coordination, or indeed to any extrinsic determination, the very points 
of the surface themselves creating an interdependent method of ‘coordinatization’. 
Thus ‘Each term exists absolutely only in its relation to the other: it is no longer nec-
essary, or even possible, to indicate an independent variable.’ It is for this reason that 
a ‘principle of reciprocal determinability as such here corresponds to the deter-
minability of the relation’ (DR, 172). Ultimately, such thought amounts to the delin-
eation of a new space of multiplicity, which comes to constitute the basis for the field 
of Ideas – ‘a system of differential relations between reciprocally determined genetic 
elements’ –, or that which is coextensive with the virtual (see DR, 173-4). 
  
To see how this is possible requires an analysis of ‘the Idea’. We have seen that they 
are the eventual product of reciprocal determinability, that which suggests the opera-
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tion of difference. But this fact discloses only the second condition within the emer-
gence of an Idea. For when it is remembered that an operation of external determina-
tion does not feature in this system, there arises the implication of a state of indeter-
mination necessarily prior to reciprocal determination – thereby fulfilling the first 
condition. This is confirmed with the statement that ‘Ideas are multiplicities’ (DR, 
182), an assertion which takes us to the heart of Deleuze’s open, non-deterministic 
thought. For the notion of multiplicity does not, as traditionally received, designate a 
combination of the many and the one; but rather ‘an organization belonging to 
the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a 
system’ (DR, 182: emphasis mine). The concepts of the ‘one’ and ‘many’ are inade-
quate for such thought, their ‘identity’ being constituted by a ‘distorted’ dialectic 
which proceeds merely by way of opposition, a process at once both entirely insuffi-
cient to the refined and nuanced discreteness of singularities and Ideas, as well as im-
plying a problematic equivocity amongst elements. By contrast, the structure of a 
multiplicity, having neither prior identity nor conceptual signification, cannot admit of 
being posited as ‘one or the same…’ It is, then, basically indeterminate, that which 
admits of definition only intrinsically (i.e. via the principle of reciprocal determina-
tion). It is in this way that it is the very ground of possibility for the manifestation of 
difference free of all subordination, itself the ground for thought of 
the many as such operating beyond the strictly numerical conceptions of the one and 
many and within the bounds of univocity (see DR, 182-3). 
!
We are now in a position to appreciate Deleuze’s definition of an Idea as ‘an n-dimen-
sional, continuous, defined multiplicity’ (DR, 182). An Idea is n-dimensional in that it 
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is, rather straightforwardly, of any number of dimensions. Not having any supplemen-
tary or extrinsic dimensions that transpire upon it, nor any basic determination/identi-
ty, it becomes a free state-space, admitting of n-degrees of freedom. Being a multi-
plicity, an Idea is, furthermore, structured in a continuous manner, a state of affairs 
which must be received in (at least) two primary senses: an Idea is that which is inten-
sive (cannot be divided without changing in kind) rather than extensive (intrinsically 
divisible); and is that which coexists in complex, obscure fashion, with adjunct fields. 
This is because Ideas are made, or unmade, ‘according to the conditions which deter-
mine their fluent synthesis’ (DR, 187), an assertion which can better be understood 
with reference to state space and the theories of Poincaré.  
!
A state space comprises of two operators: ‘differentiation’, providing the value for a 
rate of change for two or more dimensions of a manifold; and ‘integration’, which re-
constructs, from a set of such values, a series of states or a full trajectory. Of a given 
manifold changing through time, trajectories can be discerned which, after repeated 
application of the differentiation operator, yield ‘vectors’, which together comprise a 
‘vector field’. The vector field delineates the inherent – and therefore virtual – ten-
dencies of the trajectories, thereby describing the existence and distribution of singu-
larities (attractors) within the field. The specification of the existence and distribution 
of singular points in this case, as well as in that of the Idea, depends upon (1) the 
specification of adjunct fields, or the modality of the connections between fields; and 
(2) the conditions prevailing throughout the field, especially those created by adjunct 
fields. It is in this sense that “Ideas contain all the varieties of differential relations 
and all the distributions of singular points coexisting in diverse orders ‘perplicated’ in 
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one another” (DR, 206). It is, finally, the nature of this coexistence within smooth 
space that results in the definition of a multiplicity, working in a manner analogous to 
reciprocal determination. 
!
This ontological, smooth space of Ideas comprises only one half of difference: name-
ly, the dialectical half, or that which is determined by differentiation as the manner in 
which Ideas reciprocally differentiate their peculiar arrangement of singularities. 
Deleuze also identifies the dialectical half with problems, which are themselves, in 
turn, of the order of events. The other, complementary half, in which Ideas are incar-
nated or actualized, is the aesthetic – that which is determined by differenciation – 
which corresponds to the plane of solutions. We find, then, an irreducibly double sys-
tem, a ‘double series of events which develop on two planes, echoing without resem-
bling each other’ (DR, 189). This last clause is of paramount importance. For Deleuze 
goes on to assert that the ideal series enjoys the property of ‘transcendence’ in relation 
to the real (ibid.), a notion which would appear to reintroduce the operation of prede-
termination which is directly counter to the aim of Deleuze’s project. Yet such an ap-
pearance is misleading: the relation between the virtual and actual is one of onto-het-
erogenesis, placing it beyond a causal relationship in which the effect is identical to 
the cause. For, in opposition to the identity-bound relationship between the possible 
and the real, where the real merely duplicates, and ‘adds’ - in the manner of an incon-
ceivable brute eruption - ‘existence’ to the possible, which is itself a retroactively fab-
ricated image of the real; the actualization of the virtual proceeds by way of immanent 
difference, divergence, and differenciation. Each such divergence or difference takes 
the form of a divergent line, which corresponds to a manner of solving a problem in-
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sisting within the Idea. If we agree that every solution is an interpretation of the prob-
lem, such a statement can suggest, in the manner of a metaphor, how ‘In this sense, 
actualization or differenciation is always a genuine creation’ (DR, 212). 
!
It is in this way that the virtual can be said to possess reality, but not actuality (DR, 
209). For the preceding analysis has demonstrated that the reality of the virtual con-
sists of two chief aspects: a discernible determination; and a structure operating in a 
transcendent relation to a real object (cf. DR, 208-9). Determination arises from recip-
rocal determination between singular points of an Idea and relations of difference be-
tween Ideas; but also from a process of complete determination proceeding, among 
singularities, in a manner analogous to that of a vector field, which delineates the va-
rieties of relations and coexistences perplicating Ideas without designating a privi-
leged viewpoint. Such complete determination lacks merely the whole-oriented rela-
tion sets that belong to actuality. 
!
The transcendent virtual structure incarnates itself in an actual object, as noted above, 
via a process of differenciation, which is ‘at once both composition and determination 
of qualities [of parts: see DR, 217], organization and determination of species’ (DR, 
214). The former correspond to the incarnation of the singular points of an Idea, the 
latter to the actualization of its differential relations (DR, 217). But such differencia-
tion presupposes spatio-temporal dynamisms. Spatial dynamisms function as those 
spaces in which the dramatization of Ideas can proceed. Such a space creates the con-
ditions for a tracing of the differential relations, and the singularities of the Idea. In an 
explicit parallel with Dewey’s concept of rhythm (see Chapter 4, Section 5, above), 
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the temporal dynamisms, functioning as differential rhythms, incarnate the time of the 
structure in the manner of progressive determination. (This is of importance as it 
highlights once again the lack of determinism, and the inverse prevalence of undecid-
ability or ‘choice’, within the virtual; for it is only consequent to this, and the fluid 
synthesis of the singularities, that the virtual can be determined only progressively, 
that is – in the manner of an asymptote – never completely.) In this respect dy-
namisms, as dramatizations of Ideas, move beyond the representationist schemata-
concept hierarchy of transcendental spatio-temporal determination – forever as-
ymptotic due to the un-transcendable rupture between the two hierarchical levels –, 
for precisely as a dramatization it is internal to Ideas: that is, dynamisms immediately 
incarnate the very differential relations and singularities of an Idea. In this way dy-
namism, as agent of differenciation, and incarnation of differentiation, comprises its 
own power of determining space and time, whilst simultaneously preserving the uni-
vocity of Being in relation to both the virtual and the actual (DR, 218). 
!
This account of the basic ontology of the virtual, combined with the Deleuze-
Bergsonian temporally-orientated exposition of the virtual nature of the pure past, 
provides us with a model of the virtual which illuminates two of its chief aspects. The 
two aspects meet on the verges of consciousness, one of the three levels of actualiza-
tion (the others being space and time). For every spatio-temporal dynamism is ac-
companied by the emergence of an elementary consciousness born at the threshold of 
the body/object; consciousness, then, operating fundamentally as the double of every 
object, allows the tracing of directions, the doubling of movements and migrations 
(DR, 220). At the same time the three conditions of an Idea are mirrored in the essen-
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tial aspects of sufficient reason: determinability, reciprocal determination, complete 
determination (DR, 210).  
!
Yet with the emergence of the fuller picture problems arise. It would seem, for exam-
ple, that two aspects are fundamentally incompatible: the emphasis on the open, 
smooth and non-entropic functioning of the virtual ontology being contradicted by the 
temporal hegemony of the pure past. For if the present is merely the point of the ‘be-
coming’ of the past, have we not sacrificed the possibility of originality and the new 
in favour of sheer determinism? Similarly, though the ontological account of the vir-
tual emphasizes the immanence and univocity of Being qua both virtual and actual, 
does not the virtual-actual divide risk providing the ground for a basic equivocity, the 
virtual/Idea, for example, coming to function as a sign of the open ‘totality’ of Being 
within the categories of the actual? But before such issues can be addressed in full, it 
is necessary that we return to examine the third and final figure of our trio of Dewey, 
Deleuze and Kant, in order that we might appreciate the reciprocal ramifications – if 
there are any – observed between the conjunction of the philosophies of not just 
Dewey and the virtual, but each of these with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. 
!
3.3. Learning and the prospect of ‘the new’: Deleuze’s virtual as a parallel to the 
concept of temporality in Dewey’s reformulated Reflex Arc 
Much as ‘freedom lies in choosing the levels’ (DR, 83) on which to continue the pas-
sage of our lives, any encounter between Dewey and Deleuze proceeds through the 
selection, by way of affinity, of the present most affective of desire. This because such 
a state of desire induces a level of automatic-circumspection in which we are enable 
to recognize, once again through the operation of destiny, the qualitative difference 
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denoting the singularities (peaks, points) most apt to the eventual realization of this 
encounter. It would not be too much, here, to assimilate the reciprocal determination 
of the form of desire and the final event creating Dewey’s reconceived philosophical 
project with the formulation of two crucial questions: ‘What is temporality for 
Dewey?’ and ‘What happens when we learn?’ amounting to a response which unfolds 
in representation in the manner of ‘a field of problems, with the rigorous imperative to 
search, to respond, to resolve’ (DR, 85: cf. pp 197-8).   
!
Though we may have shown how it is possible to ‘create’ within the pure past, we are 
not (yet) capable of demonstrating the achievement of the new. For the glimpses af-
forded of the acts of creation so far still amount to a basic retention of identity on be-
half of an intentional, all too intentional subject. One consequence of this perceived 
basic identity of the subject is a continued linking of time with representation, or what 
is equivalent, a failure to move beyond the second synthesis of time. For despite sur-
passing representation through the manifestation of a grounding difference at the level 
of the in-itself, the second synthesis still remains relative to, and in consequence is 
proved only by, the representation that it grounds (DR, 88). Thus the in-itself of the 
past exhibits a basic identity through the relation of resemblance to its repetition with-
in reminiscence, thereby rendering the representation of presents, even within the in-
voluntary memory of objective chance, circular. Rather than the intensive changes in 
kind characteristic of the temporal, the grounding of the second synthesis still oper-
ates in a manner analogous to ‘movement’, even if it is a “movement… [in] the 
soul” (ibid); the in itself of the past, and the repetition of reminiscence, amount mere-
ly to an ‘effect’ to be denounced as an illusion correlative to representation. On the 
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level of the subject this second time constitutes only the present of metamorphosis, “a 
becoming-equal to the act and a doubling of the self, and the projection of an ideal 
self in the image of the act” (DR, 89). Translated to our present thesis this represents 
our reading of Dewey becoming capable of the act of disjunction wherein the differ-
ential nature of Being can be cognized, and the self becomes susceptible to and riven 
by - indeed receives its determination in conjunction with - the forces of external ne-
cessity (chance, destiny, etc.). In this becoming-capable we might genuinely be re-
garded as acceding to the threshold of the new, of the future. But advancing to this 
will require a much more detailed consideration of Dewey’s philosophy – reinterpret-
ed in the light of what we have seen already of Deleuze’s own ideas of time and the 
virtual (in Chapter 5, above).  
!
At present, though, we might presage this analysis with something of a prefatory note, 
applying something of what we have learned of Deleuze’s project to the notion of the 
synthesizing ‘I’ or ‘self’ that is found in Kant’s ideas of the mind and consciousness. 
For if a time of the future is to appear there must be an un-grounding engendering a 
pure and empty form of time. For the creation inherent in desiring production to be-
come truly new a caesura must be announced ushering in a future in which only dif-
ference is repeated, beyond the control of the ‘I’, self or ego. Thus the third time in 
which the future appears “signifies that the event and the act possess a secret coher-
ence which excludes that of the self… they turn back against the self which has be-
come their equal and smash it to pieces” (DR, 89). This enacts the repudiation of a 
self that seeks to fill time, substantiate it with itself and with a content, thereby creat-
ing the possibility for identity and resemblance. Instead, in the same way that dx/
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dy can be reciprocally determined beyond any global coordination, the self must be-
come part of a future which itself must be reciprocally determined beyond any global 
determinant: “The synthesis of time here constitutes a future which affirms at once 
both the unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of pro-
duction, and the independence of the work in relation to its… actor” (DR, 94). In a 
succinctly stated structure of what we will come to see is an act of learning - in 
which, at least on an individual level, the new can be created, or arise - from the fore-
going statement we can say that, for Deleuze, the conditions of production correlate to 
the past; the actor to the present; both of which, and including the future, function 
as repetition, but in very different modes. The present ‘is the repeater’, given the role 
merely of an agent destined to be effaced; the past is ‘repetition itself’, the infinite 
network of virtuality, or the ground of memory operating in a transcendent function; 
the future ‘is that which is repeated’, or the empty form or caesura which alone is able 
to return. The future makes use of these prior stages in order to make repetition, not 
that from which one ‘draws off’ a difference, nor that including difference as a vari-
ant, but the thought and production of the ‘absolutely different’, or ‘difference in it-
self’ (ibid). The activity of becoming adequate to difference in itself, or the time of the 
future must, however, be thought (DR, 110). Such an act occurs only in the form of a 
modification, or affection that the ego – or ‘I’ – both initiates and passively experi-
ences. This is possible because the basic ‘I am’ underlying the subject is undeter-
mined, and can only become determined by an ‘I think’; yet for determination to oc-
cur requires the mediation of a third term: the determinable, which establishes be-
tween the two prior values a transcendental, yet internal Difference. The form of the 
determinable is time. Consequently, the subject can only be determined within time, 
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meaning that the spontaneity of the ‘I think’ is not an attribute of a substantial being, 
but rather the affection of a passive self experiencing its own thought as that exer-
cised upon it, not by it (DR, 86). Time thus fractures the I forcing it to operate upon 
itself as Other. The becoming adequate to the time of the future involves the affirma-
tion of this fracture, which simultaneously amounts to the dispersal of the self in a 
purely empty (as in ‘not filled by any singular substance’) time, consisting of an infin-
ity of ‘excessive systems which link the different with the different, the multiple with 
the multiple, the fortuitous with the fortuitous’ (DR, 115). Stated in the terminology 
used above, the affirmation of the fractured I within the time of the future is the re-
peated repeating of repetition in itself. 
!
It is in this way that the ‘absolutely new itself’ can be produced. This third time, the 
time of excess, affects only that which has been produced ‘by default’ via the inter-
mediary of metamorphosis: that is, it affects only that which has internalized, become 
adequate to, a particular composition - constellation, if you will - of difference. But 
there is one final factor: neither the agent (of metamorphosis), nor the condition (of 
difference) will return. Their repetition under the empty form of time constituted a 
dissemination by way of excessive repetition, a description of an eternally excentric 
arc; the ‘form’ of time is an excessive formlessness belied by a universal un-ground-
ing turned upon itself: all that returns is the yet-to-come (see DR, 90-1). 
!
It is also in this way - the way of producing ‘the new’ - that we are enabled to under-
stand something of the way in which, for Deleuze, learning occurs. Though it is not 
the case that every act of learning occurs as an instantiation of the third synthesis of 
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time, I would nonetheless argue that, by proceeding on a largely unconscious level 
within the scope of the second synthesis of time, an act of learning does open-up the 
‘I’ of the learner to the wider scope of the virtual and time, and does, in one sense, 
proceed according to (some of) the conditions of metamorphosis. It might be, then, 
that an act of learning traces itself along the boundary between the second and third 
syntheses of time. Indeed, for Deleuze, learning does venture to some degree beyond 
the sphere of representation; it does not amount to simply copying or imitating the 
gestures or concepts represented or expressed by a teacher, as “Learning takes place 
not in the relation between a representation and an action (reproduction of the Same) 
but in the relation between a sign and a response (encounter with the Other)” (DR, 
22).   Instead, the individual encounters a field of elements, of distinctive points (a 48
light, a glance which focuses on it, a motor-habit of reaching toward light, an arm, a 
hand, etc.) which, encountering an unexpected element (a burning sensation), find 
their habitual relational conjugation disrupted, thereby establishing a problematic 
field, or problem. For the problem to be dissolved is for the individual to find the way 
in which to re-arrange and re-establish relations between the particular distinctive 
points such that, emerging to the consciousness of our perceptions, cognition of the 
real relations among the elements permits adjustment of our consciously directed acts: 
     
    “To learn to swim is to conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the sin-
gular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field. This conjuga-
tion determines for us a threshold of consciousness at which our real acts are adjusted 
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"  Cf. “The movement of the swimmer does not resemble that of the wave, in particular, the 48
movements of the swimming instructor which we reproduce on the sand bear no relation to 
the movements of the wave, which we learn to deal with only by grasping the former in prac-
tice as signs. That is why it is so difficult to say how someone learns: there is an innate or ac-
quired practical familiarity with signs… We learn nothing from those who say: ‘Do as I do.’ 
Our only teachers are those who tell us ‘do with me,’ and are able to emit signs to be devel-
oped in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures for us to reproduce.” DR, 22-3.
to our perceptions of the real relations, thereby providing a solution to the problem. 
Moreover, problematic Ideas are precisely the ultimate elements of nature and the 
subliminal objects of little perceptions. As  a result, ‘learning’ always takes place in 
and through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity 
between nature and mind.” (DR, 165) !!
To render the scenario within the terms of Dewey’s child-light-burn scenerio within 
the Reflex Arc essay: the problematic field, or problem, occurs when the child enacts 
what for Deleuze is a ‘passive synthesis,’ or conjugation, of the distinctive points of 
the scenario (hand, flame, head, eye movements, motor act of reaching, etc.). This 
synthesis is termed ‘passive’ because it occurs on the unconscious plane, and does not 
yet possess the ‘active’ synthesis which is determined by possession of a ‘general 
concept’ which enables the rule-possessing solution to the problem we find in knowl-
edgeable action. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze uses the example of a monkey 
who ‘learns’ its food is in a box of one particular color among several others. The ini-
tial, disordered scenario sees the monkey picking up boxes at random, but Deleuze 
observes “there comes a paradoxical period during which the number of ‘errors’ di-
minishes even though the monkey does not yet posses the ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’ of a 
solution in each case” (DR, 164-5). This paradoxical period is exactly the point at 
which the individual encounters the objectivity of the problem - that is, the child 
brings together the elements - seeing, light, reaching, flame, burn, and so on - into a 
relation which allows for consistency, and which constitutes the ‘sign’ of the problem 
which does not yet posses the rule-based ‘solution.’ 
!
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The solution, however - and thereby the completion of an educative experience, or a 
moment of learning - does not follow as a matter of necessity. It is possible that the 
elements of the problem do not conjugate to form what Deleuze calls a ‘plane of con-
sistency’, the relations between them do not stabilize, and we thus experience a failure 
to learn. In the case wherein no plane of consistency is established in relation to the 
problem, either chaos ensues, or, as more likely, the child retreats to the narrower 
plane of already extant habits, coordinations and routines.  
!
It is for this reason that we understand something that is readily observed in any class-
room: learning is a difficult and precarious process, the outcome for which can never 
be assured. It may be that for any given individual, there are too many elements to be 
conjugated and drawn into the stable relations required for a plane of consistency to 
arise. In this case, the coordination will be overwhelmed (imagine introducing to the 
child-candle scenario the loud and unexpected noise of a bystander crying out in 
alarm. Should this cause the child to withdraw their hand according to an extant re-
flex, the act of learning in relation to a burn will not be established, the stimulus of the 
noise overwhelming the ‘seeing-into’ of the burn). Accordingly, for connections 
among the elements to become established on a consistent basis, it is essential to 
achieve an equilibrium state, that which charts a course between being overwhelmed 
by ‘too many’ elements on the one hand, and the retreat to extant habits and coordina-
tions which follows the refusal or avoidance of establishing connections between the 
elements on the other. In this way, for Deleuze - and I would aver, for Dewey, too - a 
successfully educative experience, or genuine act of learning, occurs when an indi-
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vidual engages with the objectivity of the problem and constructs a plane of consis-
tency which is then able to actualize “the calm possession of a rule enabling solu-
tions” which constitutes the very nature of knowledgeable action.   49
!
The ‘new’ element which arises in the act of learning is not, however, the simple addi-
tion of the concept of ‘burn’ to the existing relations of the coordination. Indeed, as 
Dewey is at pains to point out in his Reflex Arc essay: 
    “The ordinary re- flex arc theory proceeds upon the more or less tacit assumption 
that the outcome of the response is a totally new experience; that it is, say, the substi-
tution of a burn sensation for a light sensation through the intervention of motion. The 
fact is that the sole meaning of the intervening movement is to maintain, reinforce or 
transform (as the case may be) the original quale; that we do not have the replacing of 
one sort of experience by another, but the development (or as it seems convenient to 
term it) the mediation of an experience.” (RCP, 360) 
!
In accord with Deleuze, the ‘new’ arises as a consequence of a transformation of the 
relations which the individual perceives between the elements of the Idea, and the 
plane of consistency which is established on the basis of prior experience of the pat-
tern of these relations in connection with what is perceived, and the habitual patterns 
of behavior. In this way, the ‘new’ element of learning consists in the repetition of the 
agent such that the distinctive points are aligned in a new conjugation, allowing for a 
different experience of those relations, and thus the establishment of a different, ex-
panded and transformed ability to configure the distinctive points of the body and the 
field of perception in a settled and consistent way, a way which amounts to the appli-
cation of a rule, or an settled act of knowledge. Thus: 	

 75
"  This analysis follows Jeff Bell’s illuminating explication in “Deleuze on Learning and 49
Skill.” My analysis differs in its application to the child-candle scenario of the Reflex Arc. 
See http://www.newappsblog.com/2014/04/deleuze-on-learning-and-skill.html
“When a body combines some of its own distinctive points with those of a wave, it 
espouses the principle of a repetition which is no longer that of the Same, but involves 
the Other - involves difference, from one wave and one gesture to another, and carries 
the difference through the repetitive space thereby constituted. To learn is indeed to 
constitute this space of an encounter with signs, in which the distinctive points renew 























Chapter 4: Dewey on time and temporality !
4.1. Time and temporality; philosophy and education 
There are significant works dealing with time and/or temporality as they relate to, for 
example: the history of western philosophy and science (Bardon and Dyke 2013; 
Turetzky 1998); contemporary philosophy (Margolis 2010; Rosenthal 2000 & 2010); 
contemporary physics (Prosser 2007 & 2013; Sandbothe 2001; Wallace 2013); educa-
tion (Huebner 1987); pragmatism (Fairfield 2010; Margolis 2010; Rosenthal 2000); 
the work of Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze 1999/1956, 1994/1968, 1978a & b, 2005/1981, 
1986/1983, 1989/1985; Somers-Hall 2011); and the work of Martin Heidegger (Hei-
degger 1962/1927, 1992/1925); all of which are of relevance to my thesis. These are, 
however, somewhat incidental to the main point of my proposed dissertation, which is 
the concept of temporality as it emerges in Dewey’s early work, especially as it relates 
to the field of education, and the nature of that mode experience – educative experi-
ence, perhaps – which underlies the process of learning. 
!
4.2. A narrative emerges 
When we consider works by Dewey (1925, 1929, 1934, 1938/40), Garret (1972), 
Richards (1972), Helm (1985), Calore (1989) and Mozur (1991), it is undeniable that 
we are enabled to construct at least one coherent narrative for the evolution of 
Dewey’s utilization of the concepts of time and temporality. As indicated by the title 
of Helm’s (1985) study of Dewey’s career, and Garrett’s situating of Dewey’s thought 
against the background, in the early part of the 20th century, of the ‘much larger 
movement to “take time seriously”’ (Garrett 1972, 439), the obvious means by which 
to construct such a narrative centers around the increasing importance for Dewey of 
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the question of time. On the one hand, Richards and Helm construct accounts struc-
tured according to distinguishable phases of Dewey’s treatment of time and temporali-
ty  ; and, on the other, Garrett (1972), Richards (1972) and Helm (1985) detail the 50
evolution whereby Dewey’s attempt to ‘temporalize time’ becomes the explicit means 
by which he seeks to both ‘reconstruct’ philosophy, as well as provide a naturalistic 
grounding for his work which is adequate to factors such as lived experience, the find-
ings of the natural sciences, and the conceptual consistency of a rigorous philosophy 
(Calore 1989, 12-13). 
!
4.3. Dewey’s ‘temporalization’ of time 
As we shall see, there is only a small literature of substantive work on the concept of 
temporality as it relates to Dewey’s oeuvre. This includes what, at first glance, at 
least, appears to be scant mention or treatment of the concept by Dewey himself. That 
a concept of temporality does exist – indeed, is of significance for Dewey – is attested 
to, however, by several works written by contemporary Dewey scholars such as 
Roland Garrett (1972), Bertrand Helm (1985), Gary Calore (1989) and Gerald Mozur 
(1991). Robert Richards (1972), though not explicitly concerned with Dewey’s treat-
ment of time and temporality – charting instead the developing complexity of 
Dewey’s conception of ‘natural events’ throughout the phases of his thought, and how 
each phase relates to the concept of materialism – nonetheless lends support to the 
 78
"  Though not concerned directly with Dewey’s treatment of time, Richards nonetheless 50
(1972) identifies 3 stages in Dewey’s career, basing these on his relation to the concept of 
‘materialism’. Helm, focusing explicitly on Dewey’s attempt to temporalize time, is con-
cerned with ‘The theme of time in terms of temporal quality and temporal order that arises in 
his psychology, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. As his views developed in those sub-
stantive areas, so too did his ideas about the nature and modes of temporality’ (Helm 1985, 
291).
conclusions drawn by the aforementioned authors concerning the means by which 
Dewey’s thought changed conceptually, as well as in terms of its scope of reference.  
!
More importantly – and somewhat revealingly for our thesis – Dewey himself directly 
addresses the concept of time in his contribution to the 1938 James Arthur Foundation 
series of lectures on ‘The Mysteries of Time.’ As noted in Helm’s (1985) comprehen-
sive overview of Dewey’s career as it evinces the evolution of his concepts of time 
and temporality, it is this lecture which provides the culmination of Dewey’s earlier 
employment of temporality – starting with Experience and Nature (1925), receiving 
further refinement in Art as Experience (1934) Democracy and Education (1916), and 
continuing through to his joint work with Arthur Bentley – as a means to ‘temporal-
ize’ philosophy. Such a move thereby both emphasizes philosophy’s nature as 
a process rather than a static field of thought defined by, and deriving from, the essen-
tialist-based errors of past philosophies (with Plato, perhaps, being the prime exam-
ple. Cf. Calore 1989, 12, 336; Garrett 1972, 439; Mozur 1991) and furthers Dewey’s 
attempt to overcome the ‘antithetic ontological positions of mechanistic materialism 
and teleological spiritualism through the recognition of their partial and instrumental 
characters as interpreters of nature’ (Richards 1972, 56–7). That is, temporality per se 
becomes not just a foundational component of individuality and experience – espe-
cially when considered from an aesthetic point of view – but also functions as the ba-
sis for his entire philosophical conception of both nature and reality (Calore 1989, 
13). In this way, it can be said that Dewey’s consideration of the concept of temporali-
ty, especially as it arises from his investigation of the concept of time, becomes a cen-
tral guiding feature of his career as it spans from his 1925 release Experience and Na-
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ture, continuing in The Quest for Certainty (1929), and Art as Experience (1934), then 
through the subsequent works until the end of his life (Helm 1985, 307; Richards, 
1972, 59; Calore 1989, 12-13). 
!
As Helm (1985) goes on to detail, in the lecture ‘Time and Individuality’ (1938; pub-
lished as Time and Its Mysteries, 1940), Dewey not only re-conceives time per se as 
‘the central problem of philosophy’; but, just as significantly, as a foundational com-
ponent in his final project  , conceived by Dewey as the philosophical need to (re)in51 -
terpret individuals as no longer compatible with the essentialist-based and ‘universal-
izing’ metaphysics of most previous philosophies, but rather as evolving/
devolving events.    52
!
Of equal import to our inquiry is the related distinction, drawn in Experience and Na-
ture (1925, 110-11), between ‘temporal quality’ and ‘temporal order’. Mozur renders 
‘temporal quality’ as that which is ‘possessed by any process’, is grounded in final 
fashion by the ‘dynamic’ character of events in nature, and is ‘immediate’ to our expe-
rience, especially our experience of temporal duration. This is opposed to 
‘temporal order’, which is a ‘product of inquiry because it requires a temporal metric 
and a system of coordination between events that is not immediately had in experi-
ence’ (Mozur 1991, 326). Thus: 
!
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"  Which Helm (ibid.) considers Dewey to have outlined in substantial detail in his attempt to 51
descry the temporal ground of inquiry in The Quest for Certainty (1929).
"  Following Helm (1985), 310. This will also be of significance when considering the paral52 -
lels between Dewey’s and Deleuze’s respective philosophical projects.
“Temporal quality is however not to be confused with temporal order. Quality is qual-
ity, direct, immediate and undefinable. Order is a matter of relation, of definition, dat-
ing, placing and describing. It is discovered in reflection, not directly had and denoted 
as is temporal quality. Temporal order is a matter of science; temporal quality is an 
immediate trait of every occurrence whether in or out of consciousness. Every event 
as such is passing into other things, in such a way that a later occurrence is an integral 
part of the character or nature of present existence. An "affair," Res, is always at issue 
whether it concerns chemical change, the emergence of life, language, mind or the 
episodes that compose human history. Each comes from something else and each 
when it comes has its own initial, unpredictable, immediate qualities, and its own sim-
ilar terminal qualities.” (EN, 110-11). !
Much of this is corroborated in Roland Garrett’s interpretation of Dewey’s career. 
Writing – as Garrett notes (1972, 439) – in response to the effort of his contempo-
raries to “take time seriously” through the development of a philosophy of the ‘event’, 
Dewey’s work came ultimately to provide a new and highly innovative point of depar-
ture. Rather than, as with Whitehead, follow his analysis of the nature of the event to 
deduce that ‘events do not change’ (Garrett, ibid.), Dewey’s rejection of precisely this 
principle led him to ‘the recognition of temporality’. And, whilst it may be true that, 
prior to his 1938 essay on “Time and Individuality”, Dewey nowhere treated the con-
cept of temporality either in an overt manner or in any great detail, the clues as to the 
operative function of this concept within his work, and its corresponding status within 
his naturalist philosophy, led Dewey to what Garrett terms ‘a greater 
innovation’ (Garrett 1972, 440) than was achieved by his contemporaries. 
!
4.4 Dewey’s concepts of ‘individuality’ and ‘event’ 
As Mozur establishes in his close reading of ‘Time and Individuality’, for Dewey, 
"organic behavior is a strictly temporal affair"  , a position from which it logically 53
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"  Dewey 1938a, p. 50. Cited in Mozur 1991, p. 321.53
carries that ‘organic beings are therefore intrinsically temporal entities’ (Mozur 1991, 
321). This has further implications for Dewey’s characterization of nature: by render-
ing both temporal career and time a function of the development and change of indi-
viduals, it becomes easier for us to understand Dewey’s corresponding move to estab-
lish nature as something which is fundamentally event-based.  
!
As Mozur notes, ‘The term ‘event’ is intended to express the fact that nature exhibits 
process, transaction, and connection. For Dewey, "nothing in nature is exclusively 
final” (EN, 120), a characterization which, significantly, Dewey extends as far as each 
human being (ibid., 324). In endorsing the logic of such a move, Richards (1972, 
57-8) further notes that in regarding ‘the traits of matter and mind [firstly] to be prop-
erties of natural events, and not mind the property of matter and vice versa… [and 
secondly, holding] neither mind nor matter to be reducible to the other’, Dewey 
avoids reverting to the problems of a reductionist materialist position which, in hold-
ing that a complete knowledge of the physical provides an adequate knowledge of the 
mental, cannot account for the creative complexity and dynamism of natural events. 
!
Dewey’s concept of an event, in contrast to the prevailing understanding of the word 
(Richards 1972, 62), thus becomes endowed with a more holistic, encompassing 
scope. An event ‘involves both the individual pattern of growth and the environmental 
conditions’ (ibid.), a philosophical position which at once undercuts the subject-object 
distinction, aligns itself with the phenomenon of the ‘role of the observer’ in quantum 
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mechanics   (cf. Richards 1972, 66), and renders fallacious much of the metaphysical 54
grounding for the traditional problems arising from the putative separation of cause 
and effect, mind and body, man and nature/environment, and so on (Richards 1972, 
57 & 62). 
!
Instead, for Dewey, the human individual is ‘inextricably connected to other 
events’ (ibid.), and, in Dewey’s terms, the individual "belongs in a continuous system 
of connected events which reinforce its activities and which form a world in which it 
is at home" (Dewey 1988/1925, 188. Cited in Mozur 1991, 324; cf. Richards 1972, 65 
& 66). This, then, becomes the basis upon which Dewey can establish his conclusion 
that it is illegitimate for any theory to regard physical individuals as having the ‘un-
changing, immutable natures independent of the relational, statistical, and probabilis-
tic characterizations provided by science’ (Mozur 1991, 331). It is for this basic rea-
son that Dewey is enabled to assert that time "enters into their very being (Dewey 
1988/1938/40, 107; Mozur 1991, 331)."   55
!
4.5 Dewey’s concept of ‘rhythm’ 
According to my own interpretation of Dewey’s works, allied to the corresponding 
interpretations of Dewey scholars outlined above, both the existence, and function, of 
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"  Cf. Dewey’s statement that “When a state of affairs is perceived, the perceiving-of-a-state-54
of-affairs is a further state of affairs” (EN, 101). With regard to the role of the observer in 
quantum mechanics, consult the following for an evidence-based explanation of this phe-
nomenon: http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1998/02/980227055013.htm
"  Cf. “Temporal seriality is the very essence, then, of the human individual… Individuality is 55
the uniqueness of the history, of the career, not something given once for all at the beginning 
which then proceeds to unroll as a ball of yarn may be unwound. Lincoln made history. But it 
is just as true that he made himself as an individual in the history he made” (Dewey 
1988/1938/40, 102-3. Cited in Mozur, 1991, 322-3).
a concept of temporality within Dewey’s work from 1925 onwards has been estab-
lished in considerable detail. Indeed, it has been observed by a handful of scholars, 
and they have attempted to chart its evolution and function throughout the various 
phases of Dewey’s career. The existence and delineation of such putative phases, 
however – pace Helm – remains to be established.  
!
Considering these works together, we are entitled to assert that temporality, for 
Dewey, is primarily characterized as relating to (1) a dynamic process, rather than a 
static, predetermined essence, quality, substance or attribute; and (2) a process which, 
in its privileged manifestation, arises via the interaction between a conscious, sentient 
organism   and its environment; but that this environment, being continuous with an 56
ever widening expanse such that it incorporates all systems and regions which are 
susceptible to (a) the projection of consciousness; and (b) the laws of nature and 
physics, necessarily includes both organic and non-organic entities, including such 
elementary particles as atoms and molecules.   This because I take this process in its 57
originary dimensions – both upon the plane of consciousness and those beyond it, 
down to the atomic level of the wider universe – to be characterized by what Dewey 
came to define as rhythm (AE, 169). For the purpose of my thesis, rhythm receives its 
fullest, most fruitful definition in Art as Experience (1934), where it is conceived both 
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"  Mozur also considers how Dewey can legitimately be said to have extended the scope of 56
temporality to include non-sentient elements of organic matter, such as particles, considered 
at the quantum level (1991, 328 onwards).
"  Again, reasons of space do not permit me to explore the ways in which a conscious, sentient 57
organism may or may not be held to occupy a privileged position in relation to Dewey’s con-
cept of temporality – especially in light of the anthropic principle prevalent in astrophysics 
and cosmology.
as “a matter of perception… [which] includes whatever is contributed by the self in 
the active process of perceiving”, and, significantly, that which exists as a “regularity 
of recurrence amid changing events” (AE, 169). 
!
Considering Dewey’s 1934 treatment of the concept in the light of his later develop-
ment of the concept of temporality (Dewey 1988/1938/40), rhythm, especially in 
its vital and/or expressive form (AE, 170), becomes crucial to our understanding of the 
‘full scope’ and import of the concept of temporality (cf. Calore 1989, 22) in the fol-
lowing way. Dewey’s explication of this concept not only collapses the distinction 
between the traditional conceptions of time and space, but, in parallel with Heideg-
ger’s emphasis on the prior significance of temporality (in relation to the concept of 
time), and Deleuze’s later treatment of his ‘realist ontology’, his abbreviated defini-
tion of rhythm as ‘ordered variation of changes’ (AE, 160 – emphasis mine) or ‘or-
dered variation of manifestation of energy’ (AE, 170 – emphasis mine), emphasizes 
the dynamic element within all aspects of the environment. To conceive of the envi-
ronment and its constitutive factors as varying manifestations of energy highlights the 
continuous, monistic nature of existences, and thereby, in the manner of Dewey’s re-
formulation of the Reflex Arc concept, undercuts all hypostasized and traditional dis-
tinctions of substance, object, and so on. In a move that bears strong parallels with 
Deleuze’s philosophical project, by conceiving the environment in this manner Dewey 
not only establishes the dynamic nature of the environment, but, in so doing, shifts the 
traditional privileging of a spatial conception of existence – with its insistence on di-
visibility, order and calculation – within the sciences (and, with it, the common con-
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ception of time)   to a situation whereby temporality (or temporal flow) becomes the 58
privileged form of relation, not just to reality – conceived as the plane of our creative 
act of inquiry – but to all of what Heidegger would refer to as Being. 
!
Accordingly, just as Heidegger can be seen to subvert the hierarchy wherein temporal-
ity is considered to derive from, and have less informative value than, the mathemati-
co-scientific concept of time by deriving the latter from the former; Dewey, through 
his concept of rhythm: (1) attempts to establish that temporality constitutes 
the form   and manifestation of the varied instantiations of energy which constitute 59
the full totality of existence (Being). This amounts to establishing the ‘full scope’ of 
the concept of temporality; and (2) seeks to demonstrate that temporality not only de-
fines the form of existence at the micro level, or that which is strictly beyond the 
scope of consciousness (e.g. AE, 13-14. Cf. Mozur 1991, 328 onwards), but also de-
fines the form of any historical career or manner of existence (e.g. AE, 14; cf. Calore 
1989, 19 & 22). In this way temporality can be considered the basis for 
experience per se, and thus becomes a foundational concept in relation to the natural-
istic investigation of experience and nature, particularly as it regards the notion of 




"  See Mckeon 1974, 126-7; Scott 2006, 184.58
!  E.g. “I emphasized the dependence of this final work [of art] upon the existence of rhythms 59
in nature; as I pointed out, they are the conditions of form in experience and hence of expres-
sion.” AE, 169.
4.6 Dewey’s educative process: The concept of 'growth' within Democracy and 
Education  
My interest in examining the concept of growth as it is unfolded within Democracy 
and Education comes, in part, from a rejoinder by Dewey to those who sought to crit-
icize the implications of his conception of that process. After considering these objec-
tions, Dewey says of growth, simply: "...the conception is one that must find universal 
and not specialized limited application."   There are many possible interpretations of 60
the import of that sentence, but, for me, of particular significance is the relationship it 
forges with a wider tradition of naturalist philosophy, but most particularly with those 
projects which, in regarding life as an ongoing and dynamic process of becoming, 
seek to ground their ontology in concepts and notions adequate to the peculiar vitality 
of life as it is lived. For if we take a philosopher such as Gilles Deleuze, a central part 
of his philosophy of difference was the attempt to move away from the traditional 
philosophical procedure, which finds its archetype in Kantian transcendental idealism, 
whereby the tools of thought – about life, about ourselves, about our environment, 
about society – are secured by an abstract, transcendent and immutable conceptual 
basis which, necessarily, is fundamentally foreign to the dynamism of lived experi-
ence. As with Deleuze's project, so with Dewey's. It is, accordingly, the purpose of 
this paper to outline the nature of growth as perceived by Dewey within Democracy 
and Education, and trace its ramifications as they impact upon other concepts of im-
portance within his oeuvre.  
!
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The importance of the concept of growth for Dewey is underscored not only by the 
fact that an entire chapter (Chapter 4) is devoted to its examination, but by the ir-
refragable link which is drawn between it and the concept of education. As befits such 
a fundamental concept, we are, early in the aforementioned chapter, given an explicit-
ly temporalized definition of growth as 'This cumulative movement of action toward a 
later result' (DE, 41). It becomes obvious from the very word 'This' used at the start of 
the sentence that the definition is not sufficient as an informative statement unaccom-
panied by either context or further explication. Setting aside for the moment an exam-
ination of the key words action and result, the import of the definition is clarified if 
we turn to the preceding two sentences of the chapter, where we find a discussion of 
the nature of society, which is held to be determined largely 'upon the direction chil-
dren's activities were given at an earlier period' (DE, 41). Of immediate significance 
is the link between the plural noun activities and the term action, both of which can 
trace their etymology to Latin stems denoting agency, particularly agere "to do". The 
employment in this way of two such terms, one as a central term within a crucial defi-
nition, the other as signal within the context of the definition, gives us a first indica-
tion of the importance of the notion of agency – or what might be termed positive 
force – within Dewey's philosophy, the full implications of which are only made ap-
parent in the subsequent discussion of immaturity.   61
!
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"  Here positive force can be given the provisional definition as any unfolding of an act, im61 -
pulse or movement such that it brings about an effect in a given environment.
Throughout this discussion, Dewey is at pains to differentiate between a deficient and 
an adequate definition of the word immaturity, going on to use the latter definition as 
a tool to reveal the underlying assumptions which render the former problematic for 
any plausible philosophy of education. Particularly problematic in this regard is the 
interpretation the prefix 'im' as denoting lack or void, this for the reason that the ab-
sence referenced by these terms necessarily implies an ideal or standard to which 
they are compared and found deficient. Such a standard, in this case, would seem to 
be the fully grown adult which exists as the end point – or finished product – of the 
process of growth. By importing this standard as the operant measure of development, 
such a view comes, by extension, to characterize growth as a systematic movement 
towards the realization of a pre-determined end state, which, in being pre-determined, 
is undergone by an organism in (largely) passive fashion. Aside from the fact that the 
systematic nature of this process reduces the possible function and role of freedom 
within its realization, it also minimizes the capacity of the organism involved in 
growth to realize differing and different potentialities. As against this view, Dewey is 
careful to assert: 
!
    "Now when we say that immaturity means the possibility of growth, we are not re-
ferring to the absence of powers which may exist at a later time; we express a force 
positively present – the ability to develop" (DE, 41-2).     
!
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In doing so, we must note that Dewey achieves two aims which will be of signifi-
cance later in the work: firstly, he secures the basis for his conception of growth with-
in the empirically verifiable dynamism of the ongoing life-process itself; and, second-
ly, in this way, he prepares the way for growth to play a fundamental role in determin-
ing education as a similarly dynamic process, and what is more, a process which is 
irreducibly linked to the conditions of life. But of importance for our present position 
within the text is this notion of possibility, and what this entails for the logic of 
Dewey's concept of growth. 
!
For it becomes apparent that implicit within his description of immaturity as a state 
of possibility, and his subsequent connection of this condition with positive powers, 
that Dewey is attempting to construct an overall conception of growth which is radi-
cally different to that commonly received. The traditional perception of growth might 
accurately be said to emphasize a physical basis, and one in which the physical organ-
ism increases its size, strength or area through a process of cellular and muscular ex-
pansion. Second to the physical is the mental aspect, wherein growth is regarded as 
'an approximation to a final and unchanging goal' of a the correct intellectual ability 
or state of mind, as, for example, when a child 'grows' as a student by supplying the 
correct answers to questions on taught subject matter. Yet, for Dewey, regardless of 
whether it is a matter of physical or mental growth, the process of its coming to 
fruition is characterized by an active and motivated engagement with the environment 
on the part of the organism. This same engagement, in altering the surrounding envi-
ronment in a manner which, in turn, reciprocally affects the organism's possibility for 
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action (ideally in a positive way), thereby reinforces the impetus within the organism 
to repeat the process of motivated active engagement (DE, 44-5).   The procedure by 62
which this becomes possible relies on the fact that, according to Dewey, the nascent 
state of immaturity is defined by two traits, dependence and plasticity, the function for 
each being represented as an aspect of constructive power oriented towards the ex-
pansion of an organism's capacity (DE, 42). 
!
Dependence, the first term, is usually perceived as a state of in-ability characterized 
by a basic passivity: that is, a state of helplessness. The nature of such a position 
would suggest that the organism, with time, would fail to develop at all; yet the fact 
that a sustained period of dependence within the human infant results in the emer-
gence of a socialized being of multi-faceted capacities and powers suggests the con-
structive nature of the term (DE, 42). For it is the case that, in fact, the inherent mech-
anisms of maturation for a child may generally be perceived to act towards the initia-
tion of socializing engagement with others, whereby a sensitivity to the means by 
which one creates, and then responds communicatively towards, attitudes within oth-
ers comes to be the dominant mode of expression (DE, 43).  
!
Underpinning, and, indeed, consolidating the effectiveness of this power is the capaci-
ty for plasticity, defined as 'the ability to learn form experience; the power to retain 
from one experience something which is of avail in coping with [later] 
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difficulties' (DE, 44). It is this power which may be said to provide for a structured 
deployment of the instinctive tendencies/reactions in relation to the surrounding envi-
ronment. Not only this, but the power also retains a capacity of detachment whereby 
the results of deploying certain instinctual reactions, or combinations thereof, are lent 
a lasting mental significance, and, being thus memorized in relation to particular mo-
tor sequences, are stored in memory as informative guides (or cues, perhaps) to future 
action. Repeated testing and variation of the constituent impulses comprising such 
reactions as applied to the environment ensures a continuing flexibility within the 
propensity for intellectual and emotional disposition formation, a power which finds 
its full expression in the learning and acquisition of habits (DE, 44). 
!
The concept of habit is crucial to a full understanding of the nature and implications 
of Dewey's concept of growth. Instead, once again, of habit existing as a relatively 
passive form of adaptation to our environment, it exists rather as a form of learnt 'ex-
ecutive skill' (DE, 46), one which denotes the capacity and the means by which an 
organism can utilize the environment to its intended ends. That is, it represents the 
capacity for an active control of the environment. Given that Dewey accepts a possi-
ble definition of education as 'the acquisition of those habits that effect an adjustment 
of an individual and his environment' (DE, 46), it becomes clear that the acquisition 
of habits not only sustains an organism's capacity for learning about itself in relation 
to its environment. For in employing a repeated and varied application of the intellec-
tual element, the active operation of habits results in the continued maintenance of the 
capacity for elasticity within an organism's oriented disposition: a flexibility which, in 
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increasing the adequacy of our understanding of ourselves in relation to the changing 
environment, represents the chief condition of possibility for continued and consoli-
dating growth. 
!
Existing in this way as the dynamic process by which life, in its particular instantia-
tion as an organism, co-opts the forces inherent within the environment such that they 
realize, and then expand, the potential nascent within an organism's structure, growth 
comes to be regarded in its essential basis as an open-ended tendency. As such, it op-
erates within Dewey's philosophy as the conceptual basis whereby he can distinguish 
his theory from those of practitioners such as Herbart –'Mind' as wholly formed by its 
externally presented contents (DE, 69–72) – and Froebel – development as 'the un-
folding of a ready-made latent principle’ (DE, 58) – whose theories he regarded as 
extinguishing the grounds for an intrinsically creative and positive conception of 
growth which is adequate to the developmental condition of life. 
!
4.7. Dewey and temporality: A comprehensive reading 
As per the primary contention of my thesis, regardless of the prevailing stage-based 
narrative of the evolution of Dewey’s concept of temporality arising from the work of 
Helm (1985) and Richards (1972), a fully functional, if implicit, concept of temporali-
ty can be discerned within Dewey’s work as early as his 1896 paper, The Reflex Arc 
Concept in Psychology.  
!
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Analysis of the nature of the ‘circuit’ put forward in that paper shows that, alongside 
other developments, Dewey’s reformulation of the reflex arc concept abandons the 
structure of a straightforward linear causal progression in the following fashion. The 
significance of the ‘circuit’, as Dewey explains, is that it is not comprised of distinct 
or disjointed parts which relate to each other in simply a linear causal manner. The 
circuit itself finds both its meaning and value in ‘the mediation of experience’ (RCP, 
360 – emphasis mine) making it an occurrence in which the different aspects of the 
process derive both their function and significance ‘purely from the part played in 
maintaining or reconstituting’ (RCP, 360) the coordination comprising that experi-
ence.   
!
For this to be the case, the circuit must proceed in a nonlinear manner. This is con-
firmed when Dewey states that the designated ‘last’ phase of the circuit (the burn sen-
sation), represents the ‘completion’ or ‘fulfillment’ of the opening stage (RCP, 359). 
Thus the final stage not only ‘reacts into’ the opening stage (emphasis mine), but 
comes to reconstitute its sense, meaning and value such that an incidence of ‘learning’ 
occurs (RCP, 359).  It is precisely in this manner, that of a circuit, that Dewey’s natu-
ralistic method operates as the means to an informative analysis of experience.   63
!
Furthermore, a close reading of Dewey’s structural explication of the concept not only 
confirms this, but also provides the formulation of an initial outline for the concept of 
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temporality underlying the operation of his reflex arc circuit, and, by implication, oth-
er psychological processes within the human organism.  
!
The key statements in this regard center on two of Dewey’s crucial claims: (a) that the 
determination of the ‘sensory stimulus’ or ‘motor response’ status of occurrences is 
related to the conscious awareness of a ‘problem’ concerning how to act within a giv-
en situation  ; and (b) that the ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’ phases are ‘strictly correla64 -
tive and contemporaneous’ (RCP, 370 – emphasis mine).  
!
With regard to (a): Dewey’s positing of a unifying principle underlying the reflex arc 
renders consciousness central to the stimulus/sensation-response/movement problem-
atic. Dewey collapses the distinction between the stimulus/sensation-response/move-
ment phases of the arc by showing they are not ‘distinctions of existence’, but rather 
‘teleological distinctions, that is, distinctions of function… with reference to or main-
taining an end’ (RCP, 365).  This reformulation effectively changes the structure of 
the coordination in two ways: (1) by removing the need for the arc to preserve distinct 
categories, linked by a linear relationship of cause and effect  , and dependent upon 65
correspondence to discrete external objects for their validity and continued separation; 
and (2) by transferring the locus of the reflex arc’s dynamic to the projection of teleo-
logical consciousness, Dewey requires that the meaning/value of each phase be de-
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"  Hence: “The circle is a coordination, some of whose members have come into conflict with 64
each other. It is the temporary disintegration and need of reconstitution which occasions, 
which affords the genesis of, the conscious distinction into sensory stimulus on one side and 
motor response on the other” (RCP, 370).
"  E.g. the (sensory) stimulus-as-light causes the (motor) response-as-reaching, etc.65
rived retroactively, and solely as a matter connected with the interpretation of a 
phase’s function in accomplishing the projected telos of that same situation. Thus, no 
longer existing as a particular physical or psychical identity by itself (RCP, 368), each 
occurrence within the arc – whether sensation, stimulus, movement or response – ‘has 
no fixed quality of its own’ (RCP, 368-9).  That is, each becomes co-extensive with 
the others as a mere act, the value/meaning of which, as a matter of situational inter-
pretation, is necessarily both contingent and transferrable. Put another way, we might 
say that the ‘coordination’ of the arc is demonstrated in this way to be both dynamic 
and self-organizing. It is only in this regard that we can make sense of Dewey’s 
statement that ‘one and the same occurrence plays either or both parts [sensation and/
or stimulus, movement and/or response], according to the shift of interest’ (RCP, 
364). 
!
That this has implications for the structure of temporality underlying the coordination 
is confirmed by Dewey’s second claim  : that stimulus and response phases are 66
‘strictly correlative and contemporaneous’. Consequently, we are entitled to use it as 
the basis of our attempt to discern the outline of the concept of temporality within The 
Reflex Arc essay.  
!
For the purposes of our full explication of the concept of temporality, it is essential to 
remark that Dewey terms the phases of the arc ‘contemporaneous’ because they are 
also ‘correlative’.  The definition of ‘correlative’ here is ambiguous, split between 
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meaning “Having a reciprocal relation such that each necessarily implies, or is com-
plementary to, the other” and “Related in the way of analogy, similarity; correspond-
ing, analogous.”   The latter definition, with the emphasis on things being 67
‘analogous’, renders the phases logically equivalent to one another  , a move which, 68
in removing any inherent quality upon which a predetermined linear causal order may 
be premised, requires that each factor be susceptible to the simultaneous projective 
determination of attention, itself continually open to revision, reorganization and re-
constitution. That is, each factor, as defined by Dewey, must be both dynamic and 
self-organizing. It is only on this basis that Dewey can claim: 
!
    “Now the response is not only uncertain, but the stimulus is equally uncertain… 
The real problem may be … stated as either to discover the right stimulus… or to 
discover… the response.” (RCP, 367) 
!
Given the similarities in terminology usage – compare the aforementioned terms ‘un-
certain’ and problem’, with Dewey’s later use of ‘doubtfulness’, ‘unsettled’ and ‘dis-
turbed’, for example (cf. Dewey 1938, 105; Richards 1972, 60) – it is fruitful at this 
stage to recognize the emergence of a significant overlap between this early statement 
of Dewey’s psychological theory, and his later theory of inquiry, as stated in his 1938 
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tionary (Second Edition). Retrieved from http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/41936
"  A conclusion warranted by Dewey’s use of the functionalist model, wherein “sensation as 68
stimulus does not mean any particular psychical existence. It means simply a function, and 
will have its value shift according to the special work requiring to be done. At one moment 
the various activities of reaching and withdrawing will be the sensation… At the next mo-
ment, the previous act of seeing will furnish the sensation…” (RCP, 368).
work Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. As noted by Richards (1972, 60), Dewey pro-
ceeds from the premise that ‘The first phase or condition of inquiry is the engagement 
of the human organism in a situation which is pre-cognitively experienced as unset-
tled and disturbed’, one that, in Dewey’s words, is pervaded with a ‘unique doubtful-
ness which makes that situation to be just and only the situation it is (Dewey 1938a, 
105). 
!
The feeling of uneasiness generates the second phase of inquiry, what Richards calls 
‘the cognitive apprehension of the problematic of the situation’ (1972, 61). With the 
shock of the breakdown of habit, ‘inquiry is underway’ (ibid.). If we examine this 
immediate situation of broken habit and immediate inquiry within the temporalized 
terms of the Reflex Arc, it would appear that the putative cognizance of specific fac-
tors within the situation of the present scene elicits an expectation/anticipation (that 
is, a projective, futural mode of circumspection) which derives from the dynamics of 
the neural patterns/attractors created by the past actions of the perception-action sys-
tem. Borrowing some present-day terminology from Deleuze’s philosophy, it is the 
nature of ‘attractors’ within the brain to govern what happens next, via the futural 
sense of expectation, but because these have been inappropriately applied/misapplied 
to the present scene/task at hand, a discrepancy between expectation and observation 
has resulted in a perturbation of the system. In this scenario, the ‘doubt’ surrounding 
the next act creates what we might term ‘a non-specific’ energy which self-
organizes to the extent of increasing the likelihood of either a predominant behavior 
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pattern, or else a changed organization of behavior.   This non-specific energy thus 69
provides, according to the Dewey of The Reflex Arc, ‘a motivation to attend to what 
has just taken place; to define it more carefully’ (RCP, 368), in the service of reconsti-
tuting the interpretative expectation. In the terminology of his later theory of inquiry, 
this ‘motivation’ to ‘attend’ to the scene, and provide a more careful ‘definition’, rep-
resents the moment at which inquiry is embarked upon, or set underway. In a manner 
reminiscent of his later, temporalized theory of inquiry, it also confirms the dynamic 
and necessarily self-organizing capacity of the arc’s ‘coordination’, in terms of the 
logic of Dewey’s psychological theory, stated as early as 1896. 
!
According to Richards (1972, 60), ‘Dewey takes his theory of inquiry to be funda-
mentally an articulation and refinement of scientific method… The discovery of the 
method of inquiry… [was also] a critical discovery of the way in which thinking is 
actually carried on, the way in which thought takes place and knowledge is secured.’  
In the light of the foregoing, it becomes apparent that the comparison between the 
theoretical framework Dewey exhibits in his Reflex Arc paper (1896), and that of his 
theory of education – especially as it is outlined in both Democracy and Education, 
and his concept of inquiry (in Dewey 1938a) – might provide a detailed indication of 
the presence of an operational concept of temporality. The key points of focus thus 
center on (1) the role of what Dewey terms ‘function’ as it is regarded in relation to 
what also may be termed, in light of Dewey’s essay ‘Events and the Future’, 
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‘context’  ; (2) the dynamic nature of cognition; (3) the (future-oriented) concepts of 70
‘anticipation’ and ‘expectation’; and, relatedly, (4) the significance of what we might 
call, in line with the discipline of thermodynamics, ‘a perturbation of the system’ in 
relation to Dewey’s notions of ‘conflict’ and ‘uncertainty’. 
!
When Dewey terms sensation-as-stimulus a ‘function’ he means that its status is sim-
ply that of an undetermined factor within a coordination of factors, though it is a fac-
tor whose value will become determined in the light of the aim which attention 
projects upon the situation.   The function of a factor thereby becomes determined via 71
a temporalized interrelation between the projective attention of the organism and the 
features of the present situation it considers significant. Thus function for Dewey op-
erates as the correlate of what we might describe – following development of this 
concept in various scientific and psychological disciplines – as a process of ‘self-or-
ganization’, which arises from the interrelation of motor and neural subsystems and 
the salient constraints of the perceived context, a (temporalized) process which arrives 
at stability in the effort of coordination, allowing the demands of the task at hand to 
be successfully negotiated. 
!
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"  This will be considered in greater detail when we consider the relations between Dewey 71
and Deleuze’s philosophy in Chapter 5, below. Cf. RCP, 368: “… [S]ensation as stimulus 
does not mean any particular psychical existence. It means simply a function, and will have 
its value shift according to the special work requiring to be done.” It should be noted, here, 
that I will use the terms coordination and situation as interchangeable within this thesis.
Similarly, Dewey’s emphasis on attention’s role in being able to ‘shift’ (determine) the 
value of a perceived factor of the situation in relation to a projected telos underscores 
the necessarily dynamic nature of the system including perception and mental activity 
(cognition).  The fact of this dynamism is confirmed by Dewey when he states that 
the distinction between stimulus and response arises retroactively, and only courtesy 
of the projection of a telos onto the situation – thereby rendering the distinction a mat-
ter ‘of interpretation.’    In this way, Dewey’s prioritization of attention within the act 72
of seeing directly conforms to what would typically be defined as ‘dynamic cogni-
tion’. 
!
It is here that the importance of the underlying concept of temporality becomes appar-
ent, both for Dewey’s psychological theory, and to the related theory of learning. In 
defining cognition as necessarily dynamic, Dewey’s psychology must incorporate 
within the psychological systems and processes connected to cognition an element 
capable of conceiving ‘future’ action as it relates to the immediate situation/
context.     73
!
Accordingly, we find within Dewey’s ‘sensori-motor coordination’ (RCP, 361) the 
requirement that there is an ‘anticipatory sensation’ or ‘image’ of the movements 
made possible by the situation, accompanied by a sense of their respective values, 
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"  RCP, 366 : “It is only the assumed common reference to an inclusive end which marks 72
each member off as stimulus and response, that apart from such reference we have only an-
tecedent and consequent; in other words, the distinction is one of interpretation.”
"  In addition to Dewey’s notion of the projective teleology of attention, mentioned above.  73
‘before attention will go to the seeing to break it up as a sensation of light… of a par-
ticular kind.’    74
!
Similarly, we find that in regard to a key feature of Dewey’s psychology and the 
emerging understanding of dynamical systems theory in present-day cognitive sci-
ence, there is not only a direct correlation, but that the comparison of both engenders 
a subsequent discovery which supplements Dewey’s original statement of his Reflex 
Arc theory. This is because a key aspect of Dewey’s coordination (i.e. his reformulat-
ed reflex arc concept) is that, just as with his theory of inquiry, the significant phases 
become conscious as a factor of attention because a perceived ‘conflict’ within the 
coordination induces a sense of ‘uncertainty’ about how to complete it.    Dewey’s 75
notion of uncertainty thus becomes what we might now call ‘perturbation’, with 
Dewey’s notion of conflict becoming coextensive with a modern day concept of dis-
crepancy in the environment. A full statement of this position by a representative of 
the current field of nonlinear dynamics within developmental psychology, both con-
firms the correlation, and introduces the new element of a ‘self-organized’ and ‘non-
specific energy’, itself the very model of a necessarily dynamic cognition: 
!
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"  RCP, 368 (emphasis mine). That the organization of the futural element of anticipation oc74 -
curs before the final determination of the (putative) initial stimulus is instructive for our later 
explication of the concept of temporality. Here it is sufficient to note that it confirms the non-
linear nature of both Dewey’s reflex circuit, as well as any temporality that connects with this.
"  RCP, 368: “The sensation or conscious stimulus is not a thing or existence by itself; it is 75
that phase of a coördination requiring attention because, by reason of the conflict within the 
coördination, it is uncertain how to complete it.”
    “One important requirement… is that a discrepancy between expectation and ob-
servation results in a perturbation of the system. It has long been known from stud-
ies of both human and animal behavior that within a given context, several types of 
objective environmental change (discrepancies) result in creation of nonspecific en-
ergy, which is then self-organized in the sense of increasing the likelihood of occur-
rence of the predominant behaviors… or change the organization of behavior. (Met-
zger 1997, 64.)” 
!
A more succinct description of the conditions and initial structure of a thoroughly 
temporalized act of inquiry could hardly be imagined. Furthermore, the grounds for a 
re-examination of Dewey’s early psychological work, especially in the light of its in-
cipient theory of temporality, are also established. The fact that Dewey’s psychologi-
cal theory, via consideration of the concept of temporality, remains relevant and ade-
quate to a present-day philosophy describing the functioning of the brain, thought 
processes and the understanding, is more than enough reason to pursue this line of 
thought in a more comprehensive fashion as part of a doctoral dissertation. 
!
4.8. Summary 
From the foregoing it has been established that a concept of temporality does exist 
throughout Dewey’s work, in both explicit and implicit form. The explicit form of the 
concept receives treatment in the signal works from Experience and Nature (1925) 
onwards, with perhaps its cardinal statement in the 1938/40 piece ‘Time and Individ-
uality’. It has also been established, however, that an implicit and innovative concep-
tion of temporality can be discerned as far back as Dewey’s 1896 reformulation of the 
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reflex arc concept in psychology. Both items are of significance for my proposed the-
sis inquiry because it is my contention that this extant concept of temporality: (1) is 
the grounding or foundational concept required for the possibility of an adequate con-
cept of experience  ; and (2) an adequate understanding of the learning process is not 76
possible without an adequate concept of experience. If this can be shown, it is then 
hoped that explication of this grounding, or foundational role, will better allow the 
work of educational philosophers to deal adequately and in a structured manner with 
the everyday ‘content’ or ‘substance’ of the terms ‘learning’ and ‘inquiry’ as they are 
considered in relation to educative experience.  
!
Relatedly, with regard to the notion of the ‘learning process’ as it functions within a 
putative educative process: it is proposed that Dewey’s concept of temporality, in both 
explicit and implicit forms, suggests that we abandon a conception of the learning 
process as comprising anything amounting to a causally linear, straightforwardly se-
quential course. Analysis of Dewey’s concept of temporality, and the ways in which it 
both links with, and corroborates, recent studies of the learning process premised on 
temporally asymmetric, nonlinear lines – e.g those premised on a spike-timing-de-
pendent Hebbsian mechanism, or the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (explored in Chap-
ter 3) – will enable us to determine that Dewey’s theoretical positions, as he stated 
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"  That is, it is a necessary condition for experience to occur.76
them, have both a proven informative value and continuing relevance in relation to 
current fields of inquiry within educational theory more broadly conceived.   77
!
This last will be consolidated through an explication of Dewey’s own theory of learn-
ing   – as it is outlined in his 1916 work Democracy and Education – which will be 78
shown to employ the nonlinear, temporally asymmetric concept of temporality estab-
lished above. It is hoped that this will then provide the means by which to link the 
theoretical and conceptual work of philosophers of education in general, and John 
Dewey’s work in particular, in a more adequate and concrete fashion to the issues and 
concerns of the current field of education, particularly as it relates to the notion of 










"  In this regard it should be noted that ‘the commonly received processes of learning’ may be 77
found inadequate, premised as they are on a causally linear, sequence-based, or temporally 
symmetric notion of experience through time. See, e.g. McClintock, R. 2012, page 58 on-
wards; Dewey’s reformulation of the ‘Reflex Arc’ concept, below; and work on learning aris-
ing from Hebbs. D. O. 1949, e.g. Rao, R. P. N. & Sejnowski, T. J. 2001, and Gutig. R. 
Aharonov. R. Rotter. S. & Sompolinsky. H. 2003.
!  I will use the terms ‘learning’ and ‘inquiry’ interchangeably unless specified.78
Chapter 5  
Dewey’s concept of temporality: Implications for the current field of education !
Part I: Theory !
5.1. Kant, Heidegger, Deleuze and Dewey: A recapitulation 
In the previous chapters, we saw how Kant provided Dewey, Heidegger and Deleuze 
with the idea and demonstration that (1) time is interwoven in our experience, our 
lived world, and our being as humans; (2) the need for an underlying (transcendental, 
in Kant’s term), determinative object ‘x’ (the noumena), which must structure our 
thoroughly temporalized experience (this structure becomes ‘rhythm’ for Dewey, as 
we saw in Chapter 4, Section 5; Being for Heidegger, especially as it comes into rela-
tion to Dasein’s ‘horizon’  ; and ‘the virtual’ for Deleuze). That we were justified in 79
doing so is confirmed by Heidegger’s remarks, in Being and Time, that “The first and 
only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension 
of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phe-
nomena themselves is Kant” (BT, 45/H23). 
!
But Heidegger goes on to point out, however, that there are significant problems with 
Kant’s presentation of time and temporality, going so far as to acknowledge that with-
in Being and Time, “we shall show why Kant could never achieve an insight into the 
problematic of Temporality” (H23). The problems Heidegger found to stand in the 
way of Kant gaining such an insight were twofold, the main one for our purposes be-
ing that: 
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"  For an insightful and persuasive account of how Heidegger’s reading of Kant establishes 79
horizon as the form of Dasein’s relation with being (and thus the equivalent of Kant’s notion 
of transcendence), see Golob 2013.
!
    “Furthermore, in spite of the fact that he [Kant] was bringing the phenomenon of 
time back into the subject again, his analysis of it remained oriented towards the tradi-
tional way in which time had ordinarily been understood; in the long run this kept him 
from working out the phenomenon of a ‘transcendental determination of time’ in its 
own structure and function.” (H24) !
Given that we wish to examine the ways in which temporality - especially as it is 
found within Dewey’s early work - exists as a radical departure from the ‘traditional 
way in which time had ordinarily been understood,’ that in itself is a pressing reason 
why we acknowledge the foundation for our study laid by Kant, but turn our attention 
to the later philosophers. Indeed, it is here, too that we must take our leave even from 
Heidegger: this for the reason that, though he has provided the most decisive ground 
for our study - that in which temporality as a discrete and viable concept, one which 
can be fruitfully examined on its own terms, has been distinguished from the concept 
of time - his philosophy is most (self-)avowedly not based upon naturalistic grounds. 
Given one of the aims of this thesis is to examine the way in which the concept of 
temporality within Dewey’s work - and, by extension, that of Deleuze - is based upon 
naturalistic foundations, and therefore compatible with current findings in, among 
other fields, both neuroscience and psychology, then it becomes clear that from here 
onwards we must instead confine ourselves to presenting a nuanced, detailed explica-
tion of the concept of temporality as it is provided by Dewey, and also by Deleuze. 
!
Furthermore, for Dewey and Deleuze at least, Kant’s philosophy must be rejected for 
its hypostatized distinctions, divisions, and teleologically determined aspect. Dewey 
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and Deleuze would counter, for example, that experience, our being, and the world, 
are interactive and open-ended phenomena.   80
!
For, according to one reading, the Kantian system can be seen as analogous to the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics, i.e. as a closed system that is isolated from its envi-
ronment, and thus susceptible to being ‘run down’ as entropy increases. We draw the 
legitimacy of this reading from several remarks Dewey makes about Kant’s philo-
sophic method in his 1884 monograph on that subject, particularly: 
!
    “Though the categories make experience, they make it out of a foreign material to 
which they bear a purely external relation. They constitute objects, but these objects 
are not such in universal reference, but only to beings of like capacities of receptivity 
as ourselves. They respect not existence in itself, but ourselves as affected by that ex-
istence. The system of categories furnishes the criterion for all the knowledge we 
have, but this turns out to be no real knowledge.” (Dewey 1884, 166-7) !
On Dewey’s reading, then, the categories, as a system counted over against experi-
ence, comprise of an ‘abstracted’ - a loaded word in Dewey’s lexicon   - pole of a du81 -
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"  Needless to say, Heidegger would reject this interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. Indeed, 80
his 1927/8 lecture course “Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Rea-
son,” along with his 1929 essay “Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics” go to the extent of 
providing a ‘violent’ reinterpretation of Kant’s project to establish (at least), in Golob’s words, 
that 1: “Time thus plays both the role allotted to it by mainstream Kantians and that tradition-
ally reserved for the understanding; as Heidegger puts it, ‘time is the schema-image and not 
just the form of intuition’…; and 2: “Heidegger believes that this violence [of his re-reading] 
is not arbitrary but that in unearthing the link between the Schematism and the concept of a 
horizon he has exposed the ‘concealed, inner passion’ of Kant’s thought” (Golob 2013, 
364-5). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore Heidegger’s reading of Kant, our pri-
mary purpose being to explicate Dewey’s early concept of temporality, with a secondary pur-
pose of exploring the links and parallels it bears with Deleuze’s concept of time. Heidegger 
role here is thus restricted to 1. establishing temporality as a concept distinct from time; and 
2. thereby providing western philosophy with legitimate and comprehensive grounds for a 
distinct strand of temporal philosophy (of which Dewey’s thought plays a significant part).
"  See Winther 2014 for an analysis of Dewey’s consideration of both the dangers and merits 81
of ‘abstraction’, especially as it relates to his (necessarily negative) notion of ‘the philosophic 
fallacy.’
alism (or binary) set over and against the foreign, unknown substratum of experience. 
Indeed, by contrasting the a priori nature of the categories (as form) against the a pos-
teriori nature of experience (as content), Kant, on Dewey’s reading, renders the cate-
gories as universal, unalterable and infallible, regardless of whatever the unfolding of 
experience offers. Read from the perspective of Dewey’s interactive, non-dualistic 
and transactional philosophy, the Kantian a priori/a posteriori dualism becomes an 
entirely artificial philosophical projection, as well as the basis of an unnecessary 
philosophical ‘problem’ concerning how we can be said to validate and legitimate 
what we call knowledge, based as it is on our experience. Indeed, as noted in our 
comments on the confusion surrounding the concept of time throughout history (In-
troduction to Chapter 2, below), the Kantian a priori/a posteriori dualism, erected as it 
is on the table of the Categories, can be held largely responsible for determining the 
tenor of much of the subsequent investigations of time; those investigations seemingly 
being more concerned to preserve the logical consistency of the abstract concepts re-
lated to time (such as the Categories), rather than exploring and establishing time’s 
adequacy to experience.   82
!
As such, the abstracted and artificial nature of the Kantian a priori/categories-a poste-
riori/content dualism bears a strong parallel with the nature of the original, inadequate 
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"  Cf. (1) “Since the categories, in and through self-consciousness, constitute experience, 82
Method will consist in making out a complete table of these categories in all their mutual rela-
tions, giving each its proper placing, with the full confidence that when so placed each will 
have its proper place in experience, i. e., its capacity for expressing reality determined.” 
Dewey 1884,166; and (2) “Hence, it appears that our picture of a method was doubly false - 
false in that after all it could not reach truth; false in that after all no such method was in itself 
possible. Our organic system of categories cannot constitute absolute truth - and no such or-
ganic system is itself knowable. Criterion and method we are still without. The golden prize, 
which seemed just within our hands as long as we confined ourselves to the Transcendental 
Logic, turns out to be a tinsel superfluity.” Ibid., 167.
’Reflex Arc Concept’ which, as we saw in the previous chapter, through its illegiti-
mate partitioning of aspects of an experience into such items as ‘sensation’ and ‘idea’, 
‘stimulus’ and ‘response’, erects through the backdoor dualisms which render the re-
flex arc itself entirely incapable of evincing the dynamic, contextual and interactive 
nature of a phase of experience.   83
!
For Dewey and Deleuze, on the other hand, all systems are open-ended and interrelat-
ed, and not necessarily susceptible to entropy in the same manner as with the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics. Indeed, open systems allow for the exchange of energy, 
matter and entropy across boundaries, making it possible to simultaneously satisfy 
nature’s desire for an increase in entropy and yet have an increase in complexity and 
organization at the same time.  
!
It will be the purpose of this chapter, then, to explore the nature of the ‘open’ concept 
of experience which Dewey’s work exhibits, particularly as it is both structured and 
made possible by Dewey’s novel concept of temporality. As we proceed, the overlaps 
between Dewey and Deleuze’s philosophies will be explored, as will the contempo-
rary science, explicated by Manuel DeLanda’s careful exposition of Deleuze’s work 
in Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, which serves as the naturalist foundation 
from which both Dewey and Deleuze’s work proceed. As an illustration of each of 
these aspects, as well as the potential Dewey’s concept of temporality holds for ed-
ucative inquiry, we will then construct a reformulated concept of temporality, which 
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"  Winther agrees that the parallel drawn between Dewey’s criticisms of the Reflex Arc and 83
those of Kant’s philosophic method is highly both legitimate and instructive. See Winther 
2014, 14-15.




From the foregoing examination of both Kant’s transcendental idealist explication of 
the conditions of experience in general, and his conception of the crucial role time 
plays in making experience possible in particular, we are entitled to conclude that 
Kant’s philosophy lent much to the construction of Dewey and Deleuze’s own con-
cepts of time and temporality. But those debts now remarked upon in detail, it is the 
purpose of this present chapter to consider the significant departures from Kant’s 
work made by Dewey and Deleuze individually, before exploring the prevalent affini-
ties and overlaps shared between Dewey and Deleuze’s conceptions of temporality 
and time. Stated directly, the project of this chapter is to suggest that: (a), contrary to 
the superficial appearances intimated by any putative divide between ‘continental’ and 
‘analytic’ philosophy, Dewey’s concept of temporality not only exists within a distinct 
tradition of temporal-based philosophies such as those presented by (but not limited 
to) Henri Bergson, Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze; it, in fact (b), from The Re-
flex Arc Concept in Psychology onwards, constitutes one of the earliest statements of 
such a conception. Furthermore (c), with the concept of temporality in the Reflex 
Arc existing as a significant departure for this tradition in its own right, it represents a 
concept of temporality which Dewey continued to refine and enlarge such that it 
came, eventually, to provide a framework for temporality which exhibits a strong and 
detailed parallel to that taken-up by Gilles Deleuze and re-applied to late twentieth 
century scientific and philosophical thought. This being the case (d), the reconceived 
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concept of temporality which this chapter seeks to construct - via the combination of 
Dewey and Deleuze’s work on this same concept - is one that not only underlies much 
current philosophical, neuro-biological and psychological work on the preconditions 
required for the possibility of educational experience, but one that provides the outline 
for a significant departure in considering anew particular issues that may be seen to 
present an obstacle to the full and proper fruition of such educational experience. 
!
5.3. Dewey and Deleuze: The concept of temporality reformulated 
We saw in Chapter 4, above, that Dewey’s 1896 reformulation of the Reflex Arc con-
cept in psychology provides the basis for a full and significant concept of temporality 
to be explicated. This concept not only represents a significant departure from the 
concept of temporality which underlies the previous formulation of the Reflex Arc 
concept; it also foreshadows to a highly detailed degree Dewey’s development of his 
concepts of time and temporality throughout his career, and particularly his mature 
statement of the concept of temporality from Experience and Nature (1925) through 
to his full statement of the concept in Time and Individuality (1938). 
!
That this should be so cannot simply be taken upon faith or assertion, however. But 
that significant overlaps do exist between Dewey’s 1896 conception of temporality 
and that developed in Experience and Nature is evidenced repeatedly throughout the 
latter work, most particularly perhaps in the detailed re-statement of the temporal 
structure of the reformulated Reflex Arc in ‘Chapter 7: Nature, Life and Body-Mind.’ 
One section, spanning pages 256-8, exists not merely as a nuanced statement of 
Dewey’s mature concept of temporality, but also exhibits the deployment of several 
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concepts which provide the foundation for a fruitful link with the concept of tempo-
rality advanced by Gilles Deleuze, and so deserves to be unpacked at length. 
!
5.4. A naturalistic foundation for temporality: Dewey’s concepts 
of sensitivity and susceptibility 
At this point in the analysis, it is informative to recall something of the distinction be-
tween time and temporality: namely, that time might be seen, following Heidegger, as 
derivative of temporality, and as a derivative form of it which is stripped as much as 
possible of its meaningful content. Temporality, in this way, might be seen to consti-
tute a richer, experiential mode of dynamism whereby an imminent process, coordina-
tion or whole organism unfolds or actualizes aspects of its potentiality in interaction 
with its environment.   The crucial terms here are imminent - in that all such process84 -
es always already exhibit a spontaneous and internal organization; and dynamism - in 
that such organization as is exhibited by any process can only realize the full nature of 
its individual capacities through actualizing these potentialities within a wider nested 
field of interrelated processes - what we might term a local ‘environment’ - which 
themselves part of wider nested fields (thus part of a wider environment on a more 
expansive scale). Following our analysis of rhythm (Chapter 2), and Dewey’s related 
remarks in other works (e.g. EN, 110-11, AE, 13-14, 169-70. Cf. Mozur 1991, 328 
onwards), we are entitled to hold that this characterization of temporality applies not 
just to sentient organisms - though it is admitted that Dewey is clear that these consti-
tute the most privileged example (e.g. EN, 253-4, discussed below) - but to all orga-
nized patterns of activity, even down to the sub-atomic level. For, when we remove 
 113
"  Cf. the distinction between ‘temporal quality’ and ‘temporal order’ at EN, 110-11. Also cit84 -
ed and discussed in Chapter 2, below.
our human tendency to attribute a temporal nature only to sentient beings, we find a 
picture of dynamic nature in which a unique temporal career can be detected in pro-
cesses and patterns of organization found at every level, between the fastest vibrations 
of subatomic particles at the micro-level, to the farthest extent of the macro level as it 
is found in the extremely long life cycles of cosmic bodies (DeLanda 2004, 106). 
!
Despite extending the scope of temporality to the historical career of inanimate bod-
ies, however, Dewey does go on to draw a distinction between the latter and animate 
bodies. Thus, while we may say of any organized process - the physico-chemical ac-
tivity of an iron molecule, for example, compared with that of a plant (EN, 253-4) - 
that it displays the capacity, once its inner equilibrium is disturbed, to interact with its 
surroundings such that a cycle of changes is effected, terminating only when equilib-
rium has been restored, there is, for Dewey, nonetheless a difference in the conse-
quences to be observed between the physico-chemical operations in the iron molecule 
and the plant. The difference, in Dewey’s terms, amounts to the capacity for sensitivi-
ty. Thus,  
!
“When ever the activities of the constituent parts of an organized pattern of ac-
tivity are of such a nature as to conduce to the perpetuation of the patterned ac-
tivity, there exists the basis of sensitivity. Each “part” of an organism is itself 
organized, and so of the parts of a part. Hence its selective bias in interactions 
with the environing things is exercised so as to maintain itself, while also main-
taining the whole of which it is a member…” (EN, 253-4: emphasis mine). 
!
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In the case of the plant, the capacity for sensitivity determines that the organized ac-
tivities of the component parts - each forming a component part of a nested whole - 
act in order to maintain the integral system to which they belong: namely, the overall 
organism of the whole plant. In the case of the iron molecule, while organized activity 
subsists, it has no such capacity for sensitivity. That is to say, any interactive activity 
or bias in the service of restoring equilibrium does not include a bias in favor of re-
maining within the system of organization which is integral to iron: ‘it had just as 
soon, so to speak [in its interactions with water], become iron-oxide’ (EN, 254). 
!
Sensitivity, on this interpretation, exhibits the key factors of temporality identified 
between Heidegger and Dewey: (1) the past of the organized pattern of activity is here 
represented by both the facticity of its component parts: that is, by the given materials 
and capacities which are imminent to it, as well as the previous existence of patterns 
of response which are available to for the system to deploy; (2) the future is repre-
sented by the projection of a means-ends structure, or ‘horizon’, which is circum-
scribed and defined by an identifiable organization of activity - itself comprised of the 
variations on the response patterns and modes of reorganization available to it - which 
the entire system is set-up to to maintain beyond the present; and (3) the present is 
defined and qualitatively characterized by the deployment of bias in selecting interac-
tions with the environment which are best suited to the continuation of that same or-
ganization of activity - that is, the present and future maintenance of the unique his-




Both the fully temporal nature of sensitivity, as well as its consequent status as a pre-
condition of experience, is further underlined by its correlate, susceptibility, which is 
defined, in decidedly ‘experiential’ terms as ‘the capacity of feeling’: 
!
“This pervasive operative presence of the whole in the part and of the part in the 
whole constitutes susceptibility - the capacity of feeling - whether or no this 
potentiality be actualized… Responses are not merely selective, but are discrim-
inatory… This discrimination is the essence of sensitivity. Thus with organiza-
tion, bias becomes interest, and satisfaction a good or value and not mere satia-
tion of wants or repletion of deficiencies” (EN, 256 - emphasis mine). 
!
Not only does this once again underline the temporal nature of the organism under 
scrutiny. By now it is easy to appreciate the means-ends structure that susceptibility 
both realizes and makes possible: after all, we saw with the concept of sensitivity, 
above, that such a structure is simultaneously defined by the historically determined 
materials and capacities of the organism, its futural adaptive capacities (which relate 
to Heidegger’s notion of facticity), as well as the materials and potentialities peculiar 
to the environment in which the organism is located (which relates to Heidegger’s no-
tions of ‘thrownness’). But what also emerges here, with susceptibility, for the first 
time is a sense of the structure of the temporal preconditions peculiar to an idea which 





5.5. The temporal preconditions of the educative moment 
Before we analyze the nature of the temporal structure of the educative experience, 
we must briefly describe the process by which susceptibility and sensitivity yield the 
preconditions of educative experience for Dewey. We saw, in our Chapter 4 discus-
sion of growth, how Dewey accepts a possible definition of education as 'the acquisi-
tion of those habits that effect an adjustment of an individual and his 
environment' (DE, 46). From this statement it becomes manifest that the acquisition 
of habits not only sustains an organism's capacity for learning about itself in relation 
to its environment. For in employing a repeated and varied application of the intellec-
tual element, the active operation of habits results in the continued maintenance of the 
capacity for elasticity within an organism's oriented disposition: a flexibility which, in 
increasing the adequacy of our understanding of ourselves in relation to the changing 
environment, not only represents the chief condition of possibility for continued and 
consolidating growth, but also the enlargement and refinement of our sensitivity, itself 
an aspect of our capacity for feeling (i.e. susceptibility). Furthermore, by both enhanc-
ing our understanding of the mutual interrelations between ourselves and our envi-
ronment, and thus our capacity for growth, we thereby gain a more nuanced under-
standing of which patterns of behavior and response to our environment are more 
beneficial, salubrious or effective in relation to any given aim, a process which further 
refines the nuanced nature of our feelings (susceptibility). It is in this way that our 
responses become more ‘discriminatory’, or sensitive (to our own conditions and 
those of the environment); and with refined discrimination comes an increased capaci-
ty to accurately predict the consequences and ends of actions and sequences, thereby 
enabling ourselves, through organized action, to project our preferences for certain 
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results onto the environment, using it as a tool to secure these. It is thus that a previ-
ously gross aspect of feeling or sensitivity - namely, an unreflective ‘bias’ or opaque 
‘preference’ for a state of affairs to occur - evolves into an active interest, or that 
process by which we use our own discriminating and organized agency to secure the 
outcomes which our enhanced capacity for susceptibility leads us to discern to be best 
or most good for us: in short, those outcomes which exist as values. 
!
That this describes the elements which combine to eventually comprise a more con-
scious apprehension of educative endeavor or activity can be seen when Dewey de-
scribes consciousness in detail: 
!
“[E]very situation or field of consciousness is marked by initiation, direction or 
intent, and consequences or import. What is unique is not these traits, but the 
property of awareness or perception. Because of this property, the initial stage is 
capable of being judged in the light of its probable course and consequence. 
There is anticipation. Each successive event being a stage in a serial process is 
both expectant and commemorative. What is more precisely pertinent to our 
present theme, the terminal outcome when anticipated (as it is when a moving 
cause of affairs is perceived) becomes an end-in-view, an aim, purpose, a pre-
diction usable as a plan in shaping the course of events” (EN, 101). !
What is striking, here, is that in addition to describing the coming-to-consciousness of 
an increasing capacity for susceptibility and sensitivity, these elements are also taken-
up into a new and refined conception of perception. Dewey’s notion of perception, as 
he is at pains to show in two complementary sections, between pages 317-327 and 
332-339, of Experience and Nature, is fundamentally different from either the re-
stricted sense of it as purely ‘sense-perception’ (ibid., 332), or the notion that it de-
notes ‘simple original perceptions’ of stimuli (ibid., 335 & 336) or a given ‘original 
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datum’ (ibid., 338). Instead, Dewey’s conception of perception, in line with his analy-
sis of ‘seeing’ (into) within his 1896 Reflex Arc paper (Cf. RCP, 368), conceives of 
perception as a much more active occurrence, one amounting to a thoroughly dynamic 
cognition: 
!
“We are observantly aware (in distinction from inferentially aware) only of 
what has been done; we can perceive what is there, what has happened. By de-
scription, a stimulus is not an object of perception, for stimulus is correlative to 
response, and is undetermined except as response occurs… we are aware of the 
stimuli only in terms of our response to them and of the consequences of this 
response” (EN, 336-7) 
!
Accordingly, when we realize that susceptibility and sensitivity are intimately bound-
up in any act of perception and/or cognition, and, just as 
with stimulus and response in the ‘Reflex Arc’, can only be discerned as discrete fac-
tors retroactively, the status of any putative act of perception becomes irreducibly in-
volved in a much wider bodily event featuring a multitude of interactive ‘integration 
of complex forces’, all of which act together to produce the distinct quality of any 
eventual act of awareness. This much is explicitly confirmed by Dewey when he 
states: 
!
“As a matter of fact there is no such thing as an exclusively peripherally initiated 
nervous event. Internal conditions, those of hunger, blood-circulation, endocrine 
functions, persistences of prior activities, pre-existent opened and blocked neu-
ronic connections, together with a multitude of other intra-organic factors enter 
into the determination of a peripheral occurrence. And after the peripheral exci-
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tation has taken place, its subsequent career is not self-determined, but is affect-
ed by literally everything going on within the organism… A particular excitation 
is but one of an avalanche of contemporaneously occurring excitations, periph-
eral and from proprioceptors; each has to compete with others… what happens 
is an integration of complex forces” (EN, 333-4). !
This statement is of immense significance for our understanding of this expanded 
conception of perception, and the precise way in which perception is expanded in 
scope is hugely informative with regard to our attempts to both link Dewey’s concept 
of temporality with Deleuze’s concept of time. For the fact that Dewey explicitly ren-
ders the initial enactment of an act of perception as co-extensive with retroactively 
defined components such as perception, stimulus and response, sensitivity, suscepti-
bility, emotion, etc.  ; that he integrates the eventual ‘felt quality’ of the act of percep85 -
tion with the integration of complex internal and external forces; and the fact that any 
identifiable act of perception or ‘seeing’ extends into the meaning and value of a se-
lected ‘response’ and its related consequences; renders Dewey’s extended concept of 
perception as compatible with, and perhaps even analogous to, a later pragmatist con-
cept of visual perception developed by James J. Gibson.   86
!
5.6. A further naturalist ground for temporality: DeLanda’s use of the science 
of affordances 
In his section analyzing the concept of time in Deleuze’s philosophy, Manuel DeLan-
da illustrates his point through using a concept derived from the ecological research 
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"  “Immediately, every perceptual awareness may be termed indifferently emotion, sensation, 85
thought, desire: not that it is immediately any one of these things, or all of them combined, 
but that when it is taken in some reference, to conditions or to consequences or to both, it has, 
in that contextual reference, the distinctive properties of emotion, sensation, thought or de-
sire” (EN, 304-5).
"  Gibson, James. J. 1979. The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston MA: 86
Houghton Mifflin Company. Cited in DeLanda 2004, 72-3.
by James Gibson in his work The ecological approach to visual perception. Within 
this work, Gibson, when studying the nature of ecological interactions, was led to de-
velop the concept of affordances. This concept is used to bring out the relational na-
ture of capacities which arise only when two organisms or entities interact, as op-
posed to the properties which are intrinsic to individual entities. An instructive exam-
ple   would be the fact that an area of ground has intrinsic properties which determine 87
how flat or slanted it is, how rigid it is, how convex or concave it is, and so on. Yet to 
exhibit the capacity to afford sufficient support that an animal of a certain mass, with 
certain types of limbs (properties intrinsic to the animal), etc., can successfully walk 
on that piece of ground is not simply another intrinsic property of either the ground or 
the animal. It is, in fact, a capacity which may not be exercised if there are no animals 
within the vicinity of that area of ground. In this way, the capacity for that area of 
ground to support an animal of a certain size and type is relational: it is a capacity an 
individual (area of ground) affords another individual (animal), and is dependent on 
factors such as their relative spatial scales, mass, surface density, and so on.   
!
Affordances, then, as well as being relational capacities dependent upon interaction 
for their realization, are also symmetric.   The symmetry here amounts to the fact that 88
an affordance involves both the capacity to affect, and be affected. Thus, a hole in the 
ground affords a place to hide for an animal fleeing a predator, thereby affecting the 
animal’s current state; but the animal could also dig its own hole in the same area of 
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"  Following DeLanda’s use of Gibson’s example. DeLanda, 72-3, citing Gibson (1979), pp 87
15-16.
"  Following DeLanda’s analysis and examples, ibid., p. 73.88
ground, in doing so affecting the state of the ground itself. To extend this example in 
further illustration of the symmetric nature of affordances, it has also been noted that 
the animal selects to flee the predator on account of the danger afforded by the latter, 
but the latter selects to chase the former on account of the nutrition it affords. 
!
What is significant about the concept of affordances is the fact that, as DeLanda has 
shown (ibid., 110-11), they can be equally informatively applied to temporal condi-
tions as well as spatial ones (such as were demonstrated in the examples of the previ-
ous paragraph). Thus, whereas in the examples of spatially oriented affordances we 
focus on quantities of extension - such as an insect of a certain size, mass and body 
structure being afforded the capacity to walk across the surface of a lake, whereas 
larger mammals cannot be supported by the surface tension of the water - with tempo-
ral affordances we focus instead on the intensive nature of particular timescales char-
acteristic of cyclical oscillations, each located at a particular level of temporal scale 
relative to others, and forming a nested whole (as when we compare the extremely 
short timescales of atomic oscillators, to the intermediate scales of biological oscilla-
tors, and both of these to the longer timescales of geological or stellar dynamics, and 
so on). Indeed, DeLanda goes so far as to move beyond the use of periodic cyclical 
oscillations (circadian clocks, atomic oscillations, etc.) as the sole criteria for identify-
ing characteristic timescales, generalizing the chief criteria of using characteristic 
timescales for non-periodic physical phenomena such as that exhibited by the relax-
ation times of a class of solid material referred to as ‘glasses’. 
!
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Adapting an example comparing glasses to crystalline structures from Arthur Iberall’s 
work, Towards a General Science of Viable Systems  , DeLanda (ibid., 112) shows the 89
value of characteristic timescales to the development of an idea of temporal affor-
dances. In contrast to crystalline structures, glasses do not have a well defined phase 
transition from a liquid state (as when liquid water transitions to solid ice, at tempera-
ture 0 degrees Celsius/32 degrees Fahrenheit at standard atmospheric pressure). In-
stead, glasses behave as if they are ‘arrested liquids’, continuing to exhibit the amor-
phous molecular arrangement of liquid, but flowing much slower than would be char-
acteristic of a liquid. Following DeLanda (ibid.), the distinction between the liquid 
and glass states might be drawn in terms of relaxation times, which are relatively 
short for liquids and relatively long for glasses.   90
!
The crucial point to be drawn from DeLanda’s use and explication of these illustra-
tions is this: 
!
“Iberall argues that whether a particular body appears solid or liquid to a given 
observer will depend on the ratio between relaxation and observational 
timescales, in the sense that for sufficiently long observational times the glass 
will appear to the observer as a flowing liquid… we can let the liquid and glass 
interact with each other and speak of how solid the glass “appears” to the liquid, 
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!  Iberall, Arthur. S. 1972. Towards a general science of viable systems. New York: McGraw-89
Hill.
"  To aid the reader in understanding this term, DeLanda gives the following as an illustration 90
of relaxation time: “the time taken by a radio transmitter to settle into a stable periodic state 
after being turned on, what engineers refer to as “transient behavior”. These transients occur 
in many phenomena and in each case they display a characteristic time scale. In state-space 
terminology this can be explained as follows… [A]ll trajectories within a particular basin of 
attraction will be deterministically drawn to the attractor. Once there they may be temporarily 
dislodged from the attractor by an external shock but as long as the shock is not intense 
enough to expel them from the basin, they will return to the attractor. In this case, the time 
taken for the trajectory to return to its attractor is its relaxation time.” DeLanda, 111-12.
and vice versa. The glass, given its long relaxation time scale relative to the 
scale of interaction with the liquid, will behave as a solid, affording the liquid, 
for instance, an obstacle to its flow, or affording it a channel in which to flow. 
The flowing liquid, in turn, will afford erosion to the glass. In short, what capac-
ities the glass has to affect and be affected by the liquid will depend on their rel-
ative time scales, the characteristic durations of their relaxation to 
equilibrium.” (DeLanda 2004, 112) !
To render the import of this in anthropomorphic terms: too many of our assumptions 
about time and temporality rely on an uncritical acceptance of the timescale most nat-
ural to us, namely that determined by the capacities and structure of human perception 
as it relates to the aspects of our environment most salient to our continued survival. 
Just as the school student studying the ant Polyrhachis sokolova intuitively under-
stands that the insect, because it can walk across the surface of a lake, whereas we 
continuously break the surface of the water, must be markedly different from us, we 
ought to be more cognizant of the differences manifest in temporality. The full impli-
cations of our scientific knowledge being used to show that at every level of our envi-
ronment - universe, even - there are timescales which are relatively shorter or longer, 
and in being so, exhibit salient features in strikingly different fashion, are not fol-
lowed to their conclusion. Yes, within the same science class, the teacher may illus-
trate a point about solids and molecules with the striking example that if someone 
leans with his finger long enough on the seemingly solid wooden desk or glass of the 
window, his finger will eventually merge with the wood or the glass in the process of 
passing through. Yes, too, in a geography class we will learn that we cannot, given the 
characteristics of our human timescale, observe a glacier moving forward in ‘real’ 
time, nor the continents merging or moving apart. But the extension of that viewpoint, 
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which we have here had demonstrated via reference to DeLanda’s text, is often not 
pursued, though it equally be part of our scientific knowledge. 
!
5.7. Susceptibility as indicative of educative temporality 
For the scope of educative temporality to become fully explicit requires us to analyze 
the application of susceptibility on two levels: that of the individual organism, and 
that of the organism within increasing wider spatial scales. With regard to the individ-
ual organism, the concept highlights the manner in which organisms are comprised of 
material, chemical and energetic systems and processes, which span the range from 
discrete items at the molecular and cellular level, through the chemico-material neuro-
logical structures of the brain, to the obviously visible structures of organs, limbs, 
muscles, and so on. As Dewey highlights with his phrase evoking the ‘pervasive oper-
ative presence of the whole in the part and of the part in the whole’, each discrete 
structure or system is irreducibly intervolved with others, coming to exhibit nested 
layers of organization, all of which are eventually interrelated within the wider holis-
tic sphere of the external layer and surface environs of the bodily organism. 
!
When the scope of susceptibility is continuously expanded beyond the level of the in-
dividual organism to take in what one might somewhat artificially delineate as in-
creasingly expansive and incremental spatial scales (from the individual, to the level 
of distinct reproductive community, to ecosystem and then particular species, and so 
on, all the way up to the boundless expanse of the chartable universe) on the one 
hand, and the increasingly large social ’layers’ which interrelate these (progressing, 
for instance, from the level of the family, to an organization such as their local school, 
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to the geographically bounded municipal structure of the surrounding village…na-
tion… continent… planet), on the other, we begin to discern, as related to the compo-
nent parts of each of these systems, processes, scales and layers, a nested set of cycles 
which define their temporal scope. Thus, applying susceptibility to the individual or-
ganism, we can find a spectrum of nested temporal cycles spanning from (as we have 
seen) the distinct cyclic sequence of oscillation characteristic of the fastest vibrations 
of subatomic particles, to the oscillation cycle of cells dying off and being replaced, 
the rhythmic oscillations of breathing or walking, or the increasingly longer oscilla-
tions of the sleep-wake cycle (the ‘internal clock’), various monthly or yearly cycles, 
or the length of the cycle required to achieve sexual maturity (DeLanda 2004, 106-8). 
Expanding beyond the individual organism, we might identify the various daily, 
weekly, monthly, yearly oscillations of the planets, of the earthly seasons, of the social 
festivals linked to these, of the family reaching maturity and dying away, or the intri-
cate system of the predetermined temporality at any and every stage or level of the 
school year.  
!
Thankfully, both Dewey’s appreciation of temporality, and Deleuze’s work on time, 
mean that the full ramifications of the viewpoint that temporality exhibits a relative 
spectrum of temporal scales have not been lost on either thinker, nor, too, their read-
ers. In fact, the full ramifications of the existence of a multitude of different, nested 
levels of timescales, each differentiated according to the characteristic cyclical oscil-
lations or relaxation times, are explicitly identified by Deleuze: 
!
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“In other words, whatever is future or past in relation to a certain present (a cer-
tain extension or duration) belongs to a more vast present which has a greater 
extension or duration. There is always a more vast present which absorbs the 
past and the future. Thus, the relativity of past and future with respect to the 
present entails a relativity of the presents themselves in relation to each other. 
(Deleuze, cited in DeLanda 2004, 110).” !
As with Deleuze, so with Dewey: 
“Empirical confirmation of this conception of consciousness is found in the ex-
treme instability of every perceived object; the impossibility of excluding rapid 
and subtle change… Perceived changes are those which require a redirection of 
adaptive behavior. A prior adaptation constitutes a threshold (better called a plat-
form or plateau); what is consciously noted is alteration of one plateau; re-ad-
justment to another. Similar events may mean cold at one time or place and 
warmth at another, depending on the direction of organic re-
adaption.” (EN, 313). !
With his remarks about the ‘instability’ perceived objects, Dewey can be read as high-
lighting that individual objects are comprised of those very component oscillations, 
systems and flows we have explored in DeLanda’s work. Indeed, as we saw when we 
considered Dewey’s concept of susceptibility in the previous section, Dewey is quite 
explicit that organisms are comprised of interrelated, but distinct, component parts, 
each existing in a nested set spanning from the full bodily organism, down to the os-
cillations at a cellular level. Furthermore, with his statement that we cannot exclude 
‘rapid’ and ‘subtle’ change, we can interpret him as bringing to attention the fact that 
the timescale for remarking change at the level of human perception is merely one 
level of perception among a multitude of others. As we have seen, within the human 
timescale, the oscillations at molecular level are known to occur, but they are too fast 
for us to perceive; just as the movements of glaciers and continents, the changes of 
solid objects and surfaces, are too slow for us to notice. 
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But that these faster or longer timescales are not just incorporated within our experi-
ence of temporality, that they in fact effect our experience and our overt behavior, is 
something Dewey does not merely point out: he, in fact, incorporates it as a central 
component of his overall view of how education occurs. Thus, with respect to the 
process of habit-formation - which, as we saw in Chapter 4.6, is an essential aspect of 
any educative process - Dewey explains how the affairs of faster organic timescales, 
as well as the longer geologic or stellar timescales, are nonetheless contained in, and 
effective for, our own present experience:   
!
“We find also in all these higher organisms that what is done is conditioned by 
consequences of prior activities; we find the fact of learning or habit-formation. 
In consequence, an organism acts with reference to a time-spread, a serial order 
of events, as a unit, just as it does in reference to a unified spatial variety. Thus 
an environment both extensive and enduring is immediately implicated in 
present behavior. Operatively speaking, the remote and the past are “in” behav-
ior making it what it is. The action called “organic” is not just that of internal 
structures; it is an integration of organic-environmental connections. It may be a 
mystery that there should be thinking but it is no mystery that if there is think-
ing it should contain in a “present” phase, affairs remote in space and in time, 
even to geologic ages, future eclipses and far away stellar systems. It is only a 
question of how far what is “in” its actual experience is extricated and becomes 
focal” (EN, 279-80). !
It is here that we are reminded of the full scope of Dewey’s concept of temporality, 
especially the manner in which, through his concept of rhythm (analyzed in Chapter 
4.5), it exists as not only the form   and manifestation of the varied instantiations of 91
energy which constitute the full totality of existence (Being), but also that it defines 
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!  E.g. “I emphasized the dependence of this final work [of art] upon the existence of rhythms 91
in nature; as I pointed out, they are the conditions of form in experience and hence of expres-
sion.” (AE, 169.)
(1) the form of existence at the micro level, or that which is strictly beyond the scope 
of consciousness (e.g. AE, 13-14. Cf. Mozur 1991, 328 onwards); and also (2) defines 
the form of any historical career or manner of existence (e.g. AE, 14; cf. Calore 1989, 
19 & 22). In this way, Dewey can be considered to have shown how temporality can 
be considered the basis for experience per se, and thus becomes a foundational con-
cept in relation to the naturalistic investigation of experience and nature, particularly 
as it regards the notion of human experience, including those aspects of inquiry, un-
derstanding and learning.  
!
In this respect, Dewey’s concept of temporality, in functioning as the central, structur-
al precondition for the possibility of experience, is fully in accord with Deleuze’s 
conception of the synthesizing nature of time. For Deleuze, 
!
“Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the repeti-
tion of instants. This synthesis contracts the successive independent instants into 
one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present. It is in this present 
that time is deployed. To it belong both the past and the future: the past in so far 
as the preceding instants are retained in the contraction; the future because its 
expectation is anticipated in this same contraction. The past and the future do 
not designate instants distinct from a supposed present instant, but rather the 
dimensions of the present itself in so far as it is a contraction of instants. (DR, 
70-71) !
The ‘instants’ mentioned are, as we saw in DeLanda’s explication of Deleuze, the dis-
tinctive temporal scales which define the lived present of any given ‘individual’ - that 
is, any component part of an organism, where it functions as part of an overall 
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whole.   With each timescale being contracted and synthesized as part of a wider one, 92
this explains how the multiple levels and layers of time present within any organism 
come to directly inform the tenor and quality of any given experience. Thus ‘temporal 
quality’ in Dewey’s terms, is the immediate product of, in Deleuze’s words, the syn-
thesis of these many instants, which comes to constitute the ‘living present’. Just as, 
with Dewey, the reflex arc is not made up of individual segments, stimulus and re-
sponse, past and future, but is a unifying process; so with Deleuze the past and future 
are retained within the present, not beyond it. Furthermore, we saw how, with Dewey, 
the reflex arc circuit proceeds in a nonlinear manner, wherein the designated ‘last’ 
phase of the circuit (the burn sensation), represents the ‘completion’ or ‘fulfillment’ of 
the opening stage (RCP, 359). Thus the final stage not only ‘reacts into’ the opening 
stage, but comes to reconstitute its sense, meaning and value such that an incidence of 
‘learning’ occurs (RCP, 359). This much is directly affirmed by Deleuze’s statement 
that the past (‘the preceding instants’) are ‘retained’ in the present contraction; while 
his view that the future features in the present in the form of ‘expectation’ and antici-
pation is wholly in accord with Dewey’s (future-oriented) concepts of ‘anticipation’ 
and ‘expectation’ (RCP, 368. Cf. fn. 60, p. 36, below). Accordingly, for both Dewey 
and Deleuze, past and the future do not designate instants distinct from any putative 
‘present’ instant, but are rather dimensions of the present contraction, or circuit, itself. 
!
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"  “[T]he objective reality of affordances with respect to temporal scales makes them the ideal 92
candidate to define the lived present of a particular individual, that is, what the individual 
‘perceives’ within its own time scale as the relevant capacities of the other individuals inter-
acting with it… material and energetic processes give time its metric and measurable form by 
their possession of a characteristic time scale, specified through either relaxation times… or 
intrinsic period of nonlinear oscillations… at any one of these embedded timescales the 
present is cyclical, measures the movement of bodies and depends on the matter that limits it 
and fills it out “(DeLanda 112-13).
A final convergence of great import can be noted when Deleuze speaks of the ‘direc-
tion’ of the arrow of time within the present: 
!
“The present does not have to go outside itself in order to pass from past to fu-
ture. Rather, the living present goes from the past to the future which it consti-
tutes in time, which is to say also from the particular to the general: from the 
particulars which it envelops by contraction to the general which it develops in 
the field of its expectation (the difference produced in the mind is generality it-
self in so far as it forms a living rule for the future). In any case, this synthesis 
must be given a name: passive synthesis. Although it is constitutive, it is not, for 
all that, active. It is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in the mind which 
contemplates, prior to all memory and reflection.” (DR, 71) !
It is striking, here, that by explicitly stating that the present proceeds to the future by 
way of the past (as we saw in Chapter 3), Deleuze puts himself in full accord with the 
structure of the reflex circuit as explained by Dewey. We saw, in Chapter 4.7, how the 
reflex circuit not only proceeds in a nonlinear manner, but specifically that the desig-
nated ‘last’ phase of the circuit (the burn sensation), represents the ‘completion’ or 
‘fulfillment’ of the opening stage (RCP, 359). Thus the final stage not only 
‘reacts into’ the opening stage (that is, reacts into the past), but the plays a crucial role 
in reconstitute its sense, meaning and value such that an incidence of ‘learning’ occurs 
(RCP, 359). 
!
Finally, through his characterization of ‘rhythm’ as the form and manifestation of var-
ied instantiations of energy, we are enabled to locate a full point of convergence be-
tween the concept of rhythm, and the scientific concept of ‘oscillations’ which has 
been central to DeLanda’s explication of Deleuze’s philosophy of time, and his 
grounding of that philosophy in contemporary scientific thought. 
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5.8. A fully temporal model of the educative moment 
The model of temporality discernible within the text of Democracy and Education has 
its genesis in the physiological and biological researches of Dewey’s early period, and 
seeks to move away from the Kantian model of time as an a priori schema of under-
standing that necessarily divorces us from the unknowable noumena of things-in-
themselves towards a naturalist philosophy of experience.   Applying to the concept 93
of interest the structure of the model of experience based on the sensori-motor func-
tioning outlined in his 1896 paper The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology, we can pro-
vide the basis for Dewey’s 'projective' and experimental   temporal model wherein the 94
emphasis is directed towards the future via a temporal arc.  
!
As does the corresponding sensori-motor model, so the temporal arc will be seen to be 
an organic and fundamental psychic unity which, with each aspect reciprocally deter-
minative in relation to the other aspects, is able to undercut the dualisms of sensation 
and idea, stimulus and response, body and mind, memory and perception, perception 
and projection. Here, rather than see activity as beginning with the sequence of 
present perception as a reaction to a stimulus set, each factor existing as something 
discrete and adequate to itself, we find that the real point of departure is an overall, 
perhaps even holistic, dimension of time, which does not divide itself into the parts 
past-present-future; which, similarly, does not have a unidirectional flow of causal 
influence, but which bears within itself the conditions for different emphases of di-
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"  See Helm 1985, 300-303 for details of this evolution.93
"  Following Helm, ibid., p. 304.94
mensionality.   Thus the past is not divided or counted as discrete from either the 95
present or the future, and neither can this be said of any of these temporal dimensions 
in relation to one another. Nor is the present 'now' an isolable site of experience, po-
tentially complete within itself, which operates as the sectional link within a linear 
sequence of past-present-future segments of time. Rather, deriving from an organic 
percepto-projective co-ordination  , the initial stage of temporalization is with the act 96
of projection, wherein the presently perceived environment is interpreted and deter-
mined within cognition as the facilitator of a specific future aim, or aim in general, in 
relation to the projected and projecting interest(s) of the self. The process of percep-
tion as it is informed by a contemporaneous process of interested projection both in-
hibits and excites the selection of certain responses towards consummation of the in-
terest or aim, thereby creating a reciprocal circuit of influence.  
!
Yet such interested projection-perception, and by extension, the circuit of influence, is 
always already mediated by the applied content and influence of prior experience (the 
past), both as determinative of procedures of selection and control, but also as the 
ground for discerning a particular source of interest, not to mention the entire possi-
bility of the successful process of interest projection in general. Thus, the present 
moment, in being entirely constituted by the dynamic and continuous co-ordination of 
the temporal arc, is continuously enlarged and transformed by the co-existent and co-
determinative emphases/influences of the past, present and future dimensions. Indeed, 
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"  Contradistinguishable from the unidirectional flow of causality.95
"  Following the distinctive usage of this word throughout Dewey’s ‘The Reflex Arc Concept 96
in Psychology’. Contained in John Dewey: The Early Works, 1882-1898 (Volume 5: 
1895-1898). London: Southern Illinois University Press (1972), pp 96-109.
taking any putative aim to be fulfilled, and the resultant phase of consummation 
comes to inform the quality and value of the initial projection-perception as this re-
lates to memory, thereby informing the whole of that particular temporal arc with the 
quality of an informative experience which, in being an instantiation of learning, ren-
ders it a viable influence on the temporalization of separate temporalizing arcs (both 
actualized and potential).    97
!
That the present temporal arc should form a continuous circuit including past and fu-
tural emphases as part of an organic whole is much confirmed when Dewey writes: 
!
“We find also in all these higher organisms that what is done is conditioned by 
consequences of prior activities; we find the fact of learning or habit-formation. 
In consequence, an organism acts with reference to a time-spread, a serial order 
of events, as a unit, just as it does in reference to a unified spatial variety. Thus 
an environment both extensive and enduring is immediately implicated in 
present behavior. Operatively speaking, the remote and the past are “in” behav-
ior making it what it is. The action called “organic” is not just that or internal 
structures; it is an integration of organic-environmental connections. It may be a 
mystery that there should be thinking but it is no mystery that if there is think-
ing it should contain in a “present” phase, affairs remote in space and in time, 
even to geologic ages, future eclipses and far away stellar systems. It is only a 
question of how far what is “in” its actual experience is extricated and becomes 
focal” (EN, 279-80). !
In this way, what is traditionally conceived of as the present 'now', is, on Dewey's 
model: a location in space upon which is situated an organized center of temporaliz-
ing arcs; each projecting into the environment via an immediate act of investment; 
each proceeding to fulfillment/disintegration at its own rate and rhythm of temporal-
ization; and each constituted by its transformative circuits of interest which are them-
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selves constituted by differing emphases on the temporal dimensions (past-present-
future) of dynamic experience. The futural emphasis of interest necessarily must con-
tain at least an element of openness to the environment, that process in which we 
adapt to any new information, patterns, or points of interest. The past emphasis of in-
terest, by contrast, must contain at least an element of selectivity, or that process by 
which we select for current application the most prudent sequence or item of learned 
or instinctive behavior through which similar or related situations were effectively 
dealt with in the past.  
!
It is not necessarily the case that the aforementioned process which comprise these 
temporal arcs should become conscious, or even register as a specific factor in a cur-
rent sense of awareness (though they have the capacity to do so). Instead, they are 
what, following Heidegger, we might call ‘circumspect’, and thus remain fully within 
the sphere of the preconditions which are required in order for consciousness of expe-
rience to become possible. 
!
Part II: Practice !
5.9. Dewey’s concept of temporality: Applications to educational thought and 
practice !
It has been established in our section on ‘theory’, above, that temporality exists as a 
crucial factor influencing the structure of the preconditions required for experience to 
be possible. That this has important ramifications for the day-to-day practice of edu-
cation within school classrooms will be explored within this section, with items of 
relevant, current research mentioned when appropriate. 
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The main narrative for this section on practice is provided by two important articles 
which consider the status of time and temporality within education as it is practiced 
within the West. Those articles are Duane Huebner’s “Curriculum as concern for 
man's temporality” (1967), and Patrick Slattery’s “A postmodern vision of time and 
learning: A response to the National Education Commission Report Prisoners of 
Time.” Within this latter work, Slattery explains how contemporary education practice 
regards time as a variable which is to be ‘controlled, managed, and 
manipulated’ (PVT, 612), an assumption which is based upon the modernist concep-
tion of time as being something which is segmented or divided into interchangeable 
units of measurement (seconds, minutes, hours, etc.), and which proceeds in a linear 
fashion. The nature of this assumption is then extended to work in schools where, 
what is essentially a highly complex system, is segmented into isolated parts (school 
buildings, people, curriculum), which are then divided into ‘coherent’ and ‘cohesive’ 
systems (grade levels, subject disciplines), and measured in quantitative fashion, and 
without apparent ‘contamination’ (ibid.). The results of studying these various isolated 
parts, once generated, are assumed to be generalizable, and thereby applicable to any 
educational context in the purpose of ensuring ‘steady progress’ and ‘sequential de-
velopment over time throughout the entire system’ (ibid.).  
!
The consequence of this approach, as Slattery notes, are twofold: the first conse-
quence being that educational administrators, systems and forms of government have 
placed an ‘exaggerated’ emphasis on the manipulation of time as a discrete factor 
within educational situations (ibid.); the second being that research designed to ma-
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nipulate time as ‘an isolated, independent and quantifiable variable’ is based upon the 
misguided assumption, stemming from the Newtonian concept of time, that the uni-
verse was created in time and space, as opposed to the fact that time is in fact ‘woven 
into the essence of the cosmos’ (PVT, 613). 
!
In developing his critique of the assumptions underlying the current view and ‘use’ of 
time within school settings, Slattery explicitly positions his work as being in full ac-
cord with the earlier work of Duane Huebner, who in his 1967 article, developed a 
comprehensive critique of the way in which time and temporality are viewed in cur-
riculum planning and construction. Detailing the paucity of the prevailing view of 
temporality within both curriculum theory and school-based planning, Huebner 
sought instead to develop an alternative view of temporality, based on the work of 
Martin Heidegger in Being and Time, which would be much more germane and re-
sponsive to the potentiality inherent within each student, and the growth of their 
learning capacities within educational settings. 
!
Slattery and Huebner are both heavily critical of the educational focus on ‘goals’, and, 
within the present-day classroom, the teacher’s need to clearly state the ‘aims’ and 
learning goals/outcomes for each lesson. Such a focus on goals is ‘fanciful’ and ‘idle’, 
according to Slattery, because it attempts to remove educators from the challenges and 
real difficulties of living historically, particularly with regard to paying attention to 




“It has almost been assumed that if the educator can clearly specify his goals, then he 
has fulfilled his responsibility as an historical being. But historical responsibility is 
much too complex to be so easily dismissed” (Huebner 1967, 239. Cited in PVT, 
613.).” 
!
In ignoring the complex temporal reality of living as an historical being, the use by 
educators of a modern concept of time instead has a negative impact on the human 
psyche, a fact which is comprehensively ignored within the construction of contempo-
rary research studies intended to solve complex educational problems and dilemmas 
(PVT, 614). This negative impact is further compounded by the continuing develop-
ment and reliance on technology and rationalized organizational structures which are 
supposed to reallocate time more ‘efficiently’, an approach to time and teaching in 
which time becomes characterized as a ‘restraint’, rather than a positive factor in the 
developmental processes of growth and learning (ibid.). One of the most pervasive, 
and misguided, assumptions underlying this unsatisfactory use of time is the idea that 
time, like space, is a ‘one-size-fits-all’ component, which affects and is experienced 
by individuals in an identical manner, and which can be divided up into uniform seg-
ments, arranged in a sequential and linear fashion.  
!
It is this latter assumption which, according to Slattery, is one of the chief motivations 
behind the report, issued by the National Commission on Time and Learning, 
entitled Prisoners of Time (US Government Printing Office, 1994). This report issues 
a challenge to educators to ‘fix the design flaw in the way schools are organized, as 
well as the way time is allocated for academic purposes’ (PVT, 615). The Report goes 
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on to suggest that educators utilize time in ‘new and better ways’, explicitly stating 
that: 
!
 “We recommend that state and local boards work with schools to redesign education 
so that time becomes a factor supporting learning, not a boundary marking its 
limits” (Prisoners of Time, p. 31. Cited in PVT, 615). 
!
But that time is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ component of the educational process, and that 
it does not effect students and teachers in an identical or equal manner, is attested to, 
not just by Dewey’s concept of temporality, or Slattery and Huebner’s work, but by 
several important findings in contemporary psychology and neuroscience research. 
Responding to the pioneering work on children’s conception of time by Piaget (1969), 
in Sylvie Droit-Volet and Pierre S. Zélanti’s study ‘Development of Time Sensitivity 
and Information Processing Speed’ (2013), the researchers examined whether “age-
related changes in the speed of information processing could be determined as the 
best predictors of the observed increase in sensitivity to time throughout childhood.  ” 98
They selected study participants who ranged from children aged 5 and 8 years old, to 
adults, each of whom were given two ‘temporal bisection tasks’, one with short 
(0.5/1-s) and the other with longer (4/8-s) anchor durations. In addition to this, the 
participants’ scores on different neuropsychological tests assessing both information 
processing speed and other dimensions of cognitive control (short-term memory, 
working memory, selective attention) were calculated. The results determined that: 
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"  Droit-Volet, Sylvie, and Zélanti Pierre S. 2013. “Development of Time Sensitivity and In98 -
formation Processing Speed.” PLoS ONE 8(8): e71424. 
doi: 10. 1371/journal. Pone.0071424. Quoted parts are from the ‘Abstract’.
!
 “[T]he best predictor of individual variances in sensitivity to time was information 
processing speed, although working memory also accounted for some of the individ-
ual differences in time sensitivity, albeit to a lesser extent. In sum, the faster the in-
formation processing speed of the participants, the higher their sensitivity to time was. 
These results are discussed in the light of the idea that the development of temporal 
capacities has its roots in the maturation of the dynamic functioning of the brain. 
(Droit-Volet and Zélanti 2013, ‘Abstract.’)” 
!
The results of this study, then, demonstrate two crucial facts about temporality, that is: 
the lived, historical experience of temporal passage. First, that (1) as the authors state 
it, the “the encoding and judgment of time are inherent to the dynamic functioning of 
the brain.” But what follows from this is the fact (2) that, if - as the study purports to 
show - “the faster information processing is, the more sensitive subjects would be to 
time” (ibid., page 3), then it also follows that depending on the individual dynamic 
structure of their brain, not just different individuals, but children, adolescents and 
adults of different ages, each will display differing levels of sensitivity to time. That is 
to say that, different individuals, at different age levels, will experience duration in 
different ways. Thus, the temporality of a five minute task for an educator, teaching to 
the predetermined aims of the lesson, and the goals of the curriculum, will be very 
different to that of the student undertaking the task. The lived quality of that duration 
will also differ in marked ways between students, according to the way in which past 




That this circumstance should have a profound and direct effect on the very nature of 
learning and education is not surprising. Indeed, if we consider the general notion of 
‘intelligence’, deemed as a factor central to the capacity to learn - with learning itself 
regarded as central to the process of education - then that, too, exhibits close and ir-
reducible links to temporal experience. As Droit-Volet and Zélanti go on to observe, 
Rammsayer and colleagues, who obtained similar findings on temporal sensitivity in 
human adults, hypothesized ‘‘a temporal resolution power’’ and suggested that “the 
capacity for temporal accuracy would be a major predictor of general intelligence 
(factor g)” (ibid., page 7 ‘Discussion.’). As the latter group of authors argue, in lan-
guage that links directly to our analysis of Dewey’s concept of rhythm as the structur-
al form of temporality, as well as the grounding role of oscillations in determining 
temporal scale in DeLanda’s work:  “the degree of temporal resolution would be an 
indicator of the dynamic physiological activity of our brains: A higher rate of neuronal 
oscillation should bring about faster and more efficient information processing and a 
higher level of temporal resolution” (ibid.). 
!
Furthermore, the fact that temporality is not experienced in a uniform manner among 
individuals of differing ages is one finding which undercuts the modernist notion of 
time as possessing a unitary nature. That time is, as with Dewey’s concept of tempo-
rality, neither unitary nor linear is further attested to by the existence of ‘illusions in 
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time distortion.’ Thus, in their article Perceiving the Passage of Time: Neural Possi-
bilities  , Muller and Nobre discuss how: 99
!
“[I]t has been demonstrated that, even within the visual modality, temporal perception 
of different events can be differentially distorted. For example, maintaining gaze on a 
moving stimulus in one portion of the visual field reduces the apparent duration of 
stimuli subsequently presented to that location, but not to other locations. Therefore, 
temporal perception in any given spatial region of the visual field is at least partly in-
dependent of temporal perception in other regions––again incompatible with a com-
mon, centralized representation of time in the brain… Additional profound illusions 
come from studies investigating the perceived duration between one’s action and its 
inferred effect. When individuals are asked to press a button to “cause” a tone, the 
estimated perceived time between the button press and the tone is reliably shorter than 
the actual time.”   100!
The existence of such temporal illusions as shown in the above named studies is 
clearly incompatible with the modernist notion that our perception of events proceeds 
in a linear fashion, and does much to attest to the non-linear nature of the model of 
temporality found the work of Dewey and Deleuze. Indeed, it goes some way to 
demonstrating that Dewey was both accurate and prescient in his statement, in the  
reformulated sense of the reflex circuit, that the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the notions of 
‘stimulus’ and ‘response’ are only determined retroactively (RCP, 359, 365 & 370). 
!
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"  Muller, Timothy, and Nobre, Anna C. 2014. “Flow of Time: Perceiving the passage of time: 99
neural possibilities.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1326(1): 60-71. doi: 
10.1111/nyas. 12545
"  Ibid., page 61. 100
Comprehensive proof of the very real sense in which temporality is irreducibly inter-
woven into the subjective quality of the experience of a dynamic, historical being is 
provided by a study which discusses the time-emotion paradox in psychology.   101
In the article, Droit-Volet and Gil show that, despite the fact that humans possess the 
capacity to accurately estimate time – as if we possess a specific mechanism that al-
lows us to measure time (such as an internal clock) – human representations of time 
are, as was shown in Muller and Nobre’s study, nonetheless easily distorted by con-
text. Indeed, the human sense of time is heavily dependent on both an ‘intrinsic con-
text’ – something which is partly determined by our identifiable emotional state – and 
on ‘extrinsic context’, which Droit-Volet and Gil describe as “the rhythm of others' 
activity”  . The authors go on to cite existing studies on the relationships between 102
time and emotion which suggest that such contextual variations in subjective time “do 
not result from the incorrect functioning of the internal clock but rather from the ex-
cellent ability of the internal clock to adapt to events in one's environment.”   Their 103
conclusion directly supports both Huebner and Slattery’s attempts to move education-
al thinking away from a modernist, linear conception of time, replacing it with a much 




"  Droit-Volet, S., and Gil, S. 2009. “The time–emotion paradox.” Philosophical Transac101 -
tions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1525), 1943–1953. doi:10.1098/rstb.
2009.0013
"  Ibid., ‘Abstract.’102
"  Ibid.103
“[T]he fact that we live and move in time and that everything, every act, takes more 
or less time has often been neglected. Thus, there is no unique, homogeneous time but 
instead multiple experiences of time. Our subjective temporal distortions directly re-
flect the way our brain and body adapt to these multiple time scales.” (Droit-Volet and 
Gil 2009, ‘Conclusion.’) 
!
Not only does this expose the experiential, historical and subjective nature of tempo-
ral experience, it also recalls DeLanda’s use of Deleuze’s philosophy to develop a 
concept of time exhibiting multiple timescales, each dependent on the nature of the 
oscillations peculiar to each component of an organism, something we saw echoed in 
Dewey’s developments of the concepts of sensitivity and susceptibility. That the latter 
two concepts have been shown to feature as a key structural aspect for the precondi-
tions of subjective experience in a very real way underlines the fact that Dewey’s 
concept of temporality is one which is fully compatible with the science behind our 
emerging understanding of how we think, feel and learn. That the concepts of sensi-
tivity and susceptibility should play a key role in the preconditions of educative expe-
rience, is one validation of Dewey’s educational philosophy. That those two concepts 
should also provide the means by which that educative experience can be seen to be 
thoroughly temporal, and in accordance with the model of temporality that features in 
Dewey’s work, is surely a vindication not just of the concept of temporality developed 
by Dewey, as well as the wider theory of education of which it is a central part. 
  
The implications for educative practice which arise from the structure of Dewey’s 
model of temporality are stated effectively and succinctly by Slattery: 
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“[E]ducators and researchers envision reality as linear when they conceive of time as 
an independent variable to be manipulated to improve educational outcomes, for ex-
ample, within quantitative studies examining timed tests, contact minutes, or time on 
task in the classroom that purport to demonstrate the educational effectiveness and 
efficiency of specific treatments and methodologies. Postmodernism challenges this 
assumption and argues that our very understanding of time must first change before 
the stress of time constraints can be ameliorated and the educational process will be-
come meaningful and consequential in the lives of teachers and students…” (PVT, 
618). !
The postmodernist vision of educational time developed by Slattery, and the post-
modern view requiring curriculum theory to become based on a conception of tempo-
rality developed by Heidegger, have done much to suggest the ways in which the edu-
cational process can be made more meaningful and satisfying - especially should it 
recognize the insight, embodied in the work of each of the philosophers studied in this 
thesis, that it is the nature of temporality to provide a form and structure to experience 
that operates not as a boundary, but as an essentially productive and constructive 
function, and one which underlies any sense in which the new can be produced, or an 
act of learning occur. But the nature and outline of that postmodernist view of time 
was already present in Dewey’s 1896 Reflex Arc paper – a view which Dewey went 
on to establish on a fully temporalized basis in his later work, and a view which exists 
as the precursor to both the science and the educational theory which has been out-
lined in this closing section of the thesis.  
!
Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that, contrary to present scholarship on the mat-
ter, a nuanced and sophisticated concept of temporality, and one fully in accord with 
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that exhibited in his later work, can be discerned in Dewey’s early work, particularly 
his Reflex Arc paper (1896) and Democracy and Education (1916). This was demon-
strated with a close reading of Dewey’s Reflex Arc essay in Chapter 4.7, and also by 
the reformulated concept of temporality, read into Democracy and Education, pre-
sented in Chapter 5. In the course of analyzing Dewey’s concept of temporality, we 
have been led to note the fully naturalistic foundations of his philosophy, foundations 
which enable us to ground the concept of temporality on both the scientific thought of 
his own time, as well as current scientific research being produced today. Further-
more, in exploring these naturalist foundations, we have been able to discern telling 
links and parallels between Dewey’s work on temporality, and the work on time and 
temporality produced by the philosopher Gilles Deleuze, and also, through Deleuze’s 
reading of him, Henri Bergson. In drawing out these links and parallels, we have been 
able to show that Dewey’s early concept of temporality represents a sophisticated and 
innovative contribution to the field of philosophy of temporality - a field which, draw-
ing on the point of departure provided by Immanuel Kant’s work on the concept of 
time, was established in full by the phenomenological project of Martin Heidegger, 
particularly as it is found in Being and Time. In being based upon such naturalistic 
foundations, the full scope of Dewey’s concept of temporality thereby represents an 
ongoing opportunity through which his work can be brought in line with current psy-
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